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This study provides an original quantitative and
qualitative analysis of the corporate governance of
local and regional non-commercial public service
bodies in Ireland. In so doing, it represents part of a
wider research programme on Irish public sector
bodies under the auspices of the Committee for
Public Management Research (CPMR)1. As noted in
the CPMR Research Report on Non-Commercial
National Agencies2, the definition of public bodies
must be one that is not self-selecting and that can
facilitate international comparison. Therefore, as
before, the working definition of a public service
body is an organisation that has the following
characteristics,
● It is structurally differentiated from other
organisations.
● It has some capacity for autonomous decision
making.
● It has some expectation of continuity over time.
● It performs some public function.
● It has some personnel.
● It has some financial resources.
As with the study of national non-commercial
bodies, public organisations operating at local and
regional level were invited to complete a survey
questionnaire in order to assess their autonomy and
accountability. This questionnaire was developed
in partnership with the Instituut voor de Overheid
of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Through the
COBRA (Comparative public organisation data Base
for Research and Analysis3) research network,
studies of public sector bodies have been
undertaken in Flanders (Belgium) and Norway, and
progress is underway in Italy, Germany and the
Netherlands to conduct similar analyses. 
The Irish questionnaire was pilot-tested in the
Institute of Public Adminsitraton and a small
number of public service bodies covered by the
study. Amendments were made in light of
comments received. The final questionnaire
consists of four sections, as follows:
● Section one: the organisation. This sought
information on the body’s history, its current
functions, legal status, budget and personnel
numbers. 
● Section two: autonomy. This assessed the
autonomy of the body in terms of HR, finance
and policy. 
● Section three: accountability and responsibility.
This provided information on the body’s board
and financial audit functions, as well as the
accountability of the CEO. 
● Section four: accountability and direction. This
recorded information on the body’s strategy and
direction, including its methods of performance
measurement, as well as issues concerning the
body’s relationship to its parent body/
department.
Following revision and testing of the survey
questionnaire, letters were sent to 283 local and
regional non-commercial bodies in February 2006
asking them to complete the web-based question-
naire (a copy of the questionnaire and this letter are
included in appendix 4). The data from these
bodies was then entered into an electronic database
from which findings were derived. A response rate
of 55 per cent or 157 bodies was achieved. In order
to develop a 360-degree perspective on the
relationship between the bodies and ‘parent’
organisations, semi-structured interviews with civil
servants from various departments were also
conducted during the drafting stage. Where
available, official documents on current develop-
ments were interrogated and civil and public
ix




2 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005)
3 www.publicmanagement-cobra.org
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servants were also consulted by telephone and 
e-mail concerning individual local and regional
bodies.
While the majority of bodies in this study are
either indirectly elected or representative of various
stakeholder groups, local authorities are also
included in order to provide a more complete
picture of sub-national governance in Ireland. For
ease of understanding and interpretation of results,
the bodies are categorised by ‘sub-sector’. There are




● vocational education committees
● city and county enterprise boards
● Partnerships
● LEADER groups
● regional fisheries boards
● regional tourism authorities
● city and county development boards
● city and county childcare committees
● city, county and borough councils
It should be noted that at time of writing,
initiatives to change the governance structures and
functions of several sub-sectors are underway. The
government has adopted a policy to allow local
authorities, where appropriate, take over the
functions of harbour authorities; regional tourism
authorities are being reconstituted as regional
tourism development boards with an emphasis on
their strategic rather than administrative roles; and
many of the functions of regional fisheries boards
are to be subsumed into a new national authority.
Furthermore, a ‘cohesion’ process is in progress to
provide, where possible, a merger between
Partnerships and LEADER groups. The conclusions
and recommendations of this study in respect of
these bodies are constructed in the context of these
reforms. 
The survey examined the autonomy and
accountability of these organisations vis-à-vis their
‘parent’ organisations in relation to human
resources (strategic and general), finance, policy
and management structures. Some general findings
uncovered by the survey include:
● The functions most commonly performed by sub-
national bodies in Ireland are direct implementa-
tion of policy and co-ordination.
● Over 80 per cent of existing sub-national bodies
(other than local authorities) have been created
since 1990. 
● Membership of the EU has had a strong influence
in this phenomenon, both in terms of funding
and legislation for the establishment of such
bodies.
● The average staff complement per sub-sector
ranged from 3 to over 700 full-time equivalents.
● Budgets ranged from circa €27,000 to €1.5
billion.
The degree of autonomy that local and regional
bodies have is an important issue in terms of
governance. The table below demonstrates that, in
terms of HR (strategic and general), finance and
policy, the degree of autonomy varies widely
between sub-sectors, with no clear patterns or
relationships emerging. It is notable, however, that
local and regional bodies are, on average, likely to
have more autonomy over HR issues for individual
staff and policy than for strategic HR and finance
issues.
x
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Sub-Sector Strategic HR Autonomy Financial Policy 
HR Autonomy for individual staff Autonomy Autonomy
Regional Authorities Minimum Low Low Moderate
Regional Assemblies Low Moderate Low High
Harbour Commissions Maximum Maximum Low Moderate
VECs Minimum Low Moderate Moderate
Enterprise Boards Minimum Low Low Moderate
Partnerships High Maximum Moderate Moderate
LEADER Maximum Maximum Moderate Moderate
Reg. Fisheries Boards Minimum Moderate Low Moderate
Reg. Tourism Authorities Low Moderate High High
Development Boards Minimum Low None Maximum
Childcare Committees Moderate High Low Moderate
Local Authorities Minimum Moderate Moderate Moderate
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The detailed analysis of each sub-sector is
contained in the following chapters. What follows
here are the principal findings and recommenda-
tions in relation first to eleven of the sub-sectors in
general and then to the local authorities.
The 11 Sub-Sectors – 
General Findings
The eleven (non-directly elected) sub-sectors range
considerably in age and function. However, some
important patterns emerge. Just as the study of
national non-commercial bodies found a sharp
increase in the number of such bodies being
established since the early 1990s, so too do the
majority of sub-national bodies (80 per cent) date
from 1990 onward. Also, co-ordination emerges as a
defining feature of sub-national government in
Ireland. Almost one third (32 per cent) of local and
regional bodies view co-ordination as their main
role, which demonstrates recognition of a high level
of activity diffusion at sub-national level, and the
need to avoid duplication. A further 28 per cent
view direct implementation of policy as their
primary role with another 18 per cent identifying
specialist areas of work.
In terms of secondary function, analysis of the
norm for the eleven sub-sectors again identifies co-
ordination featuring strongly (23 per cent). Other
prominent roles for sub-national bodies include the
provision of information, advising, the direct
implementation of policy and promotional (non-
commercial) development. 
There is currently considerable institutional
reconfiguration at sub-national level, and at least
three sub-sectors (harbour commissions, regional
fisheries boards and regional tourism authorities)
have recently been abolished or are in the process
of reform or having their main functions subsumed
by other organisations. Many Partnership
companies and LEADER groups have also recently
been merged, with more to follow. Membership of
the EU has also resulted in institutional change at
the sub-national level, and at least half (54 per cent)
of organisations other than local authorities noted
that the EU had a ‘strong influence’ on their current
organisation form. A further 32 per cent report that
the EU had had ‘some influence’ in this regard.
A significant number of sub-national bodies have
Articles and Memoranda of Association and
interviews suggest that the Code of Practice for the
Governance of State Bodies is used extensively.
The norm for the eleven other sub-sectors reveals
that the aspect of general HR policy which regional
and local organisations are most likely to have
autonomy over is establishing staff evaluation
schemes. Few organisations had discretion over
salary levels. Local and regional bodies also have
considerable discretion over staff appointment 
and selection procedures (61 per cent) and
dismissal criteria (56 per cent). Approximately half
of the bodies practise some form of internal HR
management devolution.
The vast majority of local and regional bodies
receive their funding from central government.
However, several raise some revenue themselves for
current expenditure, including harbour commis-
sions and Partnership companies. The EU is also an
important source of funding for other sub-sectors
although this will change in the context of Ireland’s
move from being a net recipient to a net donor
within the Union. Few can take out loans or shift
budget by year without ministerial or departmental
approval, but many can shift budgets by function.
Just over half of the eleven sub-sector respondents
report having an audit committee in their boards,
and almost all have been audited externally in the
last two years. Audits tend to focus more on
financial results, legality and compliance and
internal control systems than on organisational
results.
Only 15 per cent of sub-national bodies (other
than local authorities) have discretion over
deciding on target groups, while the equivalent
figure for policy instruments is 13 per cent. Local
and regional bodies are also more likely to report on
strategy, objectives, planned investment, financial
and non-financial targets than national non-
commercial bodies, as well as reporting on work
completed in these areas. Eighty-nine per cent of
local and regional bodies in the eleven sub-sectors
produce annual reports. The vast majority also
publicly report on financial and non-financial
performance. Fifty-six per cent state that they feel
the number of performance indicators has increased
and an equal number report that indicators are used
‘to a large extent’ in their relationship with their
parent department or body. Apart from harbour
commissions, all sub-sectors’ non-financial results
are evaluated by themselves and an external body,
which may or may not be their parent department.
Approximately three quarters report that there are
no rewards for meeting their goals (mainly resource
increases), while about half said sanctions existed.
Survey responses indicate that all local and
regional bodies have a board (compared to 69 per
cent of national bodies), appointed by a variety of
means from popular or stakeholder election to
xi
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ministerial nomination. The two largest cohorts of
representatives to local and regional bodies
(excluding local authorities) are stakeholder
representatives and members of local authorities
nominated to serve on boards of other
organisations. A majority of boards surveyed are
moving from being concerned with operational
issues to more strategic matters. The roles of the
vast majority of CEOs (or equivalent) are put in
writing. Most CEOs are accountable for results, the
functioning of the organisation, budget administra-
tion and compliance with rules and regulations.
Half of the CEOs are employed on a permanent
basis, while half are on fixed-term contracts. The
majority of CEOs are evaluated by their boards. A
majority of respondents also report that both
management and boards use internal reporting and
evaluation systems to enable results assessment ‘to
a large extent’.
While no local politicians are on the boards of
national non-commercial bodies, a significant
number of city and county councillors sit on the
boards of local and regional bodies. They comprise
35 per cent of all board members at local and
regional level. Stakeholder representatives
comprise a further 31 per cent (Table 8.2). Also,
while 29 per cent of board members of national
bodies are independent experts, only 3 per cent of
those on the boards of local and regional bodies are.
There is also considerable variation across sub-
sectors in terms of CEO appointment mechanisms,
contracts and evaluation.
One third of local and regional bodies (other than
local authorities) meet with their parent department
quarterly. Almost a quarter reported that they 
never formally meet with their parent department,
while 36 per cent do so annually. Sixty-five per cent
report that such meetings focus on the achievement
and reporting of results ‘to a large extent’. Many of
the sub-sectors have representative bodies such as
the Association of City and County Enterprise
Boards, the National Fisheries Management
Executive or PLANET (LEADER groups) which also
act as conduits between local and regional
organisations and parent bodies. Informal contact
by telephone and e-mail is very common, with
almost 70 per cent of survey respondents noting
that it occurred at least once a month, if not more
frequently.
Recommendations for the 11 sub-sectors
While each sub-sector, insofar as possible, is treated
individually in the following chapters, it is
appropriate here to present global rather than
individual recommendations. Attention to
variations in role, composition, levels of autonomy
and accountability practices between sub-sectors is
drawn throughout this study and should provide
food for thought on future reforms. Again, it must
be noted that several sub-sectors are already under-
going a process of change and transformation. It is
intended that these recommendations will improve
the corporate governance of local and regional
bodies in Ireland and inform the future develop-
ment of sub-national government in Ireland.
Creation of new local and regional bodies
The bodies considered in this study have multiple
roles and duties, and an audit of these functions 
to identify those that may more appropriately 
be located within a single national body, including
government departments, would prove useful.
While a large number of local and regional bodies
are concerned with co-ordination, it is recognised
in the new National Development Plan 2007-13
(p.238) and National Action Plan for Social
Inclusion 2007-16 (p.79) that the county and 
city development boards are ‘the key coordinating
mechanism for public service delivery at local
level’. In this respect, it is envisaged that a key
function of the development boards will be to avoid
duplication of function at sub-national level. 
A framework for clarifying what functions or
services are more appropriately performed by local,
regional or national levels of government would be
instructive. The reasons for adopting sub-national
duplicate structures instead of a centralised body
with regional offices should be borne in mind,
particularly in the context of decentralisation. To
maximise effective networking, organisations need
to adapt their internal structures and work practices
according to the task in hand. In part, the ‘cohesion
process’ currently in progress for the Partnerships
and LEADER groups within certain local authority
geographical areas provides evidence that this is
already underway. 
Local and regional organisations must also
harness their resources in tandem with other sub-
national (and national) bodies. In general, given the
wide variety of organisations currently operating at
sub-national level, and the vast array of functions
being performed by them, it would not seem
prudent to establish any further local or regional
bodies without detailed consideration of existing
structures and how potential reforms would affect
them. The diminution of EU influence (and
particularly funding) over many bodies may also act
as a catalyst for future restructuring.
xii
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HR autonomy and accountability
An audit of staff numbers at sub-national level
would be practical and should be updated at least
annually, taking seasonal variations into account.
It would also be advantageous to develop guide-
lines for the devolution of internal HR management
in organisations at sub-national level.
Although salaries are controlled centrally, some
criteria for allowing local discretion over this issue
would be useful, particularly in respect of
performance-related pay. Many local and regional
bodies report having considerable discretion over
hiring of staff and more organisations could be
given greater discretion to decide on staff numbers
within a defined budget.
In this respect, it would be constructive to
develop a system for sharing resources in staff
recruitment within and across sub-sectors.
There should be a contract template for the
various categories of staff in local and regional
bodies, particularly those who recruit seasonal
staff.
Financial autonomy and accountability
Given the variety of local and regional bodies in
existence, consistency around financial reporting
standards and formats should be ensured. Some
guidelines for smaller bodies would be valuable in
achieving this.
Value for Money audits, where they do not exist,
should be introduced on a pilot basis in
conjunction with the office of the Comptroller and
Auditor-General.
Given that a majority of local and regional bodies
do not currently have the ability to move budget by
year but are expected to report on future planned
investment, the possibility of introducing multi-
annual financial packages should be considered.
Further extension of the requirement for bodies to
produce multi-annual business plans would assist
this development, and the changing nature of EU
funding as a source of revenue will also require
changes in financial management arrangements.
Consideration should be given to allowing sub-
national bodies, particularly those involved in
commercial development, greater freedom to take
out loans once certain criteria are met.
Policy autonomy and accountability
Ensuring the coherence and consistency of national
policies at sub-national level requires high levels of
trust between central, regional and local
government. Allowing greater local discretion over
policy implementation can foster trust and improve
outcomes and can be enhanced through regular
reporting mechanisms. Consideration should
therefore be given to allowing greater involvement
of local and regional bodies in identifying policy
instruments and the target groups for policy.
Guidelines for the development and best use of
performance indicators in sub-national bodies
should be developed. 
This study has identified very little use of
rewards and sanctions in the bodies surveyed. The
introduction of rewards for performance and
financial efficiency in local and regional bodies
should be considered in the context of future public
service modernisation. Conversely, sanctions for
poor performance should also feature in any
changes in this regard. 
Boards
In terms of the non-directly elected bodies
considered here, there are significant variations in
board size and composition which often bear little
relation to the tasks required of them. The lack of
independent experts on local and regional boards
(when compared with national bodies) is
prominent in this regard, while other categories of
board member, such as local councillors and
stakeholders, tend to dominate. In order to address
this, some consideration should be given to
formulating guidelines concerning the achievement
of an appropriate board composition. Also, the
appointment of representatives of local and
regional government to the boards of national
bodies offers opportunities for the views of sub-
national government to be more formally reflected.
The demand on boards to become more strategic
in carrying out their work, as evidenced by this
study, indicates that particular skill-sets concerning
strategic planning are required. One method of
achieving this might be to create a database of
persons with relevant skills who are qualified to
serve on boards of various kinds. A board, or a
defined portion of a board, could be appointed from
this database which could be updated on an annual
basis. This database could be ordered by
geographical area in order to suit the particular
requirements of many sub-national bodies.
Consideration should be given to ensuring that
the Code of Practice for the Governance of State
Bodies is cognisant of the needs of sub-national as
well as national bodies.
Given that a large number of the bodies surveyed
do not have internal audit committees, and the cost
of employing external auditors, consideration
should be given by parent organisations to
xiii
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providing centralised training and/or resources to
help local and regional bodies in this regard. 
Relationship between local and regional bodies and
‘parent’ organisations 
This study has identified a range of reporting
practices and accountability relationships existing
between the organisations under examination and
their ‘parent’ body or department. In many cases,
intermediate structures are used. It is therefore
recommended that the role and responsibilities of
‘parent’ departments in relation to the local and/or
regional bodies under their aegis be clarified. In this
respect, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU or
Service Level Agreement) should be considered
where they do not already exist and where there are
weak statutory guidelines. MOUs are increasingly
common in Irish public administration, and are
encouraged as good practice by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development. They are
useful for managing relationships and help
establish basic principles and guidelines under
which two or more entities agree to work. 
Also, it is important to ensure that there are
regular formal meetings between the bodies and
‘parent’ organisations, and that such meetings have
a clear format and purpose. Where it does not
already occur, regular attendance of senior
departmental representatives at the board meetings
of local and regional bodies should be provided for. 
Local Authorities – General Findings
The study bears out the fact that much of local
authority activity is conducted within defined
statutory frameworks, and many functions are
performed according to legislative and
departmental guidelines. In fact, this seems to be
true of sub-national government generally and
many local and regional bodies are similarly bound.
However, within the aforementioned frameworks,
survey responses indicate that local authorities do
have room for policy manoeuvre, customisation
and innovation. 
The fact that much of local authority activity is
established in law accounts for the fact that almost
three quarters of respondents noted that the
primary role of their local authority is the 
direct implementation of policy. Also, 39 per cent
stated that regulation is their principal secondary
function. The multi-functional role of local
authorities is reflected in the fact that 
co-ordination, non-commercial promotional
development and commercial development also
feature in responses.
Local authorities display minimum levels of
strategic HR autonomy. As per the public service
generally, policy on staff numbers, salary levels and
conditions for promotion are set centrally for all
local authorities. One area where they have
discretion is in relation to staff evaluation schemes.
Almost every local authority practises some level of
internal HR management devolution. In terms of
individual HR autonomy, local authorities have
moderate levels of autonomy. Most have discretion
in relation to staff promotion, evaluation, dismissal
and appointments, but little discretion in relation to
salary and tenure.
Local authorities have moderate financial
autonomy. In the overall, local authorities source
some 56 per cent of their current expenditure from
local sources (commercial rates 26 per cent; goods
and services 30 per cent), with the remainder being
provided by way of government grants/subsidies
(23 per cent) and general-purpose grants from the
Local Government Fund (21 per cent). For most,
money from the Local Government Fund and grants
are key sources of revenue for capital and current
expenditure, with fees and charges also
contributing a significant portion of income. While
a minority of councils responded that they had
audit committees (a point also noted by the recent
Indecon report on Local Government Financing4),
recent legislative changes5 provide that such
committees will be established in all local
authorities, starting with city and county councils.
They are also audited annually by the Local
Government Audit Service, which also undertakes
value for money evaluations across the local
government sector. New financial management
systems have also been rolled out, including the
introduction of accrual accounting and risk
management techniques.
In terms of target groups and policy instruments,
local authorities operate within departmental
guidelines, but in general have moderate policy
autonomy. Local authorities are more likely than
national bodies to produce reports on planned
investment, and are adept at producing multi-
annual business plans. They are also the most likely
xiv
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4 Indecon Economic Consultants Review of Local Government Financing, (Dublin: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government, 2006), p. xx
5 Local Government (Business Improvements Districts) Act 2006, Section 5
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of all sub-national bodies to report on work
completed and all produce annual reports. In
general, local authority goals are set by the
authority, often in conjunction with the Department
of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government. A majority report that the number of
performance indictors has increased over the last
five years. Most local authorities evaluate their non-
financial results either themselves or in
conjunction with others. Almost half of local
authority respondents reported that some form of
rewards and sanctions existed for their organisation.
For local authorities, the city or county manager
is accountable for everything in the organisation to
the elected council with whom he or she works
closely. A large number of respondents note that
internal reporting and evaluation systems are being
extensively developed to assess results on
objectives and that divisions in the organisation are
managed on the basis of results. However, only half
of local authority respondents felt that resources are
allocated on the basis of results. Survey responses
also indicate that local authority management is
more likely than elected members to use internal
reporting and evaluation systems.
A variety of communication routes between local
authorities and the Department of the Environment,
Heritage and Local Government are utilised. In
particular, meetings between the department’s
management advisory committee and the County
and City Managers’ Association provide an
important channel of communication. Meetings
tend to focus on the achievement and reporting of
results. Local authorities also regularly report on
non-financial results to the department. Consider-
able work has been undertaken in recent years
towards improving governance in local authorities
through the establishment of corporate policy
groups and strategic policy committees.
Recommendations for local authorities
The new social partnership agreement, Towards
2016, calls for further developments in respect of
improving organisational performance and
Performance Management and Development
Systems (PMDS). These issues are closely related to
human resource functions and therefore the
possibility of local authorities developing greater
strategic HR autonomy might usefully be explored.
A more developed system of rewards and sanctions
for performance might also be appropriate in this
context.
Although many local authority functions are
statutory, more emphasis should be given to
ensuring that there is more focus on the allocation
of resources on the basis of results and greater
linkages between strategies and outputs. 
In keeping with good corporate governance
practices, methods of involving elected members in
local authority internal reporting and evaluation
systems would be desirable. 
As emphasised throughout this study, the wide
variation in current corporate governance arrange-
ments across and within sub-sectors make ‘one-
size-fits-all’ arrangements impracticable even if it
were to be desirable. However, greater attention
must be given to the role of non-commercial local
and regional bodies in the changing landscape of
Irish public administration. It is hoped that 
this study will achieve its goal of advancing
consistent thinking as to how the attainment of
appropriate levels of autonomy and accountability
for sub-national bodies in Ireland can best be
achieved.
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1.1 Setting the scene
The development of new organisational arrange-
ments has been a defining feature of modern Irish
public administration. It follows a pattern common
to OECD states, which has seen public administra-
tions internationally respond to a variety of
challenges, including demands for greater
efficiency and productivity. While academic and
practitioner focus has tended to be on the
emergence of non-departmental public bodies (or
agencies) at the national level, there have also been
some important developments at the sub-national
level, which forms the subject of this report. 
As part of its work programme, and in response to
a specific suggestion arising at the Implementation
Group of Secretaries General, the Committee for
Public Management Research (CPMR) agreed to
commence a research project on the ‘Corporate
Governance of Agencies’ in Ireland. The first step in
this process involved the creation of a complete
database of all public bodies operating in Ireland. In
total, 601 such bodies were identified in a study
conducted in 2003 and, subject to minor revisions
in the context of new bodies emerging and others
being reformulated since then, this database has
formed the basis for more detailed analysis. The
study of national non-commercial bodies was
completed in 2005 and approved for publication by
the Committee as CPMR Research Report No. 6,
titled The Corporate Governance of Agencies in
Ireland: Non-Commercial National Agencies. This
current research report represents the next step in
this wider project, and is concerned with the
corporate governance of non-commercial sub-
national bodies. 
1.2 Structure of the report
Following on from this introductory chapter;
Chapter 2 describes the research objectives, some
key definitions and the research project
methodology. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of Irish public
service bodies, including the rationale behind the
use of local and regional bodies in Irish public
administration and the distribution of functions
between national and sub-national levels of
government. 
Chapter 4 categorises the various types of sub-
national body surveyed for this study and presents
aggregate descriptive findings for each type.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 consider the autonomy and
accountability of local and regional bodies in terms
of human resources, finance and policy.
Chapters 8 and 9 analyse the governance struc-
tures in non-commercial local and regional bodies,
and the relationship between such bodies and their
parent departments or bodies.
Chapter 10 summarises the research’s main
findings and the recommendations emerging from
them.
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2.1 Terms of reference
The CPMR agreed the following terms of reference
for an overarching thematic research programme on
the corporate governance of public sector bodies. 
● Map the development of Irish public service
agencies over time in order to obtain a clearer
understanding of the range and variety of such
bodies, in terms of their role, function, corporate
governance and accountability relationships.
● Place this information within a wider inter-
national context. 
● Identify and discuss key and/or emergent
governance issues for the future, as well as
possible ways forward in the light of identified
national and international good practice.
It was agreed that this project would involve
detailed analysis of three different categories of
state bodies in Ireland: 
● national non-commercial bodies
● local and regional non-commercial bodies and
● local and national commercial bodies. 
This study addresses the analysis of the local and
regional non-commercial bodies.
2.2 Key definitions and concepts
Before presenting findings from the responses to
a survey that provides the main data sources for this
study, it is important to clarify the meaning of some
terms used in this study. The key terms are the ‘Irish
public sector/service’, ‘public service bodies/
agencies’, ‘local and regional’, and ‘corporate
governance’.
2.2.1 Irish public service
A distinction must be drawn between the public
sector and the public service. The definition of the
public sector developed by Humphreys and
Gorman (1987) and currently used by the Central
Statistics Office6 is as follows: 
An Irish public sector organisation is defined as
any employing body which: (a) directly derives
the majority of its share capital from Irish public
funds, or (b) has the majority of its Board/
Executive members appointed by an Irish
Minister, or (c) directly derives the majority of its
revenue from Irish public sources. The Irish
public sector comprises the following administra-
tive sub-sectors: the Oireachtas (or National
Parliament) and the Judiciary, the Civil Service,
the Garda Síochána (or National Police Force),
the Defence Forces, the Local Authorities, the
Health Services, education, the Harbour
Authorities and the State-Sponsored Bodies …
Private sector employing organisations are
defined as the residuum (Humphreys and
Gorman, 1987:8).
The ‘public sector’ therefore comprises
organisations that are both commercial and non-
commercial in character, i.e. bodies that both do
and do not derive the bulk of their revenue from
trading and commercial activities. For example, not
only does it include civil service departments,
schools and hospitals, but it also includes large
enterprises in the transport and energy sectors.
Also, as well as local authorities, our definition
encompasses regional authorities and bodies. For
the purposes of this phase of the study, the public
service does not refer to commercial bodies i.e.
those public bodies that for all or a substantial part
of their income, depend on the production of goods
or services that are sold directly to the public. 
2.2.2 Public service bodies/agencies
Internationally, the development of public bodies
outside of central government ministries and 
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offices has become a particular focus of attention 
in the study of public administration and
government. Terms such as quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organisation (QUANGO), 
non-departmental body and executive agency have
become commonplace. However, the wide range
and variety of such bodies means that identifying
an all-encompassing definition has proved
problematic7. There is consensus, however, that the
issues of autonomy and accountability are central to
our understanding of these organisations, and
identifying the correct balance between these two
factors remains at the heart of much public sector
reorganisation. 
As noted in the CPMR Research Report on Non-
Commercial National Agencies8, the definition of
agencies must be one that is not self-selecting and
that can facilitate international comparison. There-
fore, as before, the working definition of an agency
is a public service body that has the following
characteristics.
● It is structurally differentiated from other
organisations.
● It has some capacity for autonomous decision
making.
● It has some expectation of continuity over time.
● It performs some public function.
● It has some personnel.
● It has some financial resources9.
The IPA Yearbook and Diary refers to state-
sponsored bodies (SSBs) as being in general ‘bodies,
with powers and duties set by statute or by
ministerial authority, whose staffs are not civil
servants and to whose governing boards or councils
the government appoints some or all of the
members’. However, it is noted that some such
bodies may in fact be staffed by civil servants10. 
In this study, the term public service body or
bodies is used to cover both local authorities and
local or regional agencies. In order to delineate
further the jurisdiction of public service bodies for
the purposes of this study, the database used here
does not include the following entities within the
public service:
● The Office of the Houses of the Oireachtas
● government departments/offices that have direct
ministerial level representation in cabinet
● local/regional offices/branches of civil service
departments/offices
● cross-departmental teams
● tribunals of inquiry
● task forces
● non-statutory advisory committees
● The Judiciary
● The Defence Forces
● An Garda Síochána
● The Coroner’s Service
● The Sheriff’s Service
● town councils
● individual hospitals and educational institutions
● cooperative societies and voluntary organisations
● European institutions and international organisa-
tions (apart from those established following the
1999 Belfast Agreement).
Thus the 2003 survey identified 211 public
service bodies operating (on a non-commercial
basis) at national level in Ireland, and a further 283
operating at local and regional level.
2.2.2.1 Why agencies?
The study of national non-commercial bodies in
Ireland summarised the main reasons for
‘agencification’11. To briefly recap, there are five
reasons12 identified in the literature on national-
level public sector organisations, of which either
one or a multiple can explain the reason for the
establishment a new public sector body.
4
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7 See Thynne, I. “State Organisations as agencies: an identifiable and meaningful focus of research?” Public administration and
development Vol. 24 (2004), pp. 1-9; OECD Distributed Public Governance: Agencies, Authorities and other Government Bodies (OECD:
Paris, 2002), p. 9; Pollitt, C.; Talbot, C.; Caulfield, J. and A. Smullen (eds) Agencies: How Governments do things through Semi-
Autonomous Organisations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 10.
8 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005).
9 It should be noted that in responding to the survey questionnaire, a small number of bodies stated that they had no dedicated budget
or no full-time staff, and were thus technically in breach of the definition above. However, as they were isolated cases, a more informed
picture is provided by including them in the survey.
10 Institute of Public Administration Yearbook and Diary 2006 (Dublin: IPA, 2005), p. 183.
11 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), pp. 4-7
12 In a recent study of French quasi-autonomous agencies, Elgie (2006) identifies eight hypotheses for the establishment of agencies:
greater efficiency, demonstrating commitment, blame-shifting, political uncertainty, institutional isomorphism, state tradition, political
leadership and the spread of NPM norms.
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(1) Economic/efficiency reasons 
Pressure to increase the productivity and efficiency
of public sector administrations has encouraged the
‘contracting out’ of state services to specialist
public bodies. This offers opportunities for greater
operational flexibility and more efficient use of
resources.
(2) Changing expectations in society
Public demands for better and more individually-
tailored services has resulted in the creation of new
bodies which are viewed as delivering on these
demands more easily than, for example, a
government department. Also, public expectations
for greater involvement in various stages of the
policy cycle have resulted in more emphasis on
consultation and ‘stakeholder’ participation in the
work of public bodies. This is particularly evident
in the case of stakeholder appointments to the
boards of such organisations. 
(3) Political reasons 
The logic here is that removing the implementation
of policy programmes from civil service
bureaucracies to public bodies facilitates more
decisions being made using economic and
efficiency rather than political criteria. Establishing
an independent body to deal with political issues
can also allow politicians to publicly demonstrate
their commitment to these issues. Thus ‘agencies’
can provide political credibility. 
Setting up an independent agency to deal with
politically problematic issues can also help the
political administration to deal with a problematic
policy area without being seen as directly
responsible for it. Experience elsewhere would tend
to suggest however that instead of deflecting
attention, public bodies involved in politically
sensitive issues tend to attract above average
attention from the media13.
Also, political actors may seek the establishment
of a new organisation in order to solve problems in
their policy field. Alternatively, a new body might
be established to lead change that might otherwise
be directed by forces external to government.
Finally, agency-type status may in some cases allow
a government to exert more direct political control
over a policy programme, as it is able to appoint the
leadership of the organisation and set objective
performance criteria against which to judge its
success or otherwise.
(4) Specialisation
The need for specialist skills and technical
expertise may result in the establishment of a new
organisation that can employ persons from outside
traditional civil service structures. It is proposed
that this is itself a form of efficiency in policy
delivery as it allows departments more time to
focus on policy development, while the new body
focuses on more administrative and implementa-
tion tasks. 
(5) ‘Isomorphic’ factors 
This refers to a phenomenon whereby new
organisations are established in order to reflect
what is regarded as best practice or the most
appropriate form for particular service delivery or
activity. As will be identified later, the EU has
played a prominent role, both passively and
actively, in the establishment of new organisations
in member states. These include bodies established
to attract EU funds as well as those created to
distribute EU funding. Isomorphism is therefore a
strong factor in understanding the rationale behind
the establishment of many local and regional bodies
such as LEADER groups. 
To these five must be added another to take into
account the specific role of sub-national bodies.
(6) Sub-national devolution
While many of the same principles and rationale
apply to the establishment of sub-national bodes as
for national bodies, including efficiency and (local)
specialisation, the establishment of sub-national
bodies can also represent the devolution of func-
tions from the centre. Principally, such devolution
allows for public services to be put closer to their
users and provide for more local forms of
accountability and legitimacy through local
stakeholder involvement. This is particularly true
of those organisations with directly or indirectly
elected local representatives on their boards.
2.2.2.2 What are public service bodies set up to do?
The study by McGauran et al14 found that public
bodies or agencies are established to deliver one or
a number of the following specific functions: 
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13 Hogwood, B.; Judge, D. and McVicar, M. “Agencies and Accountability” in Rhodes, R. (ed.) Transforming British Government: Volume
I: Changing Institutions (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
14 See McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), pp. 7-8.
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● implementing policy
● regulation 







In order to include the range of sub-national
bodies examined in this report, two further
functions must be added to this list: co-ordination
and promotional development. As Chapter 5
details, a number of local and regional bodies in
Ireland consider their primary tasks to be one of
these latter two functions. Co-ordination is a core
preoccupation of public administration but is used
in varying contexts. For our purposes, co-ordina-
tion is the process by which management
instruments and measures are used to counteract
fragmentation, specialisation or proliferation15.
Promotional development is distinct from
commercial development as it concerns non-profit
development.
2.2.3 Local and regional
All states define territory for the purposes of
governing. Roche refers to local government as ‘a
system of administration in political sub-divisions
of a state, by elected bodies having substantial
control of local affairs, including the power to
impose taxes’16. Similarly, John argues that central
to the definition of local government is that it is ‘a
democratically elected authority that exercises
political choices within denoted boundaries’17.
These views of local government, however, fail to
adequately incorporate the many non-elected
bodies and organisations that operate within and
across local government boundaries. 
A public service body, therefore, may operate
within either a national or a sub-national territorial
jurisdiction18. In this study, local and regional
public service bodies refers to those public
organisations operating within a defined sub-
national geographical area; and different public
bodies may (or may not) operate within the same
defined territory19. 
Also, functions performed by local and regional
public service bodies may be duplicated in a range
of areas, with each body having the same functions
and powers. Town councils aside, county and city
council areas are generally, but not always, the
smallest unit within which a local public service
body operates in this study. However, some local
bodies, such as Partnerships, LEADER companies
and harbour commissioners do not follow county or
city boundaries. Similarly, the seven regional
fisheries boards are concerned with activities in
territories that are not, for example, congruent with
the geographical boundaries of the eight regional
authorities.
2.2.4 Corporate governance
The final term to be defined here is ‘corporate
governance’. It is the subject of varying interpre-
tations according to the field of inquiry. For
example, in financial management literature,
corporate governance is concerned with the design
of mechanisms that assure providers of capital
security of return on their investment20. As the
concept has been applied to the public sector, it has
become associated not only with financial reporting
and controls but also standards of behaviour and
organisational structures and processes. This study
uses the definition of corporate governance as
provided by the Australian National Audit Office,
which states that:
Broadly speaking, corporate governance generally
refers to the processes by which organisations are
directed, controlled and held to account. It
encompasses authority, accountability, steward-
6
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
_______________
15 See Verhoerst, Koen and Geert Bouckaert (2005) “Machinery of Government and Policy Capacity: The Effects of Specialization and
Coordination” in Martin Painter and Jon Pierre (eds): Challenges to State Policy Capacity.( London: Palgrave); G.B. Peters (1998) refers
to co-ordination as ‘an end-state in which the policies and programmes of government are characterized by minimal redundancy,
incoherence and lacunae’ in “Managing Horizontal Government: The politics of co-ordination” Public Administration Vol 76 (2): 295-
311.
16 Roche, D. Local Government in Ireland (Dublin: IPA, 1982), p. 1.
17 John, P. Local Governance in Western Europe (London: Sage, 2001), p. 34.
18 There are of course also international cross-border bodies but they do not form part of this study.
19 Rhodes defined sub-central government as ‘the arena of political activity concerned with the relations between central political
institutions in the capital city and those sub-central political organisations and governmental bodies within the accepted boundaries of
the state’. (1998: 14).
20 Kirchmaier, T. and Grant, J. “Corporate ownership structure and performance in Europe”, European Management Review (2005) Vol.
2 231-45.
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ship, leadership, direction and control exercised
in the organisation’21.
As detailed below, the principal corporate
governance issues of concern to this study are the
issues of function, autonomy, accountability and
direction in respect of local and regional non-
commercial public service bodies. This will help
address the dearth of knowledge concerning issues
of governance and accountability in Irish public
sector bodies22.
2.3 Survey methodology
As with the study of national non-commercial
bodies, public organisations operating at local and
regional level were invited to complete a survey
questionnaire in order to assess their autonomy and
accountability. This questionnaire was developed
in partnership with the Instituut voor de Overheid
of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The Instituut
had already utilised a similar questionnaire in a
survey of Flemish agencies in 2002, and using this
questionnaire as a template meant that comparable
international information on the structure of public
bodies would be available. Through the COBRA
(Comparative public organisation data Base for
Research and Analysis) research network, similar
studies of public sector bodies have been
undertaken in Flanders (Belgium) and Norway, and
progress is underway in Italy, Germany and the
Netherlands to conduct similar analyses. 
The Irish questionnaire was pilot-tested within
the Institute of Public Administration and a small
number of the public service bodies covered by the
study. Amendments were made in light of
comments received. The final questionnaire
consists of four sections.
– Section one: the organisation. This sought
information on the body’s history, its current
functions, legal status, budget and personnel
numbers. 
– Section two: autonomy. This assessed the
autonomy of the body in terms of HR, finance
and policy. 
– Section three: accountability and responsi-
bility. This provided information on the body’s
board and financial audit functions, as well as
the accountability of the CEO. 
– Section four: accountability and direction. This
recorded information on the body’s strategy
and direction, including its methods of
performance measurement, as well as issues
concerning the body’s relationship to its parent
body/department.
Following revision and testing of the survey
questionnaire, letters were sent to 283 local and
regional non-commercial bodies in February 2006
asking them to complete the web-based
questionnaire (a copy of the questionnaire and this
letter are included in appendices 4 and 5). The
option of completing the questionnaire in hard
copy (paper) format was also offered to respondents
and eleven relevant bodies that did not have web
access returned the survey in this form. The data
from all the responses was then entered into an
electronic database from which findings were
derived. By the deadline of 20 March, a response of
approximately 34 per cent (ninety-six organisa-
tions) had been achieved and with follow up letters,
e-mails and phone calls a response rate of 55 per
cent (157 bodies) was reached by early May23. 
Table 2.1 below details the response rates from
the various catorgories of local and regional bodies.
Within the responses, however, there were some
variations in terms of consistency and some
organisations did not complete all four sections,
returning only the first two or three sections. No
respondent did not complete section 1. The
incomplete responses nonetheless yield useful
information and the exact total number of responses
for each section are set out in Table 2.2.
All survey respondents were asked to state their
position in the organisation, and where any
organisation responded to the survey more than
once, the response of the more senior respondent
was preferred. In all, 57 per cent of respondents
were CEOs or equivalents, with a further 20 per
cent holding positions as senior managers in the
organisation. All responses therefore represent the
bona fide opinions of senior public servants from
the perspective of their particular organisation.
In order to develop a 360-degree perspective on
7
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21 Australian National Audit Office Principles and better practices: Corporate governance in Commonwealth authorities and companies,
Discussion paper (Canberra: ANAO, 1999), p. 1
22 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), p. 31
23 This included two postal responses.
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the relationship between bodies and ‘parent
organisations’, semi-structured interviews with
civil servants from various departments were also
conducted during the drafting stage. As well as
helping to explain the many inter-relationships
between local, regional and national bodies, these
interviews also provided clarity around any
potentially contradictory findings. Where available,
official documents on current developments were
interrogated and civil and public servants were also
consulted by telephone and e-mail concerning
individual local and regional bodies. 
As detailed below, the principal areas of
investigation in this report concern key elements of
corporate governance – autonomy and account-
ability in relation to human resources, financial
management and policy; as well as the structures
and arrangements governing the relationship
between local and regional bodies and their parent
body or department. Otherwise, the number of valid
responses for each sub-sector or question were used
as the total rounding up to 100 per cent.
It must also be noted that at time of writing,
initiatives to change the governance structures and
functions of several sub-sectors are in progress. The
government has adopted a policy to allow local
authorities, where appropriate, take over the
functions of harbour authorities; regional tourism
authorities are being reconstituted as regional
tourism development boards with an emphasis on
their strategic rather than administrative roles; and
many of the functions of regional fisheries boards
are to be subsumed into a new national authority.
Furthermore, a ‘cohesion’ process is underway to
provide, where possible, a merger between
Partnership and LEADER groups. The conclusions
and recommendations of thus study in respect of
these bodies are constructed in the context of these
reforms. 
The next chapter considers the range and type of
organisations identified in the initial 2003 database
of public sector bodies.
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Table 2.1: Response rate for Regional and Local
Non-Commercial Public Bodies
Category of Number Number % Response
Body of Bodies of Rate
Contacted Responses (approx)
County/City 
Enterprise Boards 35 20 57
City/County 
Development Boards 34 17 50
LEADER 38 19 50
Childcare Committee 33 19 57
Partnerships 36 18 50
Regional Tourism 
Authorities 6 2 33
Regional Authority 8 6 75
Regional Assembly 2 2 100
Vocational Education 
Committees 34 17 50
Harbour Commissions24 10 6 60
Regional Fisheries 
Board 7 3 43
City/County Councils 34 25 73.5
Borough Councils 5 1 20
Other 2 2 100
Total 283 157 55
Table 2.2: Responses by Category and
Questionnaire Section
Category Number of Section Section Section Section
of Body Responses 1 2 3 4
County/City 
Enterprise 
Boards 20 20 19 19 18
City/County 
Development 
Boards 17 17 15 16 14
LEADER 19 19 18 17 17
Childcare 
Committee 19 19 17 15 15
Partnerships 18 18 17 17 16
Regional 
Tourism 
Authorities 2 2 2 2 2
Regional Authority 6 6 5 5 4
Regional Assembly 2 2 2 2 2
Vocational 
Education 
Committees 17 17 15 14 13
Harbour 
Commissions 6 6 6 6 6
Regional 
Fisheries Board 3 3 3 3 3
City/County 
Councils 25 25 22 22 22
Borough 
Councils 1 1 1 1 1
Other 2 2 2 2 2
Total (%) 157 (55) 157 (55) 144 (51) 141 (49)135 (47)
_______________
24 There are harbour authorities at Kilrush and Youghal which, under Section 2 of the 1946 Harbours Act, are administered by the
elected Urban District (now Town) Councils. However, it is now the policy of the Department of Transport to develop legislation in order
to rationalise existing practice whereby local authorities administer these harbours. The operation of certain other harbours has already
been assumed by local authorities; for example Ballyshannon and Buncrana Harbours are administered by Donegal County Council. 
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In this chapter, the types and number of public
bodies operating in commercial and non-
commercial fields at local, regional and national
levels in Ireland are considered. This information
will be drawn from the database originally
compiled in 2003, reproduced here at Appendix 2.
3.1 Types of public body in Ireland
Public bodies in Ireland operate at either a national
or sub-national level. Furthermore, they can operate
on either a commercial or non-commercial basis.
Chapter 5 of CPMR Research Report No.6 by
McGauran, Verhoest and Humphreys discusses in
detail the numbers and main features of the 601
bodies first compiled in a 2003 database of public
sector organisations25. Rather than repeat that
analysis here, a brief comment on the principal
findings of their analysis of the 211 non-
commercial bodies operating at national level is
provided, which will provide a context for
comparisons with the sub-national bodies
examined in this report. 
3.2 National non-commercial bodies
While there have been some changes to the total
number of national non-commercial bodies in
Ireland since the CPMR Research Report was
published (particularly in respect of the
amalgamation of several health bodies within the
Health Service Executive), the number remains
close to 200. In general, these bodies are stand-
alone and do not have duplicates. Some key
findings of this report are worth restating here26. 
The most common functions identified for the
national non-commercial bodies are the provision
of policy advice (23 per cent), policy
implementation (15 per cent), regulation (13 per
cent) and the provision of information (13 per cent).
The health sector accounted for the largest cohort of
agencies (14 per cent), followed by education (9 per
cent), justice (7 per cent) and research (7 per cent).
The majority (60 per cent) of national bodies were
established during the 1990s and 2000s, although
approximately half of the bodies responding to the
survey noted that they had had a previous
existence. 
The survey population ranged from small bodies
with only a part-time staff member to a large
organisation of over 2,000 employees and a budget
of over €1 billion. The median staff cohort is thirty
and the median budget €3,828,000. In the absence
of a legal framework for the establishment of public
bodies in Ireland, there is considerable variety of
autonomy and governance structures within the
national bodies. Therefore the study identified that
39 per cent of organisations were statutory
corporations (established by primary legislation),
30 per cent were corporate bodies (established by
secondary legislation), 2 per cent were public
companies and 4 per cent were private companies.
While the majority of agencies are established by
statute, no common framework exists on what
matters are to be regulated in the piece of law
establishing an organisation (e.g. a statute, a
ministerial order). Thus the report argued that
many organisations had been set up in an ad hoc
manner, tailored to suit specific policy or service
delivery requirements.
3.3 Commercial bodies
The analysis of public sector commercial bodies
will form the final stage of the study on the
corporate governance of public sector bodies in
Ireland. These bodies are also known as state
enterprises or semi-state companies and are
9
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25 Another analysis of public bodies in Ireland is provided by Clancy, P. and Murphy, G. Outsourcing Government: Public Bodies and
Accountabilty (Dublin: TASC/New Island, 2006)
26 More detailed analysis can be found in pages 50-66 of the CPMR Research Report No. 6
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established for reasons different from the non-
commercial bodies, normally market failure to
provide certain public goods. Such bodies are
primarily involved in the provision of goods and
services on a commercial basis. They can operate at
either a national (Electricity Supply Board, Bord na
Móna) or sub-national level (port companies).
3.4 Local and regional non-commercial
bodies
As noted in Chapter 2, there are 283 bodies
operating on a non-commercial basis at local and
regional level in Ireland27. These organisations
combine to form the complex system that is Irish
sub-national government, an aspect of Irish
government and administration that has received
far less analysis and academic treatment than
central government28. This dearth of analysis is all
the more surprising given that many policies of
central government would fail without the ability of
sub-national public bodies to appropriately
implement them. For example, the bulk of public
capital investment in Ireland is implemented by
local and regional organisations, and almost 20 per
cent of public expenditure is at sub-national level29.
Also, a simple dichotomy of hierarchical local-
central relations obscures the many alternative
forms of engagement between local and central
administrations and within sub-national
government itself. Of course, while an account of
sub-national government cannot be divorced from
the reality of central government in a unitary state,
a fuller account of the contribution of sub-national
bodies to national government, including their
accountability and autonomy, is necessary to better
understand policy making in Ireland.
One of the principal understandings of why
public bodies or ‘agencies’ emerge is that a decision
is taken to create a ‘purchaser-provider’ split, and to
alter the organisational identity of a service delivery
body by removing it from within a pre-existing
structure (such as a department/ministry) and
giving it an identity of its own. The service itself is
not altered, but the department cedes a measure of
direct control over service provision and must
create a new accountability relationship to com-
pensate. The same understanding can be applied to
the establishment of local and regional bodies –
central government requires their co-operation as it
does not possess a monopoly over certain resources
such as local understanding of need. Also, it is
suggested by proponents of participative
democracy (and federalists) that the devolution of
functions to sub-national level offers greater
accountability to the people than centralised
government does30. Non directly-elected bodies
tend not to claim the same democratic legitimacy as
those that are directly elected, for example local
authorities in Ireland are constitutionally
recognised as champions of the community31.
Recognising this, Norton identifies that sub-
national bodies do not ‘govern’ insofar as they do
not have scope for making trade-offs between a
range of public functions (a defining feature of
elected local authorities), but are instead charged
with performing specific functions on grounds of
efficiency32. 
As later chapters will detail, the growth in
functions now performed at sub-national level in
Ireland has not necessarily been at the expense of
central or local government. Rather, the existence of
a large proportion of local and regional bodies
represents growing public demands for public
services as well as the provision of structures to
more effectively channel and co-ordinate sub-
national activity. Few of these bodies are concerned
with policy making but instead engage in service
provision. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4,
the period of expansion in the number of national-
level public bodies during the 1990s has been
matched by a similar growth at the sub-national
level. The involvement of networks of actors in the
various sub-national fora examined here
demonstrates that focusing on simple central-local
relations is not sufficient, and that local govern-
ment has been transformed into an intricate system
of ‘local governance’33. Similarly, focusing on local
authorities as the unit of analysis in sub-national
government may present a misleading picture.
10
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27 If we add to this number those sub-national bodies operating commercial enterprises (such as port companies) the figure rises to
approximately 300.
28 Some exceptions to this include Roche (1982) and more recently Callanan and Keogan (2003). Chubb (1982) also provided some
analysis of local government in his work on Irish government and politics. 
29 Dexia Sub-national public finance in the European Union (Dexia Economic Outlook, November 2006), pp. 9-11.
30 Rubin, E. “ The myth of non-bureaucratic accountability and the anti-administrative impulse” in Dowdle, M.W. Public Accountability:
Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Law and Society, 2006), p. 53.
31 See Article 28A of Bunreacht na hÉireann – The Constitution of Ireland.
32 Norton, A. International Handbook of Local and Regional Government (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1994), pp. 42-4.
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While recent years have witnessed expansion in
the scope of activity at sub-national level, periods of
contraction are not unusual, involving both
amalgamation and the shifting of functions
‘upwards’ from sub-national to national level. An
example of the former would be a programme at
time of writing to provide a more coherent structure
for LEADER groups and Partnership companies.
Similarly, the functions of many harbour
commissions are being transferred to local
authorities. In the case of functions moving
between levels of government, the policy areas of
Agriculture and Health have seen shifts from
central to local and back in the decades since
independence. In 1931, the Agriculture Act
approved the formal appointment of county
committees of agriculture which would operate
independently of county councils34. They were
abolished under the Agriculture (Research, Training
and Advice) Act, 1988 and their work replaced by a
national body called Teagasc35. The Health Act of
1970 established regional health boards to assume
the functions of local authorities in relation to the
administration of health services, a function that
had become statutory in 1947. However, the 2004
Health Act abolished these boards and transferred
their functions to the Health Service Executive, a
national body. 
In 1995, the government established a Devolution
Commission to conduct a ‘whole of government’
examination of activities performed at the different
levels of administration and make suggestions on
which functions could appropriately be devolved to
local authorities. The commission identified areas
such as tourism, economic development, education
and social welfare as examples where local
government involvement could be enhanced36. It
also recommended that committees at national
level representative of government departments,
local authorities, service providers and user groups
be established to discuss policy issues related to
local government. Furthermore, in its Second
Report it recommended the closer alignment of
local government with local development agencies
and groups, and this was subsequently pursued
through the city and county development boards37.
However, it has been suggested that there is scope
for further improvement in the formal mechanisms
of communication between national and sub-
national government in order to ensure coherence
in policy making38.
Internationally, what functions or services are
more appropriately performed by local, regional or
national levels of government has never been
defined. While divisions of responsibility between
levels of government frequently provoke tensions in
federal systems, the web of formal and informal
modes of communication between the ‘centre’ and
local and regional government ensures that such
tensions are alleviaated. Of course, central govern-
ment is not a unitary actor and managing the array
of local and regional bodies identified in this study
requires considerable efforts at co-ordination.
Within sub-national government in Ireland, there
are extensive formal and informal connections and
activities that link local and regional bodies. The
recent creation of city and county development
boards represents institutional innovation for the
purposes of rationalising and co-ordinating these
activities within local authority areas. Similarly, the
encouragement of interest-group bargaining as a
means of problem-solving has resulted in new
interactions at sub-national level as well as a range
of new local bodies such as Partnership companies.
Traditionally, local government in Ireland has
been conceived of as the sum of local authorities,
with elected members responding to local needs at
the helm of each. However, while local authorities
were and are central to our understanding of
government beyond the centre, such a minimalist
view of local government fails to take into account
a range of actors at local (and regional) level which
has existed since the earliest decades of the state’s
independence. As this study demonstrates, a move
from government to ‘governance’39 at the sub-
national level is not necessarily a new phenomenon
11
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33 A similar case has been made in the British context by King, D. and Stoker, G. (eds) Rethinking local democracy (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1996).
34 Roche, D. Local Government in Ireland (Dublin: IPA, 1982), p. 60.
35 O’Sullivan, T. “Local Areas and Structures” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA,
2003), p. 41.
36 Devolution Commission Interim Report (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1996), pp. 27-28; Devolution Commission Second Report (Dublin:
Stationery Office, 1997), p. 15.
37 Devolution Commission Second Report (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1997), p. 17.
38 Keogan, J. F. “Reform in Irish Local Government” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J.F. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin:
IPA, 2003), p. 87. For analysis of this issue in relation to social inclusion, see O’Riordáin, S. Poverty and Social Inclusion: Linking Local
and National Structures (Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency, 2006).
39 Rhodes, R.A.W. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 1997); Pierre, J. and Peters, G.B. Governance, Politics and the State (London: Macmillan, 2000); Kooiman, J. Governing
as Governance (London: Sage, 2003).
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in Ireland, and multiple actors have been involved
in service delivery at local level for many decades.
Clearly, recent years have witnessed acceleration in
the number of such bodies in response to changing
economic circumstances, modes of problem solving
and co-ordination requirements. As a consequence,
there are few policy areas in which local authorities
must not also consult with other sub-national (and
national) bodies before taking action.
Rhodes defines ‘sub-central’ government as ‘the
arena of political activity concerned with the
relations between central political institutions in
the capital city and those sub-central political
organisations and governmental bodies within the
accepted boundaries of the state’40. A key question
that arises when attempting to understand the
relationship between central government and sub-
national government is whether or not the
relationship is a principal-agent one, common to
theories of public administration, or if the principle
of partnership is adopted. The interviews
undertaken as part of this research identify that
partnership and consultation are key concerns of
government departments when communicating
with local and regional bodies, and input to policy
making is normally provided through formal
channels or ‘recognised [representative] bodies’. 
Apart from offering greater devolution of power,
therefore, sub-national government also offers
diversity in response to local need and the 
wishes of the population. This is in contrast 
to a centralising policy, whereby government
departments would use a number of regional
executive offices to provide services. This latter
model is advocated as providing more consistent
application of state policy and the removal of
potential for internal conflict between the
department and local bodies, and between one local
organisation and another. In Ireland, such a
centralising policy occurs in relation to some policy
areas, for example the health services. 
In Britain, the establishment of ‘local quangos’
(particularly during the 1980s) has been understood
in the context of New Public Management reforms,
political necessity, and a belief in broadening
participation in local governance41. In many cases,
local quangos divested local authorities of
functions in areas such as education and health,
and were the subject of concern in this regard42.
This is consistent with economic and rational
choice theories of why public bodies or agencies are
chosen – they allow for an ‘unbundling’ of
government in order to achieve more efficient and
responsive performance. However, simple dis-
aggregation does not adequately explain the
phenomenon in the Irish case, and the reasons for
establishing various sub-national bodies are
detailed in Chapter 5. The majority of local and
regional bodies established during the 1990s
undertook new functions, rather than removing
functions from local authorities, and their
relationships with ‘parent’ organisations have
developed in a variety of ways. If anything, the
diversity of local and regional bodies examined
here demonstrates the path-dependent and largely
uncoordinated manner in which Irish public
administration has evolved; the autonomy and
accountability of many sub-sectors being predi-
cated on existing organisational structures and
heavily influenced by administrative culture.
The process of agencification at national level, as
well as the use of contract arrangements such as
public-private partnerships, demonstrates the
increased fragmentation of government in Ireland.
At sub-national level, such fragmentation also
exists. Bodies such as the Environmental Protection
Agency and the National Roads Authority have
changed the institutional environment in which
local authorities must operate. Equally, the
emergence of new sub-national bodies poses new
challenges. For instance, as well as various
charitable organisations such as housing
associations, local authorities must work with a
range of limited companies including childcare
committees and Partnerships. As later chapters
identify, local politicians are appointed to the
boards of organisations in every sub-sector
surveyed in this study, thus providing a channel of
communication between local authorities and non-
elected bodies. Within the non-elected sub-national
state, therefore, there is considerable variety of
operation and composition, and given the move
towards greater fragmentation and interdependence
in recent years, this study provides a timely
examination of local and regional non-commercial
bodies in Ireland. Chapter 4 will consider these
bodies individually in more detail.
12
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40 Rhodes, R.A.W. Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The sub-central governments of Britain (London: Unwin, 1988), p. 14.
41 Stoker, G. Transforming Local Governance: From Thatcherism to New Labour (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 32-3.
42 Hall, W. and Weir, S. The Untouchables: Power and Accountability in the Quango State (London: Scarman Trust, 1996).
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The survey population for this study consisted of
283 non-commercial local and regional bodies. As
already noted, with the exception of two bodies, all
of the population are duplicates, i.e. each
organisation had a sister body performing similar
work but in different geographical area. The
response to the survey of 157 bodies included these
two non-duplicate bodies and in order to maintain
confidentiality and avoid distortion of the
examination of any sub-sector by including one or
both non-duplicate body, it was decided after
examination not to include them in the analysis.
Therefore our aggregate survey response consists of
155 non-commercial local and regional bodies in
twelve sub-sectors (see listing below). This and the
following chapters consider in detail the data
received from these bodies. As previously
indicated, the findings represent the bona fide
opinions of respondents from these organisations.
For ease of understanding and in order to
demonstrate the range and variety of bodies under
consideration, the twelve sub-sectors are categor-
ised here into five sectors (local and regional
administration, educational, promotional and
developmental, co-ordination, and local
authorities). As local authorities have a direct
constitutional and electoral mandate, they are
treated separately in all subsequent empirical
chapters. While other sub-sectors will also be
treated individually, where appropriate, each will
be compared with the norm for the eleven sub-
sectors as a whole. Including local authorities as
part of aggregate findings for local and regional
bodies would not only fail to give due cognisance to
their distinct statutory and constitutional identity
but would also skew the interpretation of findings
presented here. Reference will also be made as
necessary to the study of national non-commercial
bodies by McGauran, Verhoest and Humphreys43.
The five sectors and their constituent sub-sectors
are:
1. Local Authorities
City, County and 
Borough Councils






● Vocational Education 
Committees
4. Promotional and 
Developmental




● Regional Fisheries Boards
● Regional Tourism 
Authorities
5. Co-ordination
● City and County 
Development Boards44
● City and County 
Childcare Committees
4
Non-commercial local and regional bodies – 
creation and features
_______________
43 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005).
44 Though described as ‘development’ boards, the principal functions and raison d’être of city and county development boards is co-
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Before considering in more detail the role, size and
other descriptive issues of the organisations under
examination, a useful comparison is drawn here
between national non-commercial bodies and the
eleven sub-sectors (local authorities are excluded)
in terms of primary and secondary function.
Table 4.1 Primary/Main45 Function (%)
Function National Norm for eleven
Bodies Local and 
% Regional
Sub-Sectors %
To advise 23 1
Direct implementation 
of policy 15 28
Provision of information 13 2








*The remaining 5 per cent of national bodies are involved in
registration which was not asked of local and regional bodies.
In terms of secondary function, for the eleven sub-
sectors other than local authorities, the norm is as
follows:
Co-ordination 23%
Provision of information 20%
To advise 20%
Direct implementation of policy 16%
Promotional (non-commercial) development 11%
More detailed analysis of these figures follows as
the bodies in each category are described by
drawing on the information provided by survey
respondents.
4.1 Local authorities
Under this category are included the twenty-nine
county, five city and five borough councils. 
While seventy-five town councils also exist, their
limited range of functions precluded them from
consideration in the study. A majority of local
authority respondents (65 per cent) traced their
contemporary formal legal status to the pre-
Independence 1898 Local Government (Ireland)
Act, which provided for the rationalisation of local
authority structures and functions and established
the local authorities as corporate bodies with
elected councils. Demonstrating the historical roots
of local government in Ireland, some 11 per cent of
responses reported even earlier legal establishment
and almost half of all respondents (46 per cent)
noted that their local authority had a previous
existence. However, following recent legislation
such as the 1993 Local Government (Dublin) Act
and the 2001 Local Government Act, a number of
local authorities also identified more recent years as
the point of their establishment. 
While the Republic of Ireland has historically
been divided into twenty-six county areas, there are
in fact twenty-nine County Councils. This arises
due to the division of Tipperary into North
Tipperary County Council and South Tipperary
County Council46, and of the former County Dublin
into Fingal, South Dublin and Dún Laoghaire-
Rathdown County Councils in 199447. The five city
councils are Dublin, Cork, Galway, Limerick and
Waterford. 
The only other category of local authority
considered here are the borough councils, of which
there are five – Kilkenny, Drogheda, Clonmel, Sligo
and Wexford. Their status arises from their
historical receipt of a self-governing charter, and
while the 2001 Act in effect repealed their charters,
within their boundaries the borough councils
perform many of the same functions as city and
county councils. However, in some functional areas
the county council in which the borough council is
situated will have final responsibility48. The final
type of local authority, town councils, have elected
councils usually consisting of nine members. Under
the 2001 Act, the seventy-five town councils are
principally concerned with promoting the
community interest and some planning and
housing functions within the town boundary areas.
Following a referendum in 1999, a new Article
(28A) was inserted into the Constitution which
_______________
45 The National Non-Commercial Study asked respondents to identify the main function of their organisation, while the Local and
Regional Non-Commercial study asked for ‘primary’ and ‘secondary functions’.
46 This dates from the division of the county area into north and south ridings in 1838.
47 By virtue of the Local Government (Dublin) Act, 1993.
48 O’Sullivan, T. “Local Areas and Structures” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA,
2003), pp. 41-81.
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strengthened the recognition of local authorities
and the requirement for regular local elections49.
As Roche identifies, the services traditionally
provided by Irish local authorities arise from
‘history, accident [and] tradition’50, as much as
through agreed division of labour between levels of
government. Currently, the work of Irish local
authorities is normally categorised into nine
programme groups. These are:
(1) Housing and Building
(2) Road Transportation and Safety
(3) Water Supply and Sewerage
(4) Development Incentives and Control (Planning)
(5) Environmental Protection
(6) Recreation and Amenity
(7) Agriculture, Education, Health and Welfare
(8) Community and Enterprise
(9) Miscellaneous Services.
The amount of time spent working on each of
their programme group areas varies significantly,
and the survey responses identified that by far the
most common policy fields local authorities operate
in are infrastructure, environment and local
development. Also, as Figure 4.1 demonstrates, 73
per cent of local authorities saw their primary
function as direct implementation of policy, with
the next most common response being regulation 
(8 per cent). This is in contrast to the study of
national bodies where only 15 per cent of bodies
identified direct implementation of policy as their
main function, and the norm for the eleven other
sub-sectors where the corresponding figure is 28
per cent. In terms of secondary function, the
findings demonstrate that 39 per cent of local
authorities chose regulation (compared to only 2
per cent for the eleven other sub-sectors), 15 per
cent chose co-ordination, 15 per cent chose
promotional (non-commercial) development and
almost 12 per cent commercial development.
In terms of personnel, the survey showed that
local authorities range in size from 100 to 6,800
full-time equivalents, with the average local
authority having 707 staff. Budgets for 2005 ranged
from €15 million to €1.5 billion but figures can
change significantly year on year depending on the
capital projects being undertaken by individual
local authorities. The adoption of annual budgets is
a matter for the elected members, who determine in
the budget the annual rate on valuation (local tax
rate) on commercial properties and the level of
charges for goods and services to be provided.
4.2 Local and regional administration
There are three sub-sectors involved in local and
regional administration – Regional Authorities,
Regional Assemblies and Harbour Commissions.
Regional authorities
While Ireland is divided into four provinces –
Munster, Leinster, Ulster and Connaught – the
provincial areas have never been used for
administrative or government purposes, and they
are principally used today by sports organisa-
tions51. Regional government, in the traditional
continental European sense, has not therefore
officially featured in the Irish system of govern-
ment. However, for the administration of EU
funding, new administrative regions were created
in 1994 and 1999, and are included in this study. 
Eight regional authorities were established under
the Local Government Act, 1991 (Regional
_______________
49 Local authorities were implicitly recognised in Articles 12.4.2, 15.2 and 22.1, but no time limits to the lifetime of elected councils
previously existed.
50 Roche, D. Local Government in Ireland (Dublin: IPA, 1982), p. 7
51 With the exception of Dublin, the provinces also form the constituency boundaries for European Parliament elections.
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Authorities) (Establishment) Order 1993. Each
regional authority is indirectly elected, and consists
of members from a number of local authorities as
follows:
Border: Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan
and Sligo
Dublin: Dublin City, Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown,
Fingal and South Dublin
Mid-East: Kildare, Meath and Wicklow
Midlands: Laois, Longford, Offaly and Westmeath
Mid-West: Clare, Limerick City, Limerick County
and North Tipperary
South-East: Carlow, Kilkenny, South Tipperary,
Waterford City, Waterford County and Wexford
South-West: Cork City, Cork County and Kerry
West: Galway City, Galway County, Mayo and
Roscommon
Regional authorities elect a chairperson annually
from amongst their membership, and are assisted by
a director and policy and administrative staff.
Results show the average staff complement
standing at 4.6 full time equivalents. Under the
1991 Act, the principal roles of the authorities are
to promote the co-ordination of public service
provision and to monitor the delivery of EU
Structural Fund assistance in the regions. This is
borne out by the survey results, with two thirds 
(67 per cent) of regional authorities reporting that
co-ordination is their primary function (with
another 17 per cent stating that the primary
function is to ‘promote co-ordination of the
provision of public services in the region’). Half of
the regional authorities also identified provision of
policy advice as their principal secondary function. 
Survey results show that the authorities are
involved in many policy areas, including local
development, infrastructure, environment and
equality. The authorities have specific responsi-
bility for: 
● reviewing the development plans of local
authorities in their region and in adjoining
regions in order to develop a long-term planning
framework;
● preparing regional planning guidelines and
regional economic and social strategies;
● promoting cooperation, joint actions, arrange-
ments and consultation among local authorities
and other public bodies52. 
In order to fulfil these functions, each authority has
both an operational committee and an EU
operational committee. The operational committee
is chaired by the chairperson of the regional
authority and comprises senior management from
the constituent local authorities and other relevant
public sector bodies operating in the region. The
operational committee prepares the work of the
regional authority and assists and advises it on
matters relating to its functions. Also, each regional
authority has a designated city/ county manager
from one of its local authorities to further enhance
the linkages between the local authorities and the
regional authority.
The EU operational committee consists of:
● the authority’s chairperson
● the manager of each constituent city and county
council
● the chairperson and one other representative of
each constituent city and county council
● the chairperson and one other representative of
any constituent borough council and certain
town councils
● representatives of certain state agencies 
● representatives of interested parties including
trade unions, farmers and employers53.
This committee assists the regional authority in
matters relating to EU assistance and reviewing the
implementation of various EU operational 
programmes in a region. While the regional
authorities are involved with many issues of service
provision, they do not have executive functions and
do not provide services directly to the public.
Regional authorities are under the aegis of the
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government. Amongst those regional authorities
responding to the survey, the budgets for
performing their duties ranged from €320,000 to €3
million.
Regional assemblies
As well as regional authorities, another branch of
Irish local and regional administration was created
under strong EU influence. In order to apply for the
2000 to 2006 round of EU structural funds, the
government established by Statutory Instrument a
new regional tier of government in 1999. The
_______________
52 See the website of the Irish Regions Office at http://www.iro.ie/regional_authorities.html.
53 Callanan, M. “Regional Authorities and Regional Assemblies” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out
(Dublin: IPA, 2003: 429-444), p. 434.
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country was divided into two regions (according to
regional authority boundaries) with an associated
regional assembly for each region. The regional
assemblies are named after the general geographical
area under their jurisdiction for the purposes of the
disbursement of funds. 
The first region is the Border, Midlands and
Western Regional (BMW) Assembly, with its
headquarters at Ballaghaderreen. It consists of
twenty-nine elected members drawn from thirteen
local authorities. They are Cavan, Donegal, Galway,
Laois, Leitrim, Longford, Louth, Mayo, Monaghan,
Offaly, Roscommon, Sligo and Westmeath. The
BMW Region achieved Objective 1 status for
structural funds for the period 2000-6.
The Southern and Eastern (S&E) Regional
Assembly consists of forty-one elected members
from the local authorities of Dublin City, Dun
Laoghaire-Rathdown, Fingal, South Dublin, Carlow,
Tipperary South, Waterford City, Wexford,
Kilkenny, Cork City and County, Kerry, Clare,
Limerick City and County, Tipperary North,
Kildare, Meath, Wicklow. The S&E Region achieved
Objective 1 (in transition) status for the period
2000-6.
Each regional assembly employs fourteen
personnel including a director as well as policy and
administrative staff. The survey responses mirrored
the official roles of the assemblies which are to: 
● manage their respective Regional Operational
Programme (below) under the National Develop-
ment Plan
● monitor the impact of the EU programme under
the National Development Plan/Community
Support Framework within their region
● promote the co-ordination of public services
within the region
● make public bodies aware of the regional
implications of their policies, plans and
activities54.
The Regional Operational Programmes for each
regional assembly bring together a wide range of
initiatives at both regional and local level. They
cover regional and local infrastructure, local
enterprise development, agriculture and rural
development, social inclusion and childcare. As
with the regional authorities, the assemblies are
under the aegis of the Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, but
also work closely with the Department of Finance.
Harbour commissions
The final sub-sector involved in local and regional
administration is the harbour commissions. The
1946 Harbours Act is still the principal governing
legislation for the commissions. It created a new
legal basis for the control and work of harbour
authorities which, as and from 2006, are the
responsibility of the Department of Transport. Ten
of the authorities are known as harbour commis-
sions (Bantry Bay Harbour Commission was created
under the 1976 Harbours Act55), although the term
is frequently interchanged with harbour authority.
The harbour commissions are corporate bodies
administered by commissioners and therefore fulfil
the criteria necessary for our definition of a public
service body. However, the size, nature and
historical legacy of their creation makes harbour
commissions unique when compared with other
sub-sectors as the empirical chapters herein detail.
Harbour commissions are elected in the same
year as local authority elections and consist of
representatives of stakeholders such as harbour
users and local authorities, and ministerial
appointees. While not specifically commercial
bodies, harbour commissions do collect rates and
charges as set by the minister, and as far as possible
are required to be self-financing. The minister also
retains control over the disposal and acquisition of
assets. As noted above, two town councils at
Kilrush and Youghal are in fact the harbour
authorities for their harbours, and while the
harbour at Annagassan technically has
commissioners, they are inactive and it is de facto
administered by Louth County Council.
In January 2005, the government published its
‘Ports Policy Statement’. It states that the continued
operation of many of the regional harbours under
the outdated provisions of the Harbours Act 1946 is
unsustainable on the grounds of good governance. It
also reiterates the view that these harbours would
best achieve their potential through their transfer to
local authority ownership. However, in harbours
where significant commercial traffic exists,
consideration is to be given to bringing the harbour
under the control of a port company.
_______________
54 More details on the work of the regional assemblies are available at www.bwmregionalassembly.ie and www.seregionalassembly.ie.
55 O’Sullivan, T “Local Areas and Structures” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA,
2003), p. 65.
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The Department of Transport is currently working
with the Department of the Environment, Heritage
and Local Government to advance the implementa-
tion of the Ports Policy Statement with regard to the
transfer of the designated regional harbours to their
respective local authorities, where appropriate, and
will proceed individually in conjunction with the
relevant local authorities and harbour authorities,
having regard to local requirements in each case.
The survey responses identify that harbour
commissions are involved in the local develop-
ment, infrastructure and natural resources policy
fields and see their primary and secondary duties as
mainly involving regulation, co-ordination and
direct implementation of policy. There is
considerable variation in the size and numbers of
staff employed by the commissions, with the staff
complement ranging from one part-time harbour
master to five full time equivalents. Responses
suggest that the average for each commission is
2.75. The budgets for harbour commissions for 2005
ranged from €22,000 to €500,000. Most harbour
commissions are self-financing with respect to
current expenditure, with finances being raised
through berthing fees and tonnage charges. Some
capital revenue (approximately €4 million in 2006)
is made available for maintenance and repairs by
central government, but significant capital
investments do not arise.
4.3 Educational
There is only one sub-sector considered under this
sector: vocational education committees.
Vocational education committees
Vocational education committees (VECs) were
established as statutory corporate bodies under the
Vocational Education Acts, 1930 to 2001, and are
under the supervision of the Department of
Education and Science. As originally conceived
under the 1930 Act, ‘vocation’ meant both
continuation in education and technical (as
opposed to academic) education56. VECs were
therefore designed to be responsive to local
educational needs and many of them were formed
out of the previously existing technical instruction
committees. Today they are involved in not only
secondary but also post-secondary further
education and back-to-education programmes. The
1930 Act established thirty-eight VECs but this was
reduced to thirty-three following a reorganisation in
1998. While their jurisdiction broadly follows local
authority boundaries, they do not come under the
control of city and county management. However, a
majority of the members of each VEC are elected
members of local authorities, and they have
reserved functions as established under the 2001
Act.
The principal role of VECs is to provide,
administer and manage vocational schools and
community colleges. In this respect, 53 per cent of
survey responses identified the direct implementa-
tion of policy as the primary function of VECs, with
co-ordination (12 per cent), provision of informa-
tion (6 per cent) and regulation (6 per cent) also
featuring. They employ administrative and teaching
staff and provide education and ancillary services
for their administrative areas. The average staff
complement (including teachers) for VECs is 432.
They are overwhelmingly funded by the state but
also receive revenue from local rates. Budgets for
2005 ranged from €8.5 to €140 million. The most
recent legislation pertaining to VECs, the Vocational
Education (Amendment) Act, 2001 reformed the
financial, management and accountability
structures in order to better achieve local
requirements57. 
4.4 Promotional and developmental
Within this sector, there are five sub-sectors – city
and county enterprise boards, Partnerships,
LEADER companies, regional fisheries boards and
regional tourism authorities. The vast majority of
respondents from each sub-sector identified both
developmental and promotional (both commercial
and non-commercial) work as part of their primary
and secondary functions and are therefore grouped
together in this large sector.
City and county enterprise boards
Enterprise boards were first established in 1993 to
encourage local enterprise and entrepreneurship.
They emerged out of a pilot project that provided
project grants in ten counties in western Ireland58.
However, they only achieved legal recognition as
companies limited by guarantee by virtue of Section
_______________
56 Coolahan, J.Irish Education: history and structure (Dublin: IPA, 1981), p. 96
57 Curry, J. Irish Social Services (4th ed.) (Dublin: IPA, 2005), p. 90
58 Sabel, C. Ireland: Local Partnerships and Social Innovation (OECD: Paris, 1996), p. 46
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 18
19
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE BODIES IN IRELAND
10 the Industrial Development Act, 1995. There are
currently thirty-five enterprise boards and with the
exception of one local authority area (County Cork)
their geographical areas of operation are consistent
with local authority boundaries. Co-ordination and
supervision of their efforts comes within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Enterprise, Trade
and Employment.
Survey responses demonstrate that the main
policy fields in which enterprise boards function
are enterprise, local development and training.
Their principal role is to help establish and
thereafter support the development of employment
through small enterprises, defined as those
businesses employing ten or less people. This
support takes various forms, including financial
assistance and business advice. The sectors that
enterprise boards are most closely involved with
are manufacturing, services and tourism59. While
one third of respondents identified commercial
development as their primary function and 11 per
cent promotional (non-commercial) development
and regulation respectively, 39 per cent reported
that direct implementation of policy is their main
task. In terms of secondary functions, 38 per cent of
respondents identified the provision of advice.
Interestingly, while 40 per cent of respondents
noted that the EU had had ‘some influence’ on the
establishment of their enterprise board, the
remaining 60 per cent found it had had a ‘strong
influence’. Three quarters of the respondents noted
EU funding as the reason for this.
The board of each enterprise board normally
consists of an independent chairperson and
fourteen ordinary members. The ordinary members
usually consist of four local authority elected
members and a combination of representatives from
state organisations, the social partners (i.e. umbrella
organisations for the trade unions, employers,
farming and NGO sectors) and local business or
development organisations. The composition of
each board is described in its Articles and
Memorandum of Association. Each enterprise
board has a chief executive officer and a small
number of staff, with the average complement of
full time equivalents being four. Budgets range from
€686,000 to €1.2 million. 
Partnerships 
Partnerships (also known as Area Partnerships 
or Partnership Companies60) are independent
companies limited by guarantee principally
involved in issues related to social inclusion and
local community development. A report on their
work published by the OECD in 1996 viewed them
as ‘extraordinarily innovative’ and noted the
manner in which they, amongst other things,
widened participation in processes of change and
adapted national policies to meet local need61. 
Each Partnership has Memoranda and Articles of
Association. Most were established during the
1991-6 period in areas of disadvantage and with
relatively high levels of long-term unemployment,
and 83 per cent of respondents stated that the EU
had some or a strong influence on their
establishment. There are thirty-eight partnerships
currently in existence and each has a board of
directors drawn at local level from representatives
of the social partners, various state organisations
and community and voluntary organisations active
in economic and social development62. Originally,
Partnerships did not include local elected
councillors but this situation has since been
changed to include them. Their work has been
underwritten by various national social partnership
agreements and more recently the National
Development Plan 2000-6. Indeed, their creation
followed substantially from the rationale that the
success of social partnership at national level could
be replicated at local level though the structured
organisation of stakeholder groups. 
Each Partnership is required to prepare a local
development plan to counter disadvantage and to
implement that plan. Funding is derived through
Pobal, a not-for-profit company that manages
programmes on behalf of the Irish government and
the EU, aimed at promoting social inclusion,
reconciliation and equality. Partnerships have
evolved significantly in recent years and the
National Development Plan 2000-6 also required
them to take an active role in tackling issues of
social exclusion. Furthermore, many Partnerships
are also involved in the delivery of other
programmes such as LEADER (below) and Local
Employment Service. Survey results show that 
_______________
59 Keyes, J. “Community and Enterprise” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA, 2003),
p. 290
60 There are also thirty-one ‘Community Partnerships’ and two ‘Employment Pacts’ funded by Pobal but they do not form part of this
study.
61 Sabel, C. Ireland: Local Partnerships and Social Innovation (OECD; Paris, 1996)
62 Keyes, J. “Community and Enterprise” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA, 2003),
p. 290
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35 per cent of Partnerships see co-ordination as
their primary function, followed closely by direct
implementation of policy (29 per cent). There are
significant differences in the size of Partnership
companies, with some having as few as five staff to
others with as many as seventy. The average staff
complement is thirty. Budgets for 2005 ranged from
€850,000 to €3.5 million. At time of writing, a
process is underway to provide, where possible, a
merger between Partnerships and LEADER groups
(below) within, again as far as is possible, local
authority geographical areas. This process, known
as the ‘cohesion process’ is being directed by the
Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht
Affairs and is designed to provide Partnership
companies in all areas of the country. At time of
writing, twelve partnership companies operate
within LEADER structures.
LEADER Groups
LEADER is an acronym for Liasions Entre Actions
de Développement de l’Économie Rurale (Links
Between Development Actions for the Rural
Economy). It is an EU initiative designed to foster
rural development at the local level through
‘groups’, and since 2002 has been supervised by the
Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht
Affairs. It began in Ireland in 1991 with the
establishment of sixteen LEADER I groups, and was
followed with LEADER II for the period 1994-9.
LEADER II witnessed the establishment of thirty-
four local action groups and three sectoral bodies,
Irish Farm Holidays, Irish Country Holidays and
Muintir na Tíre. LEADER + is the third such
programme and covers the period 2000-6. It is part-
financed by the EU but the exchequer now
contributes a significant portion of the overall
revenue. However, 90 per cent of respondents
stated that the EU still had a ‘strong influence’ on
their organisation’s current form. As with its
predecessors, funding is channelled through local
action groups which have responsibility for
implementing business plans drawn up for their
area63. A website – the Irish Leader Support Unit –
(www.ilsu.ie) also exists to support the LEADER
groups in their work.
LEADER groups are private companies and their
work includes activities such as the marketing of
goods, rural tourism and supporting small firms,
and through the county and city development board
structures (below), attempt to work in a co-
ordinated manner with other local bodies. Twenty-
eight per cent of respondents to the survey noted
that their primary task is the direct implementation
of policy, while 17 per cent identified promotional 
(non-commercial) development, 11 per cent
commercial development, 11 per cent co-ordination
and 33 per cent identified other primary functions
such as rural development.
Each LEADER group has a board comprising
representatives of local communities, state bodies,
local authorities and social partners (which
includes farming interests). While there are no
ministerial representatives, they also tend to have a
representative from the county enterprise board in
order to avoid duplication of effort. The member-
ship of the board can change annually. The average
staff complement is nineteen and budgets for 2005
ranged from €384,000 to €3.5 million. As noted
above, work is currently underway on the creation
of a unified structure for the LEADER groups and
Partnerships in rural areas.
Regional fisheries boards
There are seven regional fisheries boards. They
have their origins in the Inlands Fisheries Trust and
Boards of Conservators. As statutory bodies under
the 1980 Fisheries Act (amended slightly in 1999),
they have responsibility for the conservation,
protection, development, management and
promotion of inland fisheries in their region. In this
regard, two thirds of survey respondents identified
regulation as their primary task. The boards are
appointed through a combination of ministerial
appointment and election by stakeholders as
described in the 1980 Act and range from twenty-
one to twenty-three members. The average staff size
of each fisheries board is forty including a chief
executive and a complement of staff involved in
administration and outdoor work. The chief
executive is recruited through the Public
Appointments Service and other staff are recruited
locally. Budgets for 2005 ranged from €2.4 to €3.5
million, and the boards tend to raise approximately
20 per cent of their income through licence fees and
fisheries rates.
They are supported by and report to the Central
Fisheries Board, a national body that advises the
20
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63 O’Sullivan, T “Local Areas and Structures” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA,
2003), p. 72.
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Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural
Resources, and the Inland Fisheries, Marine Leisure
and Research Division of the department. The
regional fisheries boards may have representation
on regional authorities or regional assemblies,
although the jurisdictions of regional fisheries
boards, regional authorities and regional assemblies
are not congruent.
Several consultancy reports have been produced
in recent years concerning aspects of inland
fisheries and the regional fisheries boards64. A
comprehensive report published in 2005 criticised
the manner in which the inland fisheries sector
(including the regional fisheries boards) was
currently governed and noted that the inland
fisheries sector involved a range of private interests
and state actors. Apart from the Department for
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources,
these included the Department of the Environment,
Heritage and Local Government, and up to fifteen
other state bodies (excluding local authorities)65. It
recommended that the functions traditionally
exercised by the regional fisheries boards be
transferred to various departments, existing
agencies (such as the Marine Institute) and a new
regulatory body. It also proposed that a National
Inland Fisheries Authority would employ staff in
various regions to carry out its functions rather than
there being duplicate independent bodies.
It also advocated that the state should withdraw
from ownership in favour of regulated ‘community
ownership’66. The review also recommended the
establishment of five statutory ‘Regional Consulta-
tive and Advisory Councils’ to provide input into
policy development. It stated that the councils
should be ‘broadly representative of the totality of
the local stakeholder community’ and be estab-
lished on a statutory basis67. At time of writing, the
regional fisheries boards are still operating and
further analysis of the proposed reforms is
underway.
Regional tourism authorities
Until their abolition in mid-2006, the regional
tourism authorities were public companies limited
by guarantee, and with their own memoranda and
articles of association. Originally established by
Bord Fáilte (now Fáilte Ireland) in 1964, the
companies were charged with the promotion of
tourism and related products in their respective
regions. They also co-ordinated the work of county
tourism committees which existed within their
jurisdictions. Membership of the authorities was
held by local authorities and members of the
tourism industry who paid an annual membership
fee which gave them voting entitlements for board
members. While eight ‘regional tourism
organisations’ were originally established, this has
since been reduced to six and the name regional
tourism authority has been in use since 1996. The
companies also operate networks of tourist
information offices. 
As later chapters identify, regional tourism
authorities enjoy significant levels of autonomy
from both Fáilte Ireland and the Department of Arts,
Sports and Tourism. They are financed by Fáilte
Ireland (which receives its funding from the
department), local authorities, membership
subscriptions and revenues generated through some
commercial activities. Each regional tourism
authority has a board consisting of elected and
appointed members, including representation from
Fáilte Ireland, with whom they are required to work
closely. Unlike many other local and regional
bodies, the regional tourism authorities do not have
any ministerial nominees on their boards. 
While the principal duties of the regional tourism
authorities as reported in the survey are the
implementation of policy and promotional (non-
commercial) development, survey respondents
noted that their secondary functions also included
commercial development and co-ordination. Unlike
the majority of local and regional non-commercial
bodies, respondents from regional tourism
authorities reported that the EU has had no
influence on their current form. The average staff
complement is seventy-five full time equivalents,
and budgets for those responding ranged from €2.6
to €7 million in 2005.
A consultancy report published in 2005
advocated an enhanced brief for the tourism
authorities, with more emphasis on their strategic
21
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64 See for example Gap Gemini Ernst & Young Human Resource Strategy Review: Future State Design Report into the Central and
Regional Fisheries Boards (Dublin: 2001) and Price Waterhouse Review of the Organisation and Management Structure of the Fishery
Service (Dublin: 1996)
65 Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources Review of the Inland Fisheries Sector in Ireland – Stage 1 (Dublin:
FGS Consulting, 2005), p. vi
66 Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources Review of the Inland Fisheries Sector in Ireland – Stage 1 (Dublin:
FGS Consulting, 2005), p. xv
67 Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources Review of the Inland Fisheries Sector in Ireland – Stage 1 (Dublin:
FGS Consulting, 2005), p. xxii
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rather than administrative roles. This has been
approved by the minister and at time of writing
progress is underway on the establishment of six
new Regional Tourism Development Boards68 to
perform these new functions. During 2006 the
regional tourism authorities abolished themselves
following acceptance of the restructuring proposals
by each board and an EGM of members. The boards’
functions and any assets have been assumed by
Fáilte Ireland. The new boards will have an
independent chair appointed by Fáilte Ireland, two
local authority elected representatives, two local
authority managers, four tourism industry
representatives and one other Fáilte Ireland
appointee.
4.5 Co-ordination
As already noted above, non-commercial local and
regional bodies in many sub-sectors are involved in
co-ordination activities alongside their other
functions. However, the primary role of the bodies
in two sub-sectors – city and county development
boards and childcare committees - are explicitly co-
ordinating ones and so are considered together
here.
City and county development boards
In 1998, the Report of the Task Force on the
Integration of Local Government and Local
Development Systems recommended closer links
between local authorities and local development
bodies such as LEADER groups, enterprise boards
and Partnership companies (above). As a result, city
and county development boards (CDBs) were
established in 2000 in each of the thirty-four county
and city council areas to provide more coherent
delivery of services, as well as to identify and fill
gaps in service delivery. CDBs are normally
facilitated by the local authority’s community and
enterprise section. While CDBs have a particular
commitment to tacking social exclusion and
promoting local development69, respondents to the
survey noted that they are involved in a very wide
range of activities, including training, social
services, environment and enterprise. Sixty-five per
cent of respondents stated that their primary
function is co-ordination.
The boards comprise representatives of local
authorities (both elected and administrative),
national bodies (such as An Garda Síochána,
Enterprise Ireland and FÁS), the social partners,
local development bodies (such as LEADER groups,
enterprise boards and childcare committees) and
various other local non-governmental organisations
and charities. All city and county councils now
have a ‘community and voluntary forum’ which
provides a network mechanism for community and
voluntary groups to nominate their representatives
to the CDB, as well as to local authority strategic
policy committees, enterprise boards, Partnerships
and other local bodies. 
In 2002, each CDB adopted its ten-year strategy
for ‘economic, social and cultural development’,
which followed a design template created by the
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government. The role is also explicitly recognised
in national strategies such as the National
Development Plan 2007-13, Towards 2016 and the
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 2007-16.
The average number of staff facilitating the work of
CDBs is five. City and county development boards
do not normally have their own budget but
indirectly can control resources ranging from
€27,000 to €4 million. The unique nature of city
and county development boards is such that many
of the survey respondents noted difficulties in
giving responses to questions concerning such
issues as human resources where they have little if
any function.
City and county childcare committees
The final sub-sector to be considered are the city
and county childcare committees. There are thirty-
three childcare committees, operating in each
county and city area (with the exception of Galway
County and City which share one such committee).
They were established as companies in 2001 and
operate as working groups of the city and county
development boards. Their role is to advance the
provision and co-ordination of quality childcare
services through the implementation of five-year
strategies. Mirroring this, 74 per cent of survey
respondents stated that their primary function is co-
ordination. 
The boards of management of childcare
22
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committees comprise representatives of local and
regional state organisations, the social partners,
parents, childcare providers and voluntary
organisations involved with childcare. The average
staff complement is 3.5 full time equivalents and
budgets for 2005 ranged from €199,000 to
€500,000. The committees received funding under
the National Development Plan 2000-6 and 74 per
cent of respondents noted that the EU had a ‘strong’
influence on their childcare committee, particularly
in terms of funding. Since 2003, childcare
committees are formally represented on city and
county development boards (above). Their work is
co-ordinated by the Childcare Directorate which,
since 2005, operates within the Office of the
Minister for Children. The directorate had formerly
been housed within the Department of Justice,
Equality and Law Reform.
4.5.1 The EU and co-ordination at local and
regional level
While a wide range of activities are performed by
local and regional bodies, they are not necessarily
as diverse or specialised as those performed by
national bodies. As noted above, while 4 per cent of
national bodies consider co-ordination to be their
primary function, almost a third of sub-national
bodies identified it as their primary function,
indicating either a high diffusion of activity at local
level, or else a concern over possible duplication of
activity. Focusing on the issue of co-ordination as a
primary or secondary function, a breakdown by
local authority and the other eleven sub-sectors is
detailed below, as is the influence of the EU on each
organisation’s current form as perceived by
respondents.
Table 4.2 demonstrates that co-ordination
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Table 4.2: Co-ordination as a function of local and regional bodies
Type of Local or Co-ordination Co-ordination Yes the EU had Year of 
Regional Agency identified as identified as a strong establishment
primary function (%) secondary influence on (modal 
function (%) the organisation’s response)
current form (%)
Local Authorities 0 15 56 1899
Regional Authorities 67 20 100 1994
Regional Assemblies 0 100 100 1999
Harbour Commissions 17 0 0 1946
Vocational Education Committees 13 13 38 1930
Enterprise Boards 0 13 60 1993
Partnerships 36 36 50 1991-6
LEADER 11 30 90 1994-6
Regional Fisheries Boards 0 0 0 1980
Regional Tourism Authorities 0 50 0 1991
Development Boards 65 20 18 2000
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Fig. 4.2: Establishment by year of bodies whose primary function is co-ordination (%)
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features more strongly for some bodies than others,
and there are some commonalities between such
organisations. For example, of those organisations
which most positively identified co-ordination as
their principal task (regional authorities,
Partnerships, development boards and childcare
committees), all were established since the early
1990s. Figure 4.2 shows that the vast majority of
sub-national bodies who identified co-ordination as
their primary function were established since 1994. 
For the two sub-sectors that responded 0 per cent
to co-ordination as a primary function (regional
assemblies and regional tourism authorities), it
featured strongly as their main secondary function
– 100 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. Also,
more than half (54 per cent) of organisations other
than local authorities noted that the EU had a
‘strong influence’ on their current organisation
form. A further 32 per cent reported that the EU had
had ‘some influence’ in this regard70.
4.6 Conclusions
The fact that much of local authority activity is
established in law accounts for the fact that almost
three quarters of respondents noted that the
primary role of their local authority is the direct
implementation of policy. While only 8 per cent
identified regulation as their primary role, 39 per
cent stated that it is their principal secondary
function. The multi-functional role of local
authorities is also reflected in the fact that 
co-ordination, non-commercial promotional
development and commercial development also
feature in responses. Local authorities must also
work in partnership with a significant number of
local and regional bodies across various policy
fields.
The other eleven (non-directly elected) sub-
sectors range considerably in age and function.
However, some important patterns emerge. Just as
the study of national non-commercial bodies found
a sharp increase in the number of such bodies being
established since the early 1990s, so too do the
majority (80 per cent) of sub-national bodies date
from this period onward. Also, co-ordination
emerges as a defining feature of sub-national
government in Ireland. Almost one third (32 per
cent) of local and regional bodies view co-
ordination as their main role, which could indicate
either a high diffusion of activity at local level, or
else a concern over possible duplication of activity.
A further 28 per cent viewed direct implementation
of policy as their primary role with another 18 per
cent identifying specialist areas of work.
In terms of secondary function, analysis of the
norm for the eleven sub-sectors again identified co-
ordination as featuring strongly (23 per cent). Other
prominent roles for sub-national bodies include the
provision of information, advising, the direct
implementation of policy and promotional (non-
commercial) development. 
There is currently considerable institutional
reconfiguration at sub-national level, and at least
three sub-sectors (harbour commissions, regional
fisheries boards and regional tourism authorities)
have recently been abolished or are in the process
of reform or having their main functions subsumed
by other organisations. Many Partnership
companies and LEADER groups have also recently
been merged, with more to follow. Membership of
the EU has also resulted in institutional change at
the sub-national level; at last half (54 per cent) of
organisations other than local authorities noted that
the EU had a ‘strong influence’ on their current
organisation form. A further 32 per cent reported
that the EU had had ‘some influence’ in this regard.
A significant number of sub-national bodies have
Articles and Memoranda of Association and
interviews suggest that the Code of Practice for the
Governance of State Bodies is used extensively.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the autonomy and accountability of
the 155 non-commercial local and regional bodies
who responded to this survey with regard to human
resources is considered. Similar to the study of
national non-commercial bodies, the analysis of
sub-national bodies reveals considerable variation
in average staffing numbers. Between sub-sectors,
these range from approximately three full-time
equivalents (harbour commissions) to several
hundred (local authorities). 
The survey considered two key issues in terms of
human resources – the extent to which the bodies
had autonomy on strategic HR policy, and
autonomy for general HR issues affecting individual
staff members such as numbers, appointments,
salaries, promotion, tenure, evaluation and
dismissals. The matrices used to perform this
analysis are set out in Appendix 3. The issues of
strategic HR autonomy for the eleven sub-sectors
and the local authorities are examined in the first
instance, before consideration of general HR
autonomy.
5.2 Strategic HR autonomy: 
11 sub-sectors
Figure 5.1 illustrates that the aspect of general HR
policy which both national, regional and local
organisations are most likely to have autonomy over
is establishing staff evaluation schemes. At the
other extreme, setting salary level is the single issue
25
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Autonomy and accountability of non-commercial local 
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Fig. 5.1: Organisation can set general policy for the following issues without 
ministerial/departmental influence (%)
*Figures for staff appointment/selection and dismissal are not available for national bodies.
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which such bodies are least likely to have
autonomy over, due to the centralisation of public
sector pay in the Department of Finance. Large
variations emerge between national bodies and
local and regional bodies (other than local
authorities) over deciding on staff numbers. An
average of 40 per cent of sub-national bodies
reported having autonomy over this issue while the
same is true for only 8 per cent of national bodies.
In terms of conditions for promotion, national
bodies (42 per cent) and other local and regional
bodies (45 per cent) have far more discretion than
local authorities (17 per cent). Local and regional
bodies (42 per cent) and local authorities (44 per
cent) also have more discretion over staff tenure
than national bodies (29 per cent). Local and
regional bodies also have considerable discretion
over staff appointment and selection procedures (61
per cent), and dismissal criteria (56 per cent).
Figure 5.1 illustrates that the general HR policy
issue that diverges most from the national agencies
is the setting of staff numbers. Within the sub-
sectors themselves there are considerable
variations, as Figure 5.2 illustrates. In general, staff
numbers for local and regional bodies are capped by
the Department of Finance. LEADER groups,
Partnerships, childcare committees and regional
tourism authorities reported comparatively high
levels of autonomy over the ability to set staff
numbers. However, the organisations must exercise
financial prudence in doing so and the cost of
employing staff must be met within their budget.
The exceptional nature of the founding legislation
for harbour commissions means that any staff that
are employed (including harbour masters), are
technically employed by the commissions
themselves. This explains the unusual result in
Figure 5.2 for the commissions. HR issues for
regional fisheries boards are co-ordinated centrally
by a HR director from the Central Fisheries Board.
The autonomy enjoyed by regional tourism
authorities over the issue is in large part due to the
fact that the seasonal nature of tourism also
demanded such flexibility over hiring staff. 
A considerable gap also emerges in respect of the
ability of local and regional bodies to set salaries,
when compared with national bodies. A detailed
analysis of the eleven sub-sectors in Figure 5.3
shows that all the harbour commissions and a
sizable percentage of LEADER groups and
Partnership companies have autonomy over
salaries. As noted above, interviews suggest that
LEADER groups and Partnerships are encouraged
by the Department of Community, Rural and
Gaeltacht Affairs to maintain financial prudency,
and to keep within their budget when deciding on
salaries. As they are private companies, the terms of
social partnership agreements do not as such apply
to them in terms of salary increases, although links
are increasingly made in relation to the public
service modernisation agenda. The autonomy of
harbour commissions in this regard is again due to
26
















































* This bar identifies the fact that 40 per cent of city and county development board responses were incomplete
Fig. 5.2: Staff Numbers: Ability to set general policy without ministerial/departmental influence
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historical reasons. For other bodies with large
staffing complements, such as VECs and regional
fisheries boards, no local autonomy over salary
exists. The Department of Education and Science
approves annually the staffing allocations for VECs
and terms and conditions are set centrally in
conjunction with the Department of Finance. 
Combining the questions concerning the overall
average level of strategic HR autonomy using the
matrix identified at Appendix 3, the following
distinctions between sub-sectors are revealed in
Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 Strategic HR















While no sub-sector reported having no strategic
HR autonomy, quite a number have a limited
amount of such autonomy. Two sub-sectors
involved in commercial issues, Partnerships and
LEADER groups, exhibit high to maximum levels of
general HR autonomy. Enterprise boards do not. For
reasons described above, harbour commissions also
have maximum independence over general HR
issues.
The bodies surveyed were also asked to what
extent internal HR management autonomy was
extended downwards in their organisation to lower
management levels. Twenty-six per cent of local
authorities reported that this happened in their
organisations ‘to a large extent’, with 70 per cent
reporting ‘to some extent’. For the other eleven sub-
sectors, the norm is 15 per cent reporting ‘to a large
extent’, 36 per cent reporting ‘to some extent’ and
22 per cent reporting not at all. A breakdown by
sub-sector is detailed in Figure 5.4.
Regional tourism authorities are the sub-sector
where such devolution of authority over HR is most
likely to happen, while it also occurred to varying
degrees in the other sub-sectors with the exception
of regional authorities.
5.3 Strategic HR autonomy: 
local authorities
Using a matrix (see Appendix 3) for identifying the
level of autonomy local authorities have in relation
to strategic HR autonomy, it is evident that on
27









































Fig. 5.3: Staff Salary Levels: Ability to set general policy without ministerial/departmental influence
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average local authorities display minimum levels of
such autonomy (see Table 5.1). Local authorities
have no discretion in setting general policy for staff
numbers, salary levels or conditions for promotion,
which are instead established at central level by the
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government and the Department of Finance. The
terms of the social partnership agreements also play
a role in pay-related issues. A minority of local
authorities responded that they did have some
ability to set policy over staff appointment and
selection, tenure and criteria for dismissal. The area
where a majority of local authorities do have
discretion is in relation to staff evaluation schemes.
5.4 Individual HR autonomy: 
11 sub-sectors
In respect of being able to decide on the terms and
conditions of individual members of staff without
ministerial or departmental influence, Table 5.2
identifies the differences between the various non-
commercial local and regional bodies by using the
methodology as set out in Appendix 3.
The table reveals that the three sub-sectors most
likely to have maximum HR autonomy for
individual members of staff are the same as those
identified as having high to maximum general HR
autonomy (see Table 5.1). These are Partnerships,
LEADER groups and harbour commissions.
Partnership companies liase closely with Pobal in
relation to HR. At the other end of the table, as with
autonomy for general HR policy, enterprise boards,
regional authorities, VECs and development boards
achieved a low score for individual HR autonomy.
Local authorities, regional fisheries boards and
childcare committees achieved slightly better
scores for individual HR autonomy than they did
for strategic HR autonomy. While regional tourism
authorities had relatively high levels of policy and
financial autonomy (below), their HR autonomy is
largely decided by a common HR policy with Fáilte
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Fig. 5.4: Does the organisation extend management autonomy for HR to lower levels?
(%)
Table 5.2: HR autonomy for individual staff















*The results for city and county development boards included many
‘non-applicable’ responses, due to the nature of the boards and their
work.
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Salary Promotion Tenure Evaluation Dismissal Appointment
Yes for all staff Yes for most staff Yes for some staff No
Fig. 5.5: Can local authorities decide on the following for individual members of staff? (%) 
Ireland. Interviews suggest that regardless of their
level of HR autonomy, many sub-national bodies
tended to liaise with their parent department in
order to ensure payment increases under the
various social partnership arrangements.
5.5 Individual HR autonomy: 
local authorities
As Figure 5.5 shows, local authorities have least
discretion over the setting of salary levels for
individual staff members, with 88 per cent
reporting not being able to do so at all. In terms of
promotion, however, 44 per cent report that that
they can decide on this for most individual staff,
with a further 26 per cent stating that they can do so
for all staff. Forty-four per cent also said they had
no say over the tenure of individual employees, and
39 per cent stated that they are able to decide on the
appointment of individual staff. 
Using the matrix for gauging the levels of
autonomy different sub-sectors have over
individual HR issues, it is demonstrated that local
authorities have a moderate level of autonomy.
5.6 Summary
The norm for the eleven sub-sectors reveals that the
aspect of general HR policy which regional and
local organisations are most likely to have
autonomy over is establishing staff evaluation
schemes. Few organisations had discretion over
salary levels. Local and regional bodies also report
considerable discretion over staff appointment and
selection procedures (61 per cent), and dismissal
criteria (56 per cent). Approximately half of the
bodies practise some form of internal HR
management devolution.
Regional authorities have minimum levels of
strategic HR autonomy and low HR autonomy for
individual staff. Also, they do not practice internal
HR management devolution.
Regional assemblies have low levels of strategic
HR autonomy and moderate levels of HR autonomy
for individual staff. However, both assemblies use
some forms of internal HR management devolution.
Of all sub-sectors, harbour commissions have
maximum strategic HR autonomy, including the
greatest autonomy over setting staff numbers and
salaries as these roles rest with the commissioners
themselves. They also have maximum HR
autonomy for individual staff, though staff numbers
tend to be small.
Vocational education committees have minimum
strategic HR autonomy, with no ability to set staff
numbers or salary levels, which is instead decided
upon centrally. They also have low HR autonomy
for individual staff.
City and county enterprise boards also have
minimum strategic HR autonomy and low HR
autonomy for individual staff.
Partnership companies also report having a high
degree of autonomy over the ability to set staff
numbers and salaries. Overall, while they liaise
closely with Pobal, they have high strategic HR
autonomy and maximum HR autonomy for
individual staff.
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LEADER groups have maximum autonomy over
strategic HR policy, including a lot of autonomy
over their staff numbers and salaries, once financial
prudence is exercised. They also have maximum
HR autonomy for individual staff.
Prior to their abolition in 2006, HR-related issues
for regional fisheries boards were centrally co-
ordinated by the Central Fisheries Boards, and
therefore the boards themselves had minimum
strategic HR autonomy and moderate HR autonomy
for individual staff.
Reflecting their company-like status, regional
tourism authorities displayed high levels of
autonomy over the ability to set staff numbers.
However, they had limitations in respect of other
HR issues and overall had low strategic HR
autonomy. All of them also practised internal HR
management devolution and had moderate HR
autonomy for individual staff.
City and county development boards display
minimum strategic HR autonomy and low levels of
HR autonomy for individual staff.
A large number of city and county childcare
committees also reported being able to set staff
numbers without ministerial or departmental
influence. Combining their results reveals that they
have moderate levels of strategic HR autonomy and
high levels of HR autonomy for individual staff.
Local authorities display minimum levels of self-
reported strategic HR autonomy. Policy on staff
numbers, salary levels and conditions for
promotion are set centrally for all local authorities.
One area where they have discretion is in relation
to staff evaluation schemes. Almost every local
authority practises some level of internal HR
management devolution. In terms of individual
self-reported HR autonomy, local authorities have
moderate autonomy. Most have discretion in
relation to staff promotion, evaluation, dismissal
and appointments, but little discretion in relation to
salary and tenure. 
30
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6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the funding of local and regional
non-commercial bodies is considered. As well as
identifying the sources of funds for each sub-sector,
their financial autonomy and accountability is also
considered. In general, non-commercial public
bodies depend on sources of funding outside of
direct levying of charges or sale of products and
services for their survival. While some of the local
and regional non-commercial bodies do set charges
such as commercial rates (local authorities) or
harbour fees (harbour commissions), the primary
source of capital and current revenue for the vast
majority is central government. This is in contrast
to the situation in many EU member states. For
example, in 2005, less than 10 per cent of sub-
national revenues in Ireland were raised through
sub-national taxes, while the EU average was over
42 per cent71. As detailed below, many local and
regional bodies also identify the EU as an important
source for their funding, which is normally routed
through central government. Financial account-
ability is a key element of corporate governance
requirements and this chapter also considers the
various audit mechanisms employed in this 
regard. 
6.2 Sources of funding: 
11 sub-sectors
As noted in Chapter 5, the budgets for local and
regional non-commercial bodies range from those
who have very small budget allocations to those
with a budget of €1.5 billion for 2005. In general,
local and regional bodies (including local
authorities) do not differ significantly from national
bodies in terms of funding sources, as Figure 6.1
demonstrates. The principal deviation occurs in
respect of EU funding, with 14 per cent of local and
regional bodies (other than local authorities)
reporting that the EU is their primary source of
income. However, this EU money is channelled
through central government. Sixty-five per cent of
organisations in the eleven sub-sectors identified
their primary source of income as direct allocation
from central government, while 77 per cent of
national non-commercial bodies did so.
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However, closer examination of the results
between each local and regional sub-sector reveals
that there can be considerable variation in the
primary sources of income (Figure 6.2).
Regional authorities, regional assemblies and city
and county development boards receive transfers
from local authorities to fund their work. The
development boards are also encouraged to seek
funding from other state bodies for any initiatives
they undertake. For harbour commissions, the
primary source of income reported by respondents
is berthing fees and tonnage charges, although the
amounts levied are controlled by the Minister for
Transport (who consults with the Attorney-General
before approving new rates). Regional tourism
authorities also receive funding from tourism
organisations and local authorities. Both LEADER
groups and childcare committees report that EU
funding forms a considerable part of their income.
Enterprise boards in the Border area have access to
EU funds such as INTERREG and PEACE, as well as
from the International Fund for Ireland. While
Partnerships receive their funding from government
under the National Development Plan, it is in fact
distributed to them by Pobal.
The level of discretion afforded to public bodies
in the management of their funds is an important
factor in understanding how they perform their
work. The study of national non-commercial bodies
found that only 1 per cent of them had maximum
financial autonomy, while 41 per cent had
moderate financial autonomy72. Interestingly, this
did not reflect the situation in relation to policy
autonomy, where 44 per cent of national bodies
reported maximum or high policy autonomy in
relation to policy instruments and target groups for
their work73. The position with regard to local and
regional bodies is considered here in more detail.
6.3 Sources of funding: local authorities
Local taxation takes the form of rates on commercial
properties. While this forms a large portion of local
authority revenue (26 per cent in 2006), local
authorities are dependant on central government
for income (44 per cent in 2006). Seventy per cent
of respondents noted that transfers from central
government were their principal source of income.
Almost every local authority response identified
direct government funding and fees and charges as
their primary and secondary sources of income.
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Fig. 6.2: Primary Sources of Income
_______________
72 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), p. 90.
73 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), p. 154
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Customer service charges are another source of
income for all local authorities. In the case of some
urban authorities, commercial rates, fees and
charges are in fact the primary source due to the
greater number of commercial premises in the
authority’s jurisdiction. Fees and charges include
planning fees, housing rents and development
levies. 
6.4 Financial autonomy: 
11 sub-sectors
For the eleven sub-sectors, there is some variation
in the pattern of financial autonomy. Furthermore,
mixed responses within some sub-sectors indicate
the context-specific nature of this issue. Taking the
eleven sub-sectors in total, over a third cannot take
out loans, while almost 50 per cent report being
able to do so, including those who can only do so
with permission from their parent department
and/or the Department of Finance74. In terms of
setting charges, 57 per cent are able to do so either
of their own accord or within guidelines set by the
minster or his/her department. However, a quarter
did not have this power. Almost three quarters of
local and regional bodies stated that they could
shift budget allocation by function within
guidelines, but over half said that they could not do
so between years. Disaggregating these figures, the
bar charts below exhibit the different results for
each sub-sector.
Figure 6.3 illustrates that the organisations with
the greatest discretion to take out loans are the
regional tourism authorities (100 per cent), the
LEADER groups (61 per cent) and Partnership
companies (56 per cent). Normally, such loans are
subject to board approval and if they are over a
certain limit are subject to approval by the
Department of Finance. The approval of Pobal is
normally required for loans taken by Partnerships.
Other bodies, such as childcare committees,
development boards and regional fisheries boards
have little discretion to take them out. The
remaining organisations have freedom to act within
conditions set by the relevant minister or
department.
In terms of setting charges for services, Figure 6.4
reveals that only regional tourism authorities have
full discretion to do so, while regional assemblies
have none whatsoever. Charging for goods or
services does not arise to any great extent for city
and county development boards. Regional fisheries
boards have a high level of autonomy over charges
for their services, although as noted in Chapter 5,
the relevant minister sets upper limits to such
charges. A substantial percentage of enterprise
boards, Partnership companies and childcare
committees also reported a strong degree of
independence over this issue. For Partnership
companies, interviews suggest that their principal
charges relate to training courses, which they also
subsidise. The same is true for enterprise boards
33
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Fig. 6.3: Can the organisation take out loans? (%)
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which have some discretion over the fees they may
charge for business training and mentoring
programmes. Similarly, some VECs offer special
educational programmes at subsidised rates.
Figure 6.5 below identifies that with the
exception of harbour commissions and develop-
ment boards, all sub-sectors have considerable
discretion over their ability to shift budget alloca-
tions, once it is within limits set by the minister or
department. The results for regional assemblies
reflect the fact that while they have discretion to
move their administrative budgets, the fact that the
implementation of their multi-annual operational
programmes is agreed in advance means any
movement of funds, either across function or year,
must be negotiated with the relevant Departments
and the EU Commission.
In terms of shifting budget allocations between
34
































































































Fig. 6.5: Can the organisation shift budget between different functions? (%)
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years, Figure 6.6 identifies that only one sub-sector
– regional tourism authorities – is not prevented to
some degree from so doing. A substantial
percentage of all other sub-sectors are limited in
this regard and several have no discretion
whatsoever, including regional fisheries boards and
development boards. With the agreement of the
Department of Education and Science, some VECs
are allowed to carry a surplus forward, in the
interest of prudent financial management. How-
ever, any deficits incurred are the responsibility of
the VEC.
Combining the results shown in Figures 6.3, 6.4,
6.5 and 6.6 (see Appendix 3) identifies varying
levels of financial autonomy for each sub-sector, as
Table 6.1 depicts.
While no sub-sector has maximum financial
autonomy, regional tourism authorities have a high
level of control over the raising and use of funds.
The high level of financial autonomy contrasts with
the low level of strategic HR policy and moderate
levels of HR autonomy for individual staff which
the tourism authorities had. 
The results for local authorities indicate that they
have moderate financial autonomy, the same as
VECS and the bodies involved in social
development – partnerships and LEADER groups.
Despite their remit of encouraging local economic
development, enterprise boards have little financial
autonomy and the Department of Enterprise, Trade
and Employment has substantial control over their
funding. Enterprise boards that receive funding
through INTERREG and PEACE retain some
autonomy over the use of these funds.
In terms of extending internal financial manage-
ment autonomy to lower management levels, all
local authorities responded that this happened in
their organisations. This has been supported by
new financial management systems and the
recruitment of professional accountants. For the
other eleven sub-sectors, the norm is 21 per cent
reporting that such devolution occurs ‘to a large
extent’, 45 per cent reporting ‘to some extent’, and
13 per cent reporting that it did not happen. A
breakdown of these results by sub-sector is detailed
in Figure 6.7.
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Fig. 6.6: Can the organisation shift budget between years?
Table 6.1: Financial Autonomy of Sub-Sectors
Level of Financial Autonomy Sub-Sector
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Authorities











No Financial Autonomy Development Boards
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 35
The organisations which are most likely to have
management autonomy for finance extended
downwards ‘to a large extent’ are the regional
tourism authorities (50 per cent), LEADER groups
(38 per cent), enterprise boards (35 per cent) and
regional fisheries boards (33 per cent). It also
occurred to some extent in VECs, Partnerships and
childcare committees.
6.5 Financial autonomy: local authorities
Table 6.2 outlines the different responses to
questions concerning loans, charges and budgets by
national, local and regional bodies. For local
authorities, the vast majority of responses reflected
the fact that they are empowered to take out loans
within conditions set by the relevant minister. This
is particularly the case in respect of capital
borrowing where EU limits may apply. However,
demonstrating the fact that some charges (such as
planning fees) are set nationally, while others (such
as development levies) are set locally, there is an
almost even split in responses concerning the
ability to set charges without such approval from
the relevant minister. In terms of shifting budget
allocations, local authorities can do so across
function more easily than between years. Capital
budgets are to a large extent determined centrally,
and on major budget allocations for nationally
important programmes it is also possible for
funding to be shifted by the relevant department
between local authorities depending on local
progress. However, funding for capital projects is
now in three-year envelopes and can therefore run
over year-on-year in some cases.
Table 6.2: Autonomy of local and regional bodies:
financial management (%)
National Local Norm for 11
Bodies Authorities Sub-Sectors
Can the organisation take out loans?
Yes, fully without prior
approval or conditions
set by Min/Dept. 3 4 22
Yes, with prior approval
or within conditions 34 87 27
No 47 9 38
N/A 15 0 13
Can the organisation set charges for services?
Yes, fully without prior
approval or conditions
set by Min/Dept. 42 48 33
Yes, with prior approval
or within conditions 28 52 24
No 17 0 24
N/A 13 0 19
Can the organisation shift its budget allocation by function?
Yes, fully without prior
approval or conditions
set by Min/Dept. 42 52 11
Yes, with prior approval
or within conditions 28 39 61
No 17 9 20
N/A 13 0 8
Can the organisation shift its budget allocation between
years?
Yes, fully without prior
approval or conditions
set by Min/Dept. 9 22 6
Yes, with prior approval
or within conditions 19 30 33
No 59 48 52
N/A 13 0 9
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Fig. 6.7: Does the organisation extend management autonomy for finance to lower levels? (%) 















































Fig. 6.8: Does the organisation have an audit committee? (%)
6.6 Audits: 11 sub-sectors
Fifty-three per cent of state bodies in the eleven
sub-sectors had an audit committee. Within the sub-
sectors, the averages fluctuated between those that
had none and those that did for every organisation
in their sub-sector, as Figure 6.8 demonstrates. The
most common membership numbers for such
committees is either four or five, although one
respondent noted that their organisation’s audit
committee had eleven members. Neither regional
assemblies nor regional authorities have internal
audit committees, but are audited by the
Comptroller and Auditor-General’s office. Only one
development board reported having such a
committee, due to the fact that many of them do not
have direct control over a budget but instead have
indirect influence over spending in certain areas.
Every enterprise board, vocational education
committee, regional fisheries board and regional
tourism authority has an audit committee. Pobal
audits the Partnership companies, and is itself
audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-General
and the Department of Community, Rural and
Gaeltacht Affairs.
Leaving aside regional authorities and regional
assemblies who have no audit committees, there are
differences in the forms of expertise available on
the audit committees themselves where they exist.
Apart from development boards, most audit
committees contain at least one member with audit
skills and one member with experience of general
management, as Figure 6.9 identifies. 
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Fig. 6.9 Does the organisation have at least one member of the audit committee with expertise in the
following areas? (%)
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Apart from having audit committees, public
bodies at local and regional level are also subject to
occasional audits. While 12 per cent of national
non-commercial bodies reported that they were not
audited either externally or internally75, the
corresponding average figure for local and regional
bodies is only 5 per cent. Figure 6.10 demonstrates
that few organisations relied on internal audit
services alone, with an average of 42 per cent across
the eleven sub-sectors opting for both an internal
and external audit. Interviews identified that where
board members do not have sufficient audit
experience, it is commonplace to engage external
consultants to prepare their annual accounts. Both
regional assemblies relied completely on an
external audit service, while 83 per cent of harbour
commissions, 73 per cent of childcare committees,
65 per cent of Partnerships and 60 per cent of
regional authorities did likewise. Many local and
regional bodies (excluding local authorities) are
also audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-
General.
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Fig. 6.10 What type of audit service does the organisation use? (%)
_______________
75 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
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Fig. 6.11 What is audited in the internal or external audit process? (%)
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Of those national non-commercial bodies which
were audited externally, 94 per cent reported that
the audit had occurred in the last two years76. The
corresponding average figure for local and regional
bodies is 99 per cent. Looking at what issues are
considered in the course of the audits reveals
broadly similar results between the national bodies,
local authorities and the norm for the eleven sub-
sectors, as Figure 6.11 demonstrates. In each field
considered (except ‘other’), local and regional
bodies experience greater auditing coverage than do
national bodies77. The greatest variation between
the categories of organisation occurred over the
issues of financial results, and legality and
compliance. 
Looking in more detail (Figure 6.12) at the issues
considered in the internal and external audit
processes for the eleven sub-sectors, with the
exception of city and county development boards
all sub-sectors score positively for audits of
financial results and internal control systems.
Audits of legality and compliance issues also
feature strongly, with the exception of harbour
commissions and development boards. Apart from
the ‘other’ category, the greatest variation occurs in
respect of organisational results, with results
ranging from 17 to 100 per cent, with an overall
average of 45 per cent. For both regional assemblies
and regional authorities, an external audit is
conducted annually by the Local Government
Audit Service. As regional assemblies receive EU
funding for several different types of activity, they
are subject to a range of national and EU audits
covering such other issues as documentation and
processes. 
Apart from routine internal and/or external
audits, local and regional organisations may be
subject to ad-hoc audits, organised by themselves,
their parent body or another body such as
government or the Houses of the Oireachtas. For the
eleven sub-sectors outside of local authorities, there
is considerable variation as to who sponsored such
audits. While at least half of the regional
authorities, harbour commissions, vocational
education committees, regional fisheries boards
and development boards did not experience an ad-
hoc audit, very few organisations (9 per cent)
carried out such an audit themselves or engaged a
consultant to do it (3 per cent). One third of these
local and regional bodies are subject to an ad-hoc
audit organised by their parent body, and this is
particularly true for regional assemblies, vocational
education committees, enterprise boards, LEADER
groups and childcare committees. 
A third of the organisations in the eleven sub-
sectors experienced an ad-hoc audit organised by
central government. The sub-sectors most
frequently experiencing this are the regional
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76 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), p. 103.
77 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K & Humphreys, P The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National Agencies













































Fig. 6.12: What is audited in the internal or external audit process? (%)
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 39
assemblies, enterprise boards, Partnerships,
LEADER groups and regional tourism authorities.
Finally, a number of organisations, and particularly
regional tourism authorities (50 per cent) and
Partnerships (41 per cent) reported having had ad-
hoc audits organised by the Houses of the
Oireachtas/Comptroller and Auditor-General. 
6.7 Audits: local authorities
While every organisation that responded to the
survey had a board (or Council), only 13 per cent of
local authorities reported having an audit
committee78. However, the Local Government
(Business Improvements Districts) Act 2006
provides for the mandatory establishment of such
committees and for widely enhanced functions.
Each local authority reported having being audited
either by an external body (such as the Local
Government Audit Service) or an internal one. All
local authorities reported that they had been
audited within the last two years and twenty-three
value-for-money reports have been published by the
Local Government Audit Service in recent years.
Local authorities also conducted occasional ad-hoc
audits, and 29 per cent have carried out their own
internal ad-hoc audit within the last five years.
Twenty-nine per cent also reported that such an
audit had been organised by the Department of
Environment, Heritage and Local Government.
Thirteen per cent responded that the government
had organised an audit, and 3 per cent had invited
an external consultant to conduct a non-routine
audit. Twenty-six per cent of local authorities
reported that no ad-hoc audits had taken place
within this period.
6.8 Summary
The vast majority of local and regional bodies
receive their funding from central government.
Some do raise their own revenue for current
expenditure, including harbour commissions and
Partnership companies. The EU is also an important
source of funding for other sub-sectors. Few can
take out loans or shift budget by year without
ministerial or departmental approval, but can shift
budgets by function. Just over half of the eleven
sub-sector respondents reported having an audit
committee in their boards, but almost all have been
audited externally in the last two years. Audits tend
to focus more on financial results, legality and
compliance and internal control systems, than on
organisational results.
For regional authorities, the primary source of
income is transfers from local authorities, and
results indicate that they have low financial
autonomy. They have no internal audit committees
but are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor-
General.
As with regional authorities, regional assemblies
have low financial autonomy and their primary
source of income is transfers from local authorities.
Their funding is distributed as agreed under the
National Development Plan 7-year framework.
Neither have an internal audit committee but the
Comptroller and Auditor-General audits them.
Harbour commissions generate their own current
expenditure themselves through charges and fees,
within limits set by the minister. Overall they have
low financial autonomy.
Vocational education committees have moderate
financial autonomy and in general budgets are
tightly controlled by the Department of Education
and Science. All of them have audit committees.
City and county enterprise boards do not have the
freedom to take out loans and display low financial
autonomy. All of them have audit committees on
their boards. 
A majority of Partnerships responded that they
could take out loans without having to seek the
approval of the department or minister. However,
the approval of Pobal is normally necessary. Overall
they have moderate financial autonomy.
A large portion of LEADER groups’ funding is
derived from the EU, and they have moderate
financial autonomy. A majority of respondents
reported that they have freedom to take out loans
without departmental approval. 
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78 A report by the Value for Money Unit of the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government in 2000 identified
shortcomings in local authorities’ internal audit procedures and guidelines were published the following year. A review of local
government financing published in 2006 also addressed the issue of local authority audit practices and recommended ‘changes in
legislation to permit councils to appoint outside experienced specialists to audit committees [and] the establishment by all local
authorities of audit committees focussed on securing on-going efficiency’, Indecon (2005) Review of Local Government Financing,
Dublin: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, p. xx. Following the publication of the review, the department
published a report advocating the establishment of internal audit committees in all local authorities and drafted a recommended ‘Audit
Committee Charter’ to aid the work of such committees. 
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Regional fisheries boards had a large degree of
discretion over setting charges for services but
otherwise had low financial autonomy. Each had an
audit committee.
Of all sub-sectors, regional tourism authorities
had the highest financial autonomy, and could take
out loans and set charges as they wished. They
received funding from membership fees, local
authorities and grants from Fáilte Ireland. They are
also most likely to extend financial management
autonomy downwards internally and each of them
had an audit committee.
Budgets for city and county development boards
tend to be small and are normally transferred from
local authorities. They have no financial autonomy.
City and county childcare committees derive
most of their income from EU grants. They have low
levels of financial autonomy.
Local authorities have moderate financial
autonomy. In the overall, local authorities source
some 56 per cent of their current expenditure from
local sources (commercial rates 26 per cent; goods
and services 30 per cent), with the remainder being
provided by way of government grants/subsidies
(23 per cent) and general-purpose grants from the
Local Government Fund (21 per cent). For most,
money from the Local Government Fund and grants
are key sources of revenue for capital and current
expenditure, with fees and charges also
contributing a significant portion of income. While
a minority of councils responded that they had
audit committees (a point also noted by the recent
Indecon report on Local Government Financing79),
recent legislative changes80 provide that such
committees will be established in all local
authorities, starting with city and county councils.
They are also audited annually by the Local
Government Audit Service, which also undertakes
value for money evaluations across the local
government sector. New financial management
systems have also been rolled out, including the
introduction of accrual accounting and risk
management techniques.
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79 Indecon Economic Consultants Review of Local Government Financing, (Dublin: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government, 2006), p. xx.
80 Local Government (Business Improvements Districts) Act 2006, Section 5
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7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, autonomy and accountability for
policy amongst local and regional bodies is
analysed. The organisations surveyed were asked to
detail the level of discretion available to them to
decide on the group to which they should direct
their activities. They were also questioned about
their ability to decide on what they believed to be
the most appropriate policy instruments for those
activities. 
7.2 Deciding on target groups: 
11 sub-sectors
For the eleven sub-sectors, the most pronounced
areas of difference in comparison with the national
bodies occurs in relation to their ability to decide
on target groups. Fifty per cent of local and regional
bodies have discretion over their target groups,
once that discretion is exercised within ministerial
or departmental limits. However, as Figure 7.1
illustrates, only 15 per cent of local and regional
bodies have almost complete freedom in deciding
on their target groups. While the study of national
bodies found that they made important inputs into
national policy81, not least because 23 per cent
claimed to provide policy advice, the same
independence is not evident for local and regional
bodies. Less than a quarter have the ability to
pursue their own courses of action in respect of
deciding on their target groups, while the majority
are obliged to operate within certain constraints, or
in some cases are given no discretion at all. For
many sub-national bodies, local discretion in the
implementation of high-level goals and objectives is
tolerated, but drifting outside of agreed or
established frameworks is not.
In terms of the ability of local and regional bodies
43
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Policy autonomy and accountability of non-commercial
local and regional bodies
_______________
81 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National





































Fig. 7.1: Can organisation decide on the target group for its actions/functions? (%)
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to decide on the policy instruments necessary to
deliver their functions, a similar pattern emerges. 
7.3 Deciding on target groups: 
local authorities
For local authorities, there are also some important
differences between their work and the work of
national bodies in terms of their ability to decide on
target groups. While 36 per cent of national bodies
reported that they decided on their target groups,
only 13 per cent of local authorities did so. This
again reflects the statutory nature of much local
authority work. Conversely, while 39 per cent of
local authorities responded that they decide on
their target group within conditions set by the
minister or department, only 12 per cent of national
bodies claimed to be restricted in this way.
7.4 Deciding on policy instruments: 
11 sub-sectors
The norm for the eleven sub-sectors of local and
regional bodies demonstrates that the biggest
difference when compared with national bodies is
in respect of ability to decide on policy
instruments. Figure 7.2 illustrates that only 13 per
cent of the organisations in the eleven sub-sectors
enjoyed discretion to decide themselves on the
appropriate policy instruments necessary to
conduct their work. However, interviews suggest
that changes in policy tend to be agreed in
consultation with parent departments, and that
once such changes are within statutory frameworks
there is normally little difficulty. Reflecting this,
while only 17 per cent of national bodies are bound
in their decisions on policy instruments by
ministerial or departmental limits, 52 per cent of
sub-national bodies must take these limits into
account.
Focusing on the response ‘organisation decides
within min/dept limits’, which is the most common
response to both the issue of selecting a target group
and choosing policy instruments, Figure 7.3
illustrates the variations within the eleven sub-
sectors. The sub-sectors most likely to have to act
within departmental limits are the harbour
commissions, LEADER groups, enterprise boards
and VECs. In the case of enterprise boards, the
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
establishes high-level targets and principles which
are then interpreted locally by the boards. Regional
tourism authorities are not constrained to any
significant degree on either issue by their parent
body. This reflects the fact that they are largely
independent of the Department of Arts, Sports and
Tourism and Fáilte Ireland. 
Similarly, many city and county development
boards enjoy a large degree of discretion over
deciding on target groups (47 per cent) and policy
instruments (40 per cent), and so in Figure 7.3 a
relatively low number report being constrained by
the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local
Government. Only 40 per cent of regional
authorities reported having discretion over these
functions. Regional fisheries boards, on the other
hand, had both their target groups and policy
instruments established by other means –
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Fig. 7.2: Can organisation decide on which policy instrument it will use? (%)
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principally legislation. The fisheries boards also
operate a range of bye-laws and ministerial
approval is necessary for amendments or the
introduction of new such laws. The regional
assemblies have their target groups set out in their
Regional Operational Programme.
Using a matrix for policy autonomy (see
Appendix 3) based on the results in Figures 7.1 and
7.2, the following Table (7.1) identifies on a scale
the variations on policy autonomy emerging
between the sub-sectors.
Table 7.1: Policy autonomy 

















Interestingly, while regional tourism authorities
achieve a ‘high’ level in terms of policy autonomy,
interviews suggest that many felt they had little
input into policy formulation at a higher level in
respect of tourism. This is recognised in the fact
that one of the reasons the new regional tourism
development boards have been established is to
provide for greater input by the regions into tourism
policy.
7.5 Deciding on policy instruments: 
local authorities
For local authorities, one of the biggest areas of
deviation from national bodies concerns the ability
to independently decide on policy instruments.
Only 9 per cent of local authorities reported that
they decide on their policy instruments themselves,
compared to 36 per cent of national bodies (Figure
8.2). Also, 57 per cent of local authorities are bound
in their decisions concerning what they believe to
be appropriate policy instruments by ministerial or
departmental limits.
7.6 Types of strategy documents: 
11 sub-sectors
Once target groups and policy instruments have
been decided upon, it is necessary for organisations
to have a means of reporting on the implementation
of policy. The survey asked respondents to identify
whether or not they produce documents which
consider such issues as strategy, investment and
financial targets. Another question asked how
successful the organisation has been in achieving
its goals in respect of these issues. Figure 7.4 shows
that broadly similar patterns emerged between
45













































Fig. 7.3: Organisation decides within min/dept limits
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national bodies and local and regional organisa-
tions in terms of producing reports for government
detailing planned strategy and objectives. For
planned investment reports, the norm for the 11
other sub-sectors is 56 per cent, again higher than
for the national bodies. Local and regional bodies
are also more likely than national bodies to produce
reports on planned financial and non-financial
targets.
Looking in more detail at the figure for planned
investment for local and regional bodies, only two
of the five sub-sectors identified in Chapter 4 as
‘Promotional and Developmental’ organisations –
enterprise boards and LEADER groups – have
notably high positive response rates (Figure 7.5).
Interviews corroborate that LEADER groups submit
regular business plans, although the average
investment in projects is relatively small at
€20,000. The other sub-sectors – Partnership
companies (58 per cent), regional fisheries boards
(50 per cent) and regional tourism authorities (50
per cent) – include a substantial proportion of
organisations that do not report in advance on
planned investment. Regional assemblies have
46
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Fig. 7.5: Does a document go to government detailing planned investment? (%)
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 46
operational programmes which detail proposed
investment across a range of areas. In many sub-
sectors, including harbour commissions and
development boards, capital investments tend not
to arise in the course of the organisation’s work. For
Partnerships, any investment plans must receive
city/county development board endorsement as
well as the support of Pobal.
In general, where sub-national bodies are
embarking on capital investments, appropriate
business plans are required. For VECs, the 2001
Vocational Education (Amendment) Act requires
each committee to create a five-year plan as well as
annual service plans which are submitted to the
Department of Education and Science. Also, some
organisations have their investments funded as part
of the National Development Plan. Several
organisations, particularly city and county
development boards, are not involved in
investments and therefore such documentation
does not arise.
For the eleven sub-sectors, the use of multi-
annual business plans varies substantially, with 21
per cent stating they did not use them, 23  per cent
stating they used them ‘to some extent’ and 32 per
cent stating ‘to a large extent’. There are also sub-
sector specific arrangements. For example, regional
assemblies operate within a 7-year framework as
established under the National Development Plan,
and report annually on their progress. Regional
authorities have a ‘designated manager’ from one of
the local authorities within their jurisdiction, with
whom they discuss progress and future plans. A
more detailed breakdown by sub-sector is given in
Figure 7.6 below.
In the case of regional fisheries boards, while a
multi-annual business plan does not arise in the
context of proposals to the boards, they do produce
annual business plans which are agreed with the
department.
7.7 Types of strategy documents: 
local authorities
As Figure 7.4 (above) illustrates, a much larger
percentage of local authorities (90 per cent) produce
reports on planned investment than national
bodies. This is because such plans are required by
the Department of Finance in order to ensure
National Development Plan funding is secured.
Furthermore, 52 per cent of local authorities also
reported that the use of multi-annual business plans
occurs ‘to a large extent’ in their organisation, while
a further 44 per cent said that this happened ‘to
some extent’.
7.8 Reporting on work done: 
11 sub-sectors
Reporting on work done in document format is a
central part of the accountability regime of local
and regional bodies to central government, as well
as to the public. Organisations were asked about
their reporting on how successful the organisation
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Fig. 7.6: Does the organisation prepare multi-annual business plans?
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has been in achieving its targets, objectives,
planned investments, financial and non-financial
targets. For all local and regional bodies, Figure 7.7
demonstrates that the combined average result is
higher than for national bodies across all five
issues. While results for reporting on strategy and
objectives is broadly similar, larger differences
opened up when comparing results for reporting on
planned investment, financial and non-financial
targets.
As with Figure 7.4, the issue of planned
investment reveals the greatest disparity between
local authorities, national bodies and the norm for
the other eleven sub-sectors.  A closer examination
of the responses by the eleven sub-sectors (Figure
7.8 below) reveals a broadly similar pattern to the
results on advance reporting (Figure 7.5). Given
their role in promoting commercial development,
reporting by Partnership groups (58 per cent) is
somewhat lower than it is for enterprise boards (94
per cent) and LEADER companies (75 per cent).
Nonetheless, interviews suggest that Partnerships
produce both annual and interim reports for Pobal,
and that for Parliamentary Questions, the
48
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Fig. 7.8: Does the organisaton report in a document on investment targets? (%)
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Department for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht
Affairs can easily access information as required.
VECs also show some variation between the
number who report on achievement of planned
investment (60 per cent) and those who do not (30
per cent). Interviews suggest nonetheless that there
is significant central control over the building of
new schools and other educational establishments
with which the VEC may be involved. Regional
assemblies must present an annual implementation
report to the EU Commission which details progress
on their work, including investment targets.
An average of 89 per cent of local and regional
bodies also produce annual reports. As Figure 7.9
illustrates, a high percentage of harbour
commissions (83 per cent) do not produce such
reports, due to their small size and lack of
associated personnel. A large minority of city and
county development boards (44 per cent) and
LEADER groups (35 per cent) also do not produce
them, as do a small minority of VECs (14 per cent),
childcare committees (13 per cent) and Partnership
companies (12 per cent). In the case of VECs,
annual reports are a relatively new phenomenon.
Development boards have discretion over whether
or not to publish them.
In some departments, annual reports are often
‘checked’ against the requirements of the Code of
Practice for State Bodies before being signed off by
the secretary-general. Childcare committees are
required to draw up an Annual Progress Report
which reflects on their achievements; provide an
overview of work completed during the year; and
identify the extent to which targets were reached
and objectives were met. Some bodies also produce
quarterly reports to their parent departments and
interviews revealed that monthly financial reports
are common. 
Survey respondents were also asked about the
extent to which public reporting on financial and
non-financial issues happened in their
organisation. As Figure 7.10 demonstrates, broadly
similar results occurred for reporting on both issues
by the eleven sub-sectors. Fifty-nine per cent said
that they reported on financial performance ‘to a
large extent’ and 63 per cent reported the same for
non-financial issues.
7.9 Reporting on work done: 
local authorities
Figure 7.7 (above) illustrates that when compared to
both national bodies and the norm for the other
local and regional bodies, local authorities
demonstrate a high level of reporting across all of
the issues raised, with at least 85 per cent stating
that they reported on each of the five issues. As well
as reporting on specific strategic issues, the local
and regional bodies were questioned as to whether
or not they produced an annual report.  Annual
reports are normally public documents and because
of this will present different forms of information
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Fig. 7.9: Does the organisation produce an annual report? (%)
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than the more strategic policy-based documents
outlined above. While 81 per cent of national
bodies82 did so, every local authority did so as
required under the Section 221 of the 2001 Local
Government Act. Also, the vast majority of local
authorities stated that public reporting on financial
(100 per cent) and non-financial performance (96
per cent) happened ‘to a large extent’ in their
organisations. 
7.10 Setting Goals: 11 sub-sectors
In terms of setting goals for the various local and
regional bodies to achieve, some differences emerge
as demonstrated in Figure 7.11 below. While in no
case does the parent body decide the goals of any
local and regional body without at least some
consultation, no sub-sector reported that all its
respondents have full freedom to set its goals. In the
case of harbour commissions and city and county
development boards, a significant majority of
respondents reported having the ability to set their
goals. Conversely, a significant minority of LEADER
groups, Partnership companies and regional
fisheries boards reported having such discretion,
with most responding that they set goals in
consultation with their parent body or department.
In the case of Partnerships, the body with whom
goals are agreed is Pobal. In the case of LEADER
groups, the Department of Community, Gaeltacht
and Rural Affairs is responsible for co-ordinating
the achievement of targets under the LEADER+
programme.
A broadly similar pattern as that for local
authorities (below) emerges for the norm of the
eleven sub-sectors in terms of whether the type of
goals established by organisations are in
50
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Fig. 7.10 Is there public reporting by the
organisations in the 11 sub-sectors on financial
and non-financial performance? (%) 
Fig. 7.11: Does the organisation set goals?
_______________
82 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), p.119.
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quantitative or qualitative format. Eighty per cent
reported that they used both, with 10 per cent
responding that their goals are exclusively
qualitative or quantitative respectively. Figure 7.12
disaggregates these figures by sub-sector. Both
regional assemblies noted that all of their goals are
qualitative.
7.11 Setting Goals: local authorities
Fifty-seven per cent of local authorities report that
they set their own goals, while a further 30 per cent
state that their goals are set in conjunction with the
department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government. Only 13 per cent reported that the
department set the goals for their local authority to
achieve. The variety in figures reflects the fact that
local government policy making involves a variety
of actors and interviews confirm that partnership
and consultation are principles informing the
process. Local authorities tend to have considerable
local discretion in helping to achieve national
policies and targets, in order to ensure successful
implementation. The majority (79 per cent) of local
authority respondents stated that their goals are set
in both quantitative and qualitative formats, with
only 17 per cent responding that they are
exclusively quantitative
7.12 Performance indicators: 
11 sub-sectors
The public sector modernisation agenda places an
emphasis on improving the ability of the Irish
public service to measure and assess the quality of
its output. Performance indicators have therefore
become a common feature of many public organisa-
tions. In terms of the number of performance
indicators in the strategy statements of the
organisations in the 11 sub-sectors, the norm is
approximately 26 per cent for both the 11-20 and
21-49 range of indicators (see Figure 7.13). On
closer examination, however, a large percentage of
the organisations involved in local and regional
administration (regional authorities, regional
assemblies and harbour commissions) reported
having no indicators whatsoever in their strategy
statements, as represented in Figure 7.13. At the
other extreme, 43 per cent of development boards
and 27 per cent of childcare committees responded
that they use over fifty indicators in their strategy
statements. Amongst the other six sub-sectors, a
majority of respondents have at least twenty
indicators in their statements. 
Turning to the question of whether or not the
number of indicators has increased in recent years,
the norm for the eleven sub-sectors reveals that 56
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Fig. 7.12: Are the goals of the organisation set in qualitative or quantitiative terms?
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per cent of respondents felt that they had increased,
with only 11 per cent responding that the number
had decreased. Again the vast majority of
organisations involved in local and regional
administration (regional authorities, regional
assemblies and harbour commissions) produced
different results from other sub-sectors, mainly
stating that there had been no change in the number
of indicators in the last five years. With the
exception of regional fisheries boards (33 per cent)
and city and county development boards (31 per
cent), a majority of all other sub-sectors argued that
the number of indicators had increased.
Interestingly, 34 per cent of the regional fisheries
boards and 38 per cent of the city and county
development boards responded that the number
had decreased, as Figure 7.14 illustrates. 
When asked if they believed the indicators in
their organisation’s strategy statements reflected the
full range of their activities, the norm for the eleven
52


































































































Fig. 7.14 How has the number of indicators changed in the last 5 years?
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sub-sectors revealed that just over half (51 per cent)
did so ‘to a large extent’. A further 39 per cent felt
that they did so ‘to some extent’. This reflected the
pattern across almost all sub-sectors. As Figure 7.15
identifies, regional authorities (50 per cent) and
harbour commissions (83 per cent) expressed the
strongest response to the category of ‘to a small/no
extent’. 
An average of 56 per cent of local and regional
organisations (other than local authorities) stated
that their indicators are used ‘to a large extent’ in
their relationship with their parent department or
body. As Figure 7.16 depicts, this is particularly
true for the childcare committees (87 per cent),
Partnership companies (86 per cent) and LEADER
groups (77 per cent). In the latter case, while
LEADER groups are required to complete ‘indicator
sheets’, they are collectively responsible for
achieving targets under the LEADER programme,
and this work is co-ordinated by the department.
Partnership companies have a certain number of
key performance measures to achieve in relation to
the Local Development Social Inclusion Programme
(LDSIP). They are also used in reporting to the
regional assemblies in the context of NDP funding.
A further 25 per cent of local and regional bodies
noted that indicators are used for this purpose ‘to
some extent’, most notably regional fisheries boards
(67 per cent), VECs (54 per cent) and regional
tourism authorities (50 per cent). Nineteen per cent
of the bodies, including both regional assemblies
and 80 per cent of harbour commissions, reported
that they are not used for this purpose to any great
extent, if at all.
Looking in more detail at what the indicators
measure, respondents were asked to identify the
extent to which indicators measured the following: 
● effects on society
● quality of services
● use of resources
● activities and task performance
● quantitative results
● qualitative results.
In terms of measuring the effect on society of the
organisation’s work, Figure 7.17 demonstrates that
one third of the harbour commissions, half of the
53



















































Fig. 7.15: To what extent do the indicators 



















































Fig. 7.16 To what extent are indicators used in 
the relationship between the organisation 
and the parent body? (%) 
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Fig. 7.17: To what extent do the indicators
measure the effect on society of the


















































Fig. 7.18: To what extent do the indicators
measure the quality of the organisation's


















































Fig. 7.19: To what extent do the 



















































Fig. 7.20 To what extent do the organisation's
indicators measure its activities and task
performance? (%) 
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regional authorities, and both regional assemblies
reported that their indicators did not measure it. As
for the other sub-sectors, with the exception of the
regional fisheries boards and regional tourism
authorities, at least a quarter reported that their
indicators measured the effect of their work on
society, with a majority stating that they did so ‘to
some extent’.
As for quality of services, Figure 7.18 shows that
100 per cent of the regional tourism authorities
responded that their indicators measured this issue.
Regional assemblies are again the exception with
none of their measures doing so. The other sub-
sectors represent a mix of ‘to some extent’ and ‘to a
large extent’, with more organisations reporting that
their indicators did so ‘to a large extent’ than for the
effect on society of their work (Figure 7.17).
When asked whether or not the indicators
measured the organisation’s use of resources, with
the exception of regional authorities (0 per cent)
and development boards (38 per cent), at least 50
per cent of all-sub-sectors reported that they did so
‘to a large extent’. Figure 7.19 shows particularly
positive responses from VECs, enterprise boards
and childcare committees. 
In terms of measuring activities and task
performance, apart from regional authorities (50 per
cent), an overwhelming number of organisations
reported measuring these issues, as Figure 7.20
shows. At least 50 per cent of each stated ‘to a large
extent’. 
Indicators measuring quantitative results are also
very common as Figure 7.21 illustrates, and tended
to be more common than those measuring
qualitative results (Figure 7.22). A very large
percentage of city and county enterprise boards (94
per cent), Partnership groups (80 per cent), LEADER
companies (67 per cent), and 100 per cent of city
and county childcare committees reported that the
indicators do so ‘to a large extent’. 
While the number of organisations responding
that their indicators did not measure qualitative
results did not alter dramatically from those in
Figure 7.21, there is in general less responses of ‘to
a large extent’ and instead more of ‘to some extent’
across the sub-sectors.  Comparing Figures 7.21 and
7.22, only city and county development boards
reported that more of their indicators measured
qualitative rather than quantitative results ‘to a
large extent’.  
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Fig. 7.21: To what extent do the organiation's



















































Fig. 7.22: To what extent do the organisation's
indicators measure qualitative 
results? (%)
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 55
7.13 Performance indicators: 
local authorities
For local authorities, a revised set of forty-two
‘service indicators’ were published in 200483 which
cover the breadth of tasks undertaken by local
government from water quality to expenditure on
training and development. Figure 7.23 indicates
some variation in the number of indicators
appearing in local authority strategy statements.
Eighty-three per cent of local authority respondents
also noted that the number of indicators had
increased in the last five years, with 9 per cent
finding that there is now less and a further 9 per
cent saying there is no change. 
In terms of how well the indicators reflect the full
range of local authority activities, 52 per cent of
respondents felt that they did so ‘to a large extent’,
35 per cent ‘to some extent’ and 13 per cent ‘to a
small/no extent’. Furthermore, while 61 per cent of
local authorities stated that indicators are only used
‘to some extent’ in their relationship with the
Department of Environment, Heritage and Local
Government, 22 per cent noted that they used them
for this purpose ‘to a large extent’. 
While financial audits are considered elsewhere
in this report, the organisations were also surveyed
about the extent to which the indicators they used
measured the following issues:
● effects on society
● quality of services
● use of resources







































To a large extent To some extent Not at all
Fig. 7.24 To what extent do local authority indicators measure the following? (%) 
_______________
83 Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government Delivering Value for Money: Service Indicators in Local Authorities
(2004).
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84 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), p.121-2.
For local authorities, the indicators over-
whelmingly measured all of the above issues either
‘to a large extent’ or ‘to some extent’, as Figure 7.24
demonstrates. 
7.14 Evaluating non-financial results: 
11 sub-sectors
For the eleven sub-sectors, a majority of the
organisations are evaluated by various methods
concerning non-financial results. Apart from
harbour commissions (who are largely subject to
self-evaluation) and regional authorities, all sub-
sectors are at a minimum evaluated by their parent
department, with many also being evaluated by
third parties as Table 7.2 demonstrates. The sub-
sectors subjected to the most third party evaluation
are the VECs, enterprise boards and Partnerships,
followed closely by LEADER groups, development
boards and childcare committees.
7.15 Evaluating non-financial results:
local authorities
For local authorities, the evaluation of non-
financial results is conducted by a variety of actors
as Table 7.3 demonstrates. A substantial proportion
of local authorites evaluate their own non-financial
results, while a number of respondents also
reported that the Department of the Environment,
Heritage and Local Government employs other
parties (such as the Office for Local Authority
Management) to do so.
Table 7.3 Who evaluates the non-financial results





Third party directed by organisation 
evaluates non-financial results 4%
Third party directed by department 
evaluates non-financial results 39%
Others evaluate non-financial results 30%
Nobody evaluates non-financial results 0%
7.16 Rewards and sanctions: 
11 sub-sectors
The study of national non-commercial bodies
identified that systems of rewards and sanction are
underdeveloped, and that sanctions are more likely
to be implemented than rewards84. Where rewards
did exist, they usually took the form of more
resources for the organisation, rather than increased
operational autonomy. Financial bonuses for
individual members of staff, apart from the CEO, are
not common outside of payments for adherence to
the terms of social partnership agreements. For the
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Table 7.2 Who evaluates non-financial results? (Shaded box indicates positive response)
Sub-Sector Organisation Parent Third  Third Others Nobody
parties, parties,
itself Department under the under the
direction direction of
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eleven regional and local sub-sectors, 73 per cent of
organisations said that there is no reward for
meeting their goals. Twenty-three per cent said they
are rewarded ‘to some extent’, while only 5 per cent
(mainly regional tourism authorities) said they are
rewarded ‘to a large extent’, as Figure 7.25
illustrates. One third of the harbour commissions
also reported being rewarded ‘to a large extent’ for
good results or meeting targets (although on closer
examination such rewards tended to be simply
ensuring maximum budget allocation). As with
national bodies, the rewards for local and regional
bodies tend to be increases in resources (which may
also occur in mid-year), although some respondents
did respond that they received greater autonomy for
good performance. 
Local and regional bodies tended not to be overly
concerned with sanctions for poor performance,
and 49 per cent of respondents stated that they did
not exist for their organisation. A further 48 per
cent responded that they existed ‘to some extent’
while 4 per cent stated they existed for them ‘to a
large extent’ (mainly VECs and LEADER groups), as
Figure 7.26 depicts. For the national bodies, the
most common form of sanction is a reduction in
financial allocations, which occurred when an
organisation underspent its annual budget85. A
similar pattern emerges for local and regional
bodies and by far the most common sanction is less
resources or delaying payments until certain tasks
have been completed. Regional tourism authorities
are the most likely to suffer from them. However,
with one exception, neither increases nor decreases
in staff or management wages feature as a reward or
sanction for the sub-national bodies.
7.17 Rewards and sanctions: 
local authorities
For local authorities, while a majority (56 per cent)
responded that there are no rewards extended to
them, a large minority (44 per cent) said that they
are rewarded ‘to some extent’ for the performance of
their tasks. In terms of sanctions, 47 per cent of
local authorities responded that there are no
sanctions for poor results or failing to achieve
targets, while an almost equal number (48 per cent)
reported that sanctions did exist to some extent.
Five per cent responded that they existed ‘to a large
extent’.
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Fig. 7.25: To what extent are there rewards for the organisation when it has good results or 
reaches its targets? (%) 
_______________
85 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), p.122
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7.18 Summary
Only 15 per cent of sub-national bodies (other than
local authorities) reported having discretion over
deciding on target groups, while the equivalent
figure for policy instruments is 13 per cent. Local
and regional bodies are also more likely to report on
strategy, objectives, planned investment, financial
and non-financial targets than national non-
commercial bodies, as well as reporting on work
completed in these areas. Eighty-nine per cent of
local and regional bodies in the eleven sub-sectors
produce annual reports. The vast majority also
publicly report on financial and non-financial
performance. Fifty-six per cent stated that they felt
the number of performance indicators had
increased and an equal number reported that
indicators are used ‘to a large extent’ in their
relationship with their parent department or body.
Apart from harbour commissions, all sub-sectors’
non-financial results are evaluated by themselves
and an external body, which may or may not be
their parent department. Approximately three-
quarters reported that there are no rewards for
meeting their goals (mainly resource increases),
while about half said sanctions also existed.
Regional authorities have moderate policy
autonomy. They do not use performance indicators
in their strategy statements.
Regional assemblies have high levels of policy
autonomy. They do not use performance indicators
in their strategy statements but those indicators that
exist focus principally on their use of resources.
Of all sub-sectors, harbour commissions are the
most likely to have to operate within ministerial or
departmental limits on target groups and policy
instruments. Overall they had moderate policy
autonomy. They tend not to produce reports due to
their size and do not use performance indicators
either. Almost all of them reported that they set
their own goals.
Vocational education committees have moderate
policy autonomy, applying local discretion to goals
and objectives set centrally. Their performance
indicators tend to focus extensively on the use of
resources. 
City and county enterprise boards have little
discretion over deciding on policy instruments, and
even less on target groups. They have moderate
policy autonomy overall. They are the organisations
most likely to produce documents on planned
investment for their parent departments. A majority
of respondents noted that sanctions existed for
them for not meeting targets.
Partnerships have moderate policy autonomy.
Most of them produce multi-annual business plans
and planned investment requires CDB
endorsement. Most of them set their goals in co-
operation with Pobal and the department.
Indicators played an important role in their
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Fig. 7.26: To what extent are there sanctions for poor results or not meeting targets? (%)
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relationship with their parent body, and are used in
reporting to the regional assemblies
LEADER groups have moderate policy autonomy,
including little discretion over deciding on target
groups and policy instruments. After enterprise
boards, they are most likely to submit documents
on planned investment to their parent department.
A number of LEADER groups do not produce
annual reports. Most of them set their goals in co-
operation with the department. Indicators played
an important role in their relationship with their
parent body.
Regional fisheries boards have moderate policy
autonomy. Most of them set their goals in co-
operation with the department. A majority of
respondents noted that sanctions existed for them
for not meeting targets.
Regional tourism authorities are the sub-sector
with the greatest discretion over deciding on target
groups and policy instruments and overall had high
policy autonomy. They are most likely of all sub-
sectors to produce multi-annual business plans.
Half of the respondents noted that the performance
indictors in their strategy statements reflected their
work only to a small, if any, extent. Rewards exist
for the authorities, as do sanctions but to a lesser
extent. 
Within their co-ordinating role, city and county
development boards have maximum policy
autonomy, and reported having a large degree of
discretion over deciding on target groups and
policy instruments. A large minority of the boards
do not produce annual reports. Almost all of the
boards report having freedom to set their goals. A
large number of them reported having over fifty
performance indicators in their strategy statement,
although many also noted the number of indicators
had decreased. They are the only sub-sector to
identify that more of their indicators measured
qualitative rather than quantitative results.
City and county childcare committees reported
having moderate policy autonomy. Indicators
played an important role in their relationship with
their parent body and tended to focus mainly on
use of resources, activities and tasks and
quantitative results. A majority of respondents
noted that sanctions existed for them for not
meeting targets.
In terms of target groups and policy instruments,
most local authorities state that they operate within
departmental guidelines, but in general had
moderate policy autonomy. Local authorities are
more likely than national bodies to produce reports
on planned investment, and are adept at producing
multi-annual business plans. They are also the 
most likely to report on work completed, and all
produce annual reports. Local authority goals are
set either by the authority or in conjunction with
the Department of Environment, Heritage and 
Local Government. A majority reported that the
number of performance indictors has increased
over the last five years. Most local authorities
evaluate their non-financial results either
themselves or in conjunction with others. Almost
half of local authority respondents reported that
some form of rewards and sanctions existed for
their organisation.
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_______________
86 McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-Commercial National
Agencies (Institute of Public Administration: Committee for Public Management Research Report No. 6, 2005), p.125.
Table 8.1: Method of board member appointment and average board size 
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THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE BODIES IN IRELAND
8.1 Introduction
Boards are an essential element of the governance
machinery for many public bodies. Whereas 69 per
cent of national bodies surveyed by McGauran et
al86 had a board, 100 per cent of local and regional
bodies responded that they had one. In this chapter
the composition and role of these boards are
considered, as well as the role and accountability of
the CEOs (or equivalent) of sub-national bodies.
8.2 Board appointment mechanisms and
composition: 11 sub-sectors
For the eleven sub-sectors, the method of appoint-
ment and average size of boards is as laid out in
Table 8.1.
The organisations with the most diverse method
of board nominations are harbour commissions and
enterprise boards, with organisations from both
sub-sectors deriving their board membership 
from the full range of methods listed here. LEADER
groups, regional fisheries boards and child-
care committees have their boards appointed from 
a combination of appointments by ministers,
stakeholders, indirect election and other
nominations. In the case of the childcare
committees, this latter category included for
example, community and voluntary repre-
sentatives. For regional fisheries boards, licensed
anglers are entitled to elect board members. A more
detailed breakdown of numbers is presented in
Table 8.2.
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As is clear from the above table, the two largest
cohorts of representatives to local and regional
bodies (excluding local authorities) are stake-
holder representatives, and members of local
authorities nominated to serve on boards of other
organisations. Local authority representation on
boards offer greater democratic legitimacy to 
non-directly elected local and regional bodies. In
fact, for many local and regional bodies, new boards
are elected in the same year as local authority
elections. Central government representatives
account for a relatively small percentage of total
board appointments. When compared with the
corresponding figures for national level bodies,
some variations emerge as revealed in Figure 
8.1.
The most significant difference occurs in respect
of elected members, with no national bodies having
members of local authorities on their boards. There
are also comparatively few independent experts on
the boards of local and regional bodies (3 per cent)
when compared with national bodies (29 per cent).
In respect of government representatives, while the
percentage of central (departmental) representatives
62
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Table 8.2: Total number of representatives on 11 sub-sectors’ boards (n=141)
Sub-Sector Central Other Trade Employer Employee Stake- Inde- Elected Other Total
Govt Govt Union Reps Reps holder pendent Members*
Reps Reps Reps Reps Experts
Regional Authorities 146 146
Regional Assemblies 70 70
Harbour Commissions 6 12 3 3 2 6 12 44
VECs 3 1 23 28 139 49 243
Enterprise Boards 4 25 18 21 2 75 28 48 16 237
Partnerships 1 69 40 30 12 111 5 48 20 336
LEADER 14 4 8 2 129 6 55 3 221
Regional Fisheries Boards 1 3 15 40 7 66
Regional Tourism Authorities 2 1 1 6 13 23
Development Boards 25 60 13 19 10 107 22 96 14 366
Childcare Committees 24 9 9 10 135 2 42 4 235
Total 37 206 91 91 63 608 63 703 125 1987
Total % 2% 10% 5% 5% 3% 31% 3% 35% 6% 100%







































Fig. 8.1: Representation of groups on boards (%)
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for local and regional bodies (2 per cent) is less than
for national bodies (10 per cent), there are
comparatively more persons appointed from non-
departmental state organisations to local and
regional bodies (10 per cent) than national bodies (4
per cent). For example, many of the city and county
development boards have large numbers of
representatives from organisations such as the
Health Service Executive and FÁS.
Many boards are also moving from being
principally concerned with control over opera-
tional issues to concern with strategic control.  For
the eleven sub-sectors, 22 per cent responded that
this is happening ‘to a large extent’, 43 per cent ‘to
some extent’ and 11 per cent responded that it is
not happening. It is most commonly happening to a
large extent in regional tourism authorities (50 per
cent), LEADER groups (31 per cent), enterprise
boards (28 per cent) and VECs (25 per cent). A more
detailed breakdown is described in Figure 8.2
below.
8.3 Board appointment mechanisms and
composition: local authorities
The ‘Boards of Directors’ for local authorities are in
fact the council of popularly elected members. For
the city, county and borough councils who
responded to the survey, the number of such
members ranged from twelve to fifty-two, with an
average size of twenty-five. These councils remain
in place until the following local election – a period
of five years. As demonstrated in Figure 8.1 above,
a significant proportion of local politicians are also
board members of other local and regional
organisations. Interestingly, 17 per cent of local
authority respondents reported that their elected
councils were ‘to a large extent’ moving from being
principally concerned with control over
operational issues to being concerned with more
strategic control. A further 70 per cent noted this to
be true ‘to some extent’.
8.4 Appointing and monitoring the CEO:
11 sub-sectors
For the eleven sub-sectors, on average two thirds of
responding organisations reported that their CEO
(or equivalent) is appointed by the board. A further
12 per cent stated that the board appointed the CEO
after consulting with the organisation. Sixteen per
cent of respondents identified other methods of
appointment, including local authorities for city
and county development boards, and the Local
Appointments Commission (now Public
Appointments Service) for regional assemblies. In
the latter case, the assembly endorses the
appointment. A detailed breakdown by sub-sector
is presented in Figure 8.3.
On average, 91 per cent of all organisations
reported that the CEO’s role is described in writing.
While one third of harbour commissioners reported
that the role of the harbour master is not in writing,
the 1946 Act founding the commissions did
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Fig. 8.2: Has the organisation's board shifted from more operational to more strategic 
oriented control? 
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describe in some detail the duties of the harbour
master. Also, one quarter of development boards
reported that the role of the local authority director
of service normally appointed to manage their work
is not written anywhere. A small percentage of
VECs (14 per cent) and childcare committees (13
per cent) also reported that the CEO’s role is not in
writing. 
In terms of CEO accountability, all of the regional
assemblies, enterprise boards, Partnerships and
regional tourism authorities responded that the
specific accountability of their CEOs are in writing.
While two thirds of regional fisheries boards
reported that the accountability of their CEO is not
written, the 1980 Fisheries Act details the role of
the chief executive. Also, while the same is true for
half of the harbour commissions, it must be noted
that the harbour masters have contracts with the
commissions directly. Twenty per cent of regional
authorities and childcare committees also
responded that the CEO’s accountability is not in
writing. While 37 per cent of development boards
also stated that the accountability of the director of
service or equivalent is not in written format,
Section 129(8) of the 2001 Local Government Act
does identify that the ‘chief officer’ of the CDB shall
be an employee of the council. Under Section 17 of
the 2001 Vocational Education (Amendment) Act,
the CEO of a VEC can be called before the
Committee of Public Accounts. 
The local and regional bodies were asked
whether or not their CEO is accountable for:
● results 
● the functioning of the organisation
● administration of the budget
● compliance with rules and regulations
● or other issues.
In terms of results, an overwhelming majority of
organisations noted that their CEO is responsible
for such. Twenty per cent of regional authorities, 17
per cent of harbour commissions and 14 per cent of
VECs stated that this is not the case for their CEOs.
Only a small number of organisations responded
that their CEO is not accountable for the
functioning of the organisation. The same is true in
respect of budget administration and compliance
with rules and regulations. Both regional
assemblies responded that the CEOs are also
accountable for other issues as well, as did one
third of the regional fisheries boards. Of the other
sub-sectors, an average of 15 per cent also
responded that their CEOs are accountable for
issues other than those listed above. 
For the eleven sub-sectors, exactly half of the
CEOs are reported as being appointed on fixed term
contracts and half as permanent appointees. Figure
8.4 illustrates that permanent contracts are
extended to the CEOs of VECs, regional fisheries
boards and regional tourism authorities. The vast
majority of development boards are managed by
directors of service who are also employed on
permanent contracts.
On the other hand, the majority of CEOs in
regional authorities, harbour commissions,
enterprise boards, LEADER groups and childcare
committees are reported to be employed on fixed-
term contracts. In the case of enterprise boards,
64















































Fig. 8.3: Who appoints the CEO?
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following a successful initial 3-year appointment, a
CEO may then receive a permanent appointment.
For harbour commissions, the CEOs tend to be
permanent in the larger harbours which have more
volume of traffic. Approximately half of the
respondents for the Partnership companies noted
that their CEOs are on fixed-term contracts.
Finally, in terms of evaluating the CEOs, a large
majority of respondents noted that the board of the
organisation performs this function. However,
many organisations responded that evaluation of
the CEO is conducted by more than one body, as
revealed by Figure 8.5. 
As this figure demonstrates, a number of
respondents from the harbour commissions, VECs
and LEADER groups noted ministerial involvement
in CEO evaluation. For development boards,
evaluation of the director of service is conducted by
the county or city manager. Also, it is noted that
Fáilte Ireland, as the parent body, had a role in the
65

















































































Fig. 8.5: Who evaluates the CEO? (%)
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evaluation of the CEOs of the regional tourism
authorities. 
8.5 Appointing and monitoring the CEO:
local authorities
For local authorities, the CEO is the city or county
manager (or the town clerk in the case of borough
councils). The normal method for appointing a
manager is recommendation by the Public
Appointments Service (PAS) followed by approval
by the elected council. Section 145 of the 2001
Local Government Act provides that the nominee of
the PAS will automatically assume the position if
the council does not approve nomination within
three months. In responding to the survey, 65 per
cent of local authorities noted that the manager is
appointed by the council, but 13 per cent stated that
the government or minister made the appointment.
A further 17 per cent recognised the PAS as the
appointing body. The manager is accountable to the
council, with whom he or she works closely.
In terms of the role and accountability of local
authority managers, 96 per cent of respondents
stated that the role is described in writing, while 92
per cent stated that the same is true for the
accountability of the CEO. Ninety-six per cent also
noted that local authority managers are appointed
on fixed-term contracts, normally seven years.
When asked what the CEO is accountable for, local
authorities responded as follows:
Table 8.3: What is City/County Manager/Town
Clerk accountable for? (%)
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In terms of evaluating local authority managers, 57
per cent of respondents reported that the elected
council conducted this task. However, 39 per cent
of respondents also referred to the Committee for
Performance Awards in this context. A small
number of responses indicated that the minister is
also involved in the evaluation of managers.
Turning to the issue of results-based management,
74 per cent of local authorities reported that
divisions in their organisation were managed ‘to a
large extent’ on the basis of results. Sixty-five per
cent also reported that the development of internal
reporting and evaluation systems to help
management assess results on objectives ‘happened
to a large extent’.
8.6 Results-based management and
resource allocation: 11 sub-sectors
Survey respondents were also questioned about the
extent to which organisation divisions are managed
and resources allocated on the basis of objectives
and results.
For the eleven sub-sectors, the average results for
managing divisions on the basis of objectives and
results are as follows:
Does not happen 9%
Happens to some extent 27%
Happens to a large extent 38%
N/A 27% 
A more detailed breakdown (Figure 8.6)
demonstrates that the sub-sectors where
management of divisions on the basis of objectives
and results occurs ‘to a large extent’ most
commonly are regional fisheries boards (67 per
cent) and regional tourism authorities (50 per cent).
Sixty-two per cent of VECs reported that it
happened in their organisations ‘to some extent’.
The norm for the allocation of resources based on
results for the eleven sub-sectors is as follows:
Does not happen 20%
Happens to some extent 27%
Happens to a large extent 14%
N/A 39% 
A similar breakdown of these results by sub-sector
in Figure 8.7 demonstrates that Partnerships (60 per
cent) and regional tourism authorities (50 per cent)
are the most likely organisations for this to happen
‘to a large extent’. Again, 62 per cent of VECs and 50
per cent of regional tourism authorities said that it
occurred ‘to some extent’
Some sub-national bodies have contracts with
their parent departments. For example, regional
fisheries boards had performance contracts with the
Department of Communications, Marine and
Natural Resources, normally reviewed each year.
However, the nature of the work undertaken by the
66
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 66
boards made performance targets difficult to
identify. LEADER groups have service-level
contracts with the Department of Community, Rural
and Gaeltacht Affairs. That department also has a
framework agreement with Pobal, as the funding
body for Partnerships, rather than with the
companies themselves.
8.7 Results-based management and
resource allocation: local authorities
For local authorities, the vast majority (96 per cent)
of respondents reported that divisions are managed
on the basis of resources being allocated according
to objectives and results either ‘to some extent’ or
‘to a large extent’. However, interviews indicate that
local authorities also allocate resources according
to assessed need, and are legally bound to fund
certain services. Furthermore, as well as economic
efficiency, local authorities must take social and
environmental factors into consideration in such
allocations. The fact that many local authority
services are not performed on the basis of simple
economic viability is borne out in Figure 8.8. It
demonstrates that just over half of local authorities
responded that resources are allocated to divisions
67
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Fig. 8.7: Does the organisation allocate resources to divisions on the basis of results? (%) 
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on the basis of results, with almost a third
indicating that this was not necessarily the case. 
8.8 Developing internal reporting and
evaluation systems: 11 sub-sectors
The use of internal reporting and evaluation
systems is a method of helping assist in the
assessment of results in the pursuit of objectives.
Survey respondents were queried about the extent
to which this is done by both management and the
board of their organisation. For the eleven sub-
sectors, similar results for both boards and
management teams were returned, and again the
vast majority of organisations used such systems
either ‘to a large extent’ or ‘to some extent’ (Figure
8.9).
Looking at the extent to which the boards used
such systems within the various sub-sectors, it is
most likely to happen in enterprise boards (77 per
cent), childcare committees (64 per cent), LEADER
groups (56 per cent), Partnerships (53 per cent) and
regional tourism authorities (50 per cent). As Figure
8.10 illustrates, it is least likely to happen in
harbour commissions and regional fisheries boards.
Turning to management in the sub-sectors, it is
68
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Fig. 8.8: Allocation of resources in local
authorities based on results?
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Fig. 8.10: Does the organisation develop internal reporting and evaluation systems to enable the 
board assess results? (%) 
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evident that the management teams most likely to
use internal reporting and evaluation systems ‘to a
large extent’ are the enterprise boards (76 per cent),
LEADER groups (75 per cent), childcare committees
(66 per cent), Partnership companies (53 per cent)
and regional tourism authorities (50 per cent).
Again, as Figure 8.11 describes, it is least likely to
happen in harbour commissions and regional
fisheries boards.
8.9 Developing internal reporting and
evaluation systems: local authorities
For local authorities, as Figure 8.12 demonstrates,
management is more likely than the councils to use
internal reporting and evaluation systems. Overall,
over 90 per cent of both councils and management
teams report using such systems either to ‘a large
extent’ or ‘to some extent’. 
8.10 Summary
Survey responses indicate that all local and
regional bodies have a board (compared to 69 per
cent of national bodies), appointed by a variety of
means from popular or stakeholder election to
ministerial nomination. The two largest cohorts of
representatives to local and regional bodies
(excluding local authorities) are stakeholder
representatives and members of local authorities
nominated to serve on boards of other
organisations. A majority of boards surveyed are
moving from being concerned with operational
issues to more strategic matters. The roles of the
vast majority of CEOs (or equivalent) are in writing.
Most CEOs are accountable for results, functioning
of the organisation, budget administration and
compliance with rules and regulations. Half of the
CEOs are employed on a permanent basis, while
half are on fixed-term contracts. The majority of
CEOs are evaluated by their boards. A majority of
respondents also reported that both management
and boards use internal reporting and evaluation
systems to enable results assessment ‘to a large
extent’.
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Fig. 8.11: Does the organisation develop internal reporting and evaluation systems to enable
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Fig. 8.12 Use of internal reporting and 
evaluation systems to enable results assesments
in local authorities? (%) 
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While no local politicians are on the boards of
national non-commercial bodies, a significant
number of city and county councillors sit on the
boards of local and regional bodies, and they
comprise 35 per cent of all board members at local
and regional level. Stakeholder representatives
comprise a further 31 per cent (Table 8.2). Also,
while 29 per cent of board members of national
bodies are independent experts, only 3 per cent of
those on the boards of local and regional bodies are.
There is also considerable variation across sub-
sectors in terms of CEO appointment mechanisms,
contracts and evaluation.
The boards of regional authorities consist solely
of local councillors and the CEOs are on fixed-term
contracts.
The CEOs of regional assemblies are accountable
for issues other than results, functioning of the
organisation, budget administration and
compliance with rules and regulations.
Harbour commissions have very diverse board
memberships.
A majority of vocational education committees
reported that management of divisions on the basis
of results happened ‘to some extent’ in their
organisation.
City and county enterprise boards have the most
diverse board memberships. The management and
boards of enterprise boards are most likely of all
sub-sectors to use internal reporting and evaluation
systems to enable results assessment.
Partnership company boards average at around
twenty members. Partnerships are the most likely to
allocate resources on the basis of objectives and
results.
Almost a third of LEADER groups responded that
their boards are moving from operational to more
strategic issues. The management of LEADER
groups are very likely to use internal reporting and
evaluation systems to enable results assessment.
Regional fisheries boards had a relatively large
average board size of twenty-two. They are most
likely of all sub-sectors to manage divisions on the
basis of results and objectives. The use of internal
reporting and evaluation systems to enable results
assessment by management and boards is least
likely in regional fisheries boards.
Fifty per cent of regional tourism authorities
reported that their boards are moving from
operational to more strategic issues. Allocating
resources on the basis of objectives and results is
also very likely to happen in the authorities.
City and county development boards have
relatively large average board sizes of twenty-three
members. The role of the local authority officer
(normally the director of service) who works with
the board is not in writing, but they are evaluated
by the city or county manager.
The boards and management of city and county
childcare committees are very likely to use internal
reporting and evaluation systems to enable results
assessment.
For local authorities, the city and county manager
would appear to be accountable to the elected
council for everything in the organisation, with
whom he or she works closely. A large number of
respondents noted that internal reporting and
evaluation systems are being extensively developed
to assess results on objectives, and that divisions in
the organisation are managed on the basis of results.
However, only half of local authority respondents
responded that resources are allocated on the basis
of results. Survey responses also indicate that local
authority management is more likely than elected
members to use internal reporting and evaluation
systems.
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9.1 Introduction
Identifying the best method for ‘parent’
organisations to steer or control those bodies under
their remit has spawned an array of official and
academic literature, particularly in the field of
performance measurement and management87. If a
public body has no autonomy and too many
accountability demands placed on it, questions
naturally arise concerning the need for its
existence. At the other extreme, public bodies with
too much autonomy and little accountability
requirements to fulfil may not achieve efficient use
of public resources. In between these two poles, an
array of management techniques and accountability
arrangements exist, and in this chapter the
principal structures and processes governing the
relationship between local and regional
organisations and parent departments and bodies
are identified.
Non-commercial local and regional public
service organisations have contact with their parent
departments or bodies through a variety of means.
As noted in Chapter 7, some of these contacts are
made through regular reporting mechanisms, while
some departments might on occasion attend
meetings held between the duplicate bodies under
their aegis. It has also been noted earlier how parent
departments or bodies are involved to varying
degrees with issues concerning HR, policy and
financial management in local and regional bodies.
In this section the extent and nature of formal
steering meetings between local and regional non-
commercial bodies and their parent entities are
examined, as are any informal contacts that occur.
Corresponding figures for the study of national
level bodies are not available.
9.2 Contacts with departments and
parent bodies: 11 sub-sectors
Figure 9.1 demonstrates that very few organisations
at local and regional level engage in monthly formal
meetings with their parent departments. The modal
response for the eleven sub-sectors is ‘at least once
a year’ (36 per cent). However, a substantial
percentage (27 per cent) of organisations responded
that they have no formal contact annually, with one
third (33 per cent) reporting that they had such
meetings ‘quarterly’. 
The sub-sectors most likely to say that they never
formally meet with their parent departments are the
harbour commissions (66 per cent), VECs (58 per
cent) and regional tourism authorities (50 per cent).
However, interviews reveal that these figures reflect
the fact that other fora exist for formal communica-
tion. In the case of harbour commissions, formal
meetings are unnecessary as they employ part-time
personnel, and such meetings are arranged only if
an issue warrants it. The Irish Vocational Education
Association, which represents VECs, is a ‘named
partner’ for the purposes of consultation with the
Department of Education and Science, and meets at
least quarterly with department officials. Also,
while the comparative autonomy of regional
tourism authorities meant that many rarely had
formal meetings with the Department of Arts,
Sports and Tourism, Fáilte Ireland has formal
quarterly engagement with the department – known
as the Bilateral Consultative Committee. Interviews
suggest that when the regional tourism authorities
did meet with the department, it was usually to
lobby for something. 
At the other end of the scale, the sub-sectors most
likely to have quarterly formal meetings are the
71
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE BODIES IN IRELAND
9
Relationship between non-commercial local and regional
bodies and parent departments and bodies
_______________
87 Pollitt, C. and Talbot C. (eds) Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and
Contractualisation (London: Routledge, 2004); Pollitt, C.; Talbot, C.; Caulfield, J. and A. Smullen (eds) Agencies: How Governments do
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enterprise boards (88 per cent), regional authorities
(50 per cent) and LEADER companies (45 per cent).
In the latter case, representatives from each
LEADER group meet once a month and the
department attends such meetings on four to five
occasions per year. Similarly, the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment may attend
meetings of the Association of City and County
Enterprise Boards.
Of course, other avenues of communication
between local and regional bodies and their parent
bodies/ministers exist. For example, in respect of
regional fisheries boards, the CEO of each board
regularly meets with the CEO of the Central
Fisheries Board to form the National Fisheries
Management Executive (NFME) which co-ordinates
issues relating to the fisheries under their remit.
Departmental representatives regularly attend this
forum to engage with the CEOs. The NFME can
advise the minister on matters concerning the
management of the fisheries88. Also, the fisheries
boards have a ‘liaison group’ consisting of the
CEOs, chair and one other board member from each
of the regions as well as the Central Fisheries Board.
The department has occasionally addressed
meetings of this group. Partnerships have a
representative network known as PLANET89 which
makes submissions on behalf of the companies to
Pobal and other organsations.
Survey respondents were asked to what extent




● the achievement / reporting on results.
For the eleven sub-sectors, 44 per cent reported
that such meetings focused on economic issues to ‘a
large extent’, while 45 per cent said they did so ‘to
some extent’. Within this there is considerable
variation however – the harbour commissions
responses indicate that economic issues are focused
on to a large extent, while all responding regional
tourism authorities noted that economic issues are
focused on ‘to some extent’. Formal meetings with
regional assemblies did not consider economic
issues at all.
In terms of professional issues, Figure 9.3
demonstrates that 59 per cent of all sub-sectors
responded that these are focused on ‘to some
extent’. Sixty-one per cent of enterprise boards and
33 per cent of harbour commissions, however,
reported that professional issues are focused on ‘to
a large extent’. Interestingly, all responding regional
authorities noted that professional issues are never
considered at their meetings with the Department of
the Environment, Heritage and Local Government.
Finally, in terms of the achievement or reporting
of results, 65 per cent of all other sub-sectors noted
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89 For more information see www.planet.ie 
Fig. 9.1: Frequency of formal meetings between parent body and organisation
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Fig. 9.3: To what extent are professional issues focused on in meetings? (%)
that this is focused on ‘to a large extent’ in their
meetings. Very few local and regional bodies (3 per
cent) stated that they never focused on such issues.
However, 100 per cent of the responding harbour
commissions and regional authorities, and 67 per
cent of regional fisheries boards, noted that the
formal meetings only did so to some extent.
9.3 Contacts between local authorities
and the Department of the Environment,
Heritage and Local Government 
Local authorities do not have a ‘parent’ department
in the sense used to describe the relationship
between organisations in other sub-sectors and
central government. However, local authorities
have a close working relationship with the
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government. Local authorities do not have
corporate formal meetings as such with the
department. Hence, in the survey 43 per cent of
local authorities indicated that they never meet
with the department. Instead, a variety of formal
and informal routes of communication and
interaction exist. This is reflected in the response
by 35 per cent of local authorities who reported that
they meet the department at least once a year, with
a further 13 per cent stating such meetings took
place at least quarterly, and 9 per cent at least once
a month. Interviews reveal that the department’s
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management advisory committee (MAC), including
the secretary-general (and on occasion the
minister), meet twice a year with the executive of
the City and County Managers Association (CCMA)
to discuss high-level issues of concern to local
authorities. The various divisions within the
department, such as housing or water for example,
also meet with CCMA committees to discuss issues
concerning the various programme areas. There are
also continuous communications between the
department and local authorities through circulars,
e-mails and telephone. Local government elected
member associations such as the Local Authority
Members’ Association (LAMA), the Association of
Municipal Authorities of Ireland (AMAI) and the
Association of County and City Councils (ACCC)
also have regular contact with the department at
administrative and political levels.
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Fig. 9.4: To what extent is the achievement or reporting of results focused on in meetings? (%) 
Fig. 9.5: How frequently does organisation report non-financial results to parent body? (%) 
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Fifty-four per cent of local authorities responded
that meetings focused on economic issues to ‘a large
extent’, while 31 per cent said they did so ‘to some
extent’. In terms of professional issues, two thirds of
local authorities reported that these are focused on
‘to some extent’. Finally, in terms of the
achievement or reporting of results, 77 per cent of
local authorities stated that this is focused on ‘to a
large extent’ in their meetings. 
9.4 Reporting on non-financial results
and informal contact: 11 sub-sectors
For the eleven sub-sectors, an average of 39 per cent
of organisations reported non-financial results to
their parent department or body at least quarterly,
20 per cent at least twice a year and 20 per cent less
than once a year. Looking at the results for these
sub-sectors in more detail in Figure 9.5, it is clear
that very few organisations (and mainly VECs and
LEADER groups) report non-financial results more
frequently than monthly. However, a significant
percentage of enterprise boards (56 per cent),
regional fisheries boards (67 per cent), childcare
committees (73 per cent) and all of the regional
tourism authorities reported on non-financial
results at least quarterly. Both regional assemblies,
57 per cent of development boards and half of the
regional authorities reported on non-financial
results less than once a year.
Apart from formal meetings at which economic,
professional and results-related issues are
discussed, local and regional bodies have informal
contact with their parent organisations. Such
informal contact may consist of meetings without
written proceedings, e-mails or phone calls.
Interviews suggest that phone calls between the
bodies and parent departments are very frequent.
The norm for the eleven sub-sectors in terms of
such contact is as follows:
● More than once a week 28%
● More than once a month 40%
● At least quarterly 27%
● At least once a year 4%
● Never 1%
Figure 9.6 below identifies the frequency with
which each sub-sector experiences such contact.
The sub-sectors that had the most frequent
informal contact with their parent entities are the
VECs (69 per cent), regional fisheries boards (67 per
cent), LEADER companies (53 per cent) and
regional tourism authorities (50 per cent). 
9.5 Reporting on non-financial results
and informal contact: local authorities
In terms of reporting to the Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government on
non-financial results, 36 per cent of local
authorities responded that they did so at least twice
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Fig. 9.6: Frequency of informal meetings between parent body and senior management of organisation
(%) 
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a year, while 32 per cent did so at least quarterly. A
further 18 per cent stated that they did so only once
a year. Informal contacts between local authorities
and the department also occurred, and 57 per cent
responded that they had such contact at least once
a week, with a further 39 per cent stating that they
did so at least once a month. 
9.6 Summary
One third of local and regional bodies (other than
local authorities) responded that they met with
their parent department quarterly. Almost a quarter
reported that they never formally meet with their
parent department, while 36 per cent reported
doing so annually. Sixty-five per cent reported that
such meetings focussed on the achievement and
reporting of results ‘to a large extent’. Many of the
sub-sectors have representative bodies such as the
Association of City and County Enterprise Boards,
the National Fisheries Management Executive or
PLANET (LEADER groups) which also act as
conduits between local and regional organisations
and parent bodies.  Informal contact by telephone
and e-mail is very common, with almost 70 per cent
of survey respondents noting that it occurred at
least once a month, if not more frequently.
Formal meetings between regional authorities
and the Department of the Environment, Heritage
and Local Government are relatively frequent and
tend to focus mainly on economic issues.
Regional assemblies do not report regularly on
non-financial results and tend to meet with the
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government infrequently.
Harbour commissions are the sub-sector least
likely to meet with their parent department.
Vocational education committees tended not to
meet formally with the Department of Education
and Science, and instead the Irish Vocational
Education Association represents their interests.
VECs frequently report on non-financial results and
are the most likely sub-sector to make informal
contact with their parent department.
City and county enterprise boards are most likely
to have formal quarterly meetings with their parent
department (Enterprise, Trade and Employment).
Professional issues and the achievement and
reporting of results are mainly focussed on. A large
number of enterprise boards noted that they report
on non-financial results at least quarterly.
Partnerships have a representative network
which makes representations on their behalf.
LEADER groups report on non-financial results
regularly, and the achievement and reporting of
results are the main issues of concern at meetings
with the Department of Community, Rural and
Gaeltacht Affairs.
Regional fisheries boards are amongst the most
likely sub-sectors to make informal contact with
their parent department.
Regional tourism authorities were not likely to
meet formally with their parent department,
communicating principally with Fáilte Ireland
instead. The achievement and reporting of results
provided the main focus at such meetings.
City and county development boards tend not to
formally meet with the Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government.
A large majority city and county childcare
committees responded that they report on non-
financial results at least quarterly. At meetings with
their parent department, the achievement and
reporting of results are the principal matters, ahead
of professional or economic issues.
A variety of communication channels are used
between local authorities and the Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government. In
particular, meetings between the department’s
management advisory committee and the City and
County Managers’ Association provide an
important channel of communication. Meetings
tended to focus on the achievement and reporting of
results. Local authorities also regularly report on
non-financial results to the department. 
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10.1 Introduction
This chapter collates the main findings from
Chapters 5 to 10 by sub-sector, and also presents
some general conclusions. The variations in these
findings demonstrate that global recommendations
for future corporate governance reforms of local and
regional bodies must be cognisant of the individual
circumstances pertaining within each sub-sector.
The chapter also presents some recommendations
for the future development of corporate governance
arrangements in non-commercial local and regional
bodies.
All local and regional bodies surveyed in this
report are duplicate bodies, and while they perform
a wide range of activities, these activities are not
necessarily as diverse or specialised as they are for
national bodies. For national bodies, the key
primary functions are providing advice, imple-
menting policy, regulation and providing informa-
tion. However, for local and regional bodies (other
than local authorities), the principal function
identified is co-ordination followed closely by the
direct implementation of policy (Table 4.1). Local
authorities identify policy implementation as their
main function.
Table 10.1 presents the summary findings with
regard to the autonomy of local and regional bodies
in respect of strategic HR, individual HR, finance
and policy. It demonstrates the wide range in
variety between sub-sectors with no clear patterns
or relationships emerging between the various
issues. It is notable, however, that local and regional
bodies are, on average, likely to have more
autonomy over HR issues for individual staff and
policy than for strategic HR and finance issues.
The table yields some interesting findings in
relation to individual sub-sectors. For example,
harbour commissions, Partnerships and LEADER
groups display high levels of HR (strategic and
individual) autonomy. However, regional
authorities, VECs, enterprise boards and develop-
ment boards display low levels of equivalent HR
autonomy.
Of all sub-sectors, regional tourism authorities
exhibited the highest level of financial autonomy,
reflecting the commercial nature of their work. This
strong financial autonomy is matched by a similarly
high level of policy autonomy. Regional authorities,
harbour commissions, enterprise boards, regional
fisheries boards and childcare committees have low
financial autonomy but some (moderate) policy
autonomy in their respective fields. City and county
development boards, whilst having no financial
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Towards a new approach to non-commercial regional and
local bodies
Table 10.1: Autonomy of Local and Regional Bodies
Sub-Sector Strategic HR HR Autonomy Financial Policy
Autonomy for individual staff Autonomy Autonomy
Regional Authorities Minimum Low Low Moderate
Regional Assemblies Low Moderate Low High
Harbour Commissions Maximum Maximum Low Moderate
VECs Minimum Low Moderate Moderate
Enterprise Boards Minimum Low Low Moderate
Partnerships High Maximum Moderate Moderate
LEADER Maximum Maximum Moderate Moderate
Reg. Fisheries Boards Minimum Moderate Low Moderate
Reg. Tourism Authorities Low Moderate High High
Development Boards Minimum Low None Maximum
Childcare Committees Moderate High Low Moderate
Local Authorities Minimum Moderate Moderate Moderate
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autonomy and low HR autonomy, reported having
maximum levels of policy autonomy, albeit within
a defined framework. Local authorities have only
moderate policy and financial autonomy but are
engaged in a multitude of tasks.
10.2 The 11 sub-sectors – 
general findings
As outlined in Chapter 4, the eleven (non-directly
elected) sub-sectors range considerably in age and
function. However, some important patterns
emerge. Just as the study of national non-
commercial bodies found a sharp increase in the
number of such bodies being established since the
early 1990s, so too do the majority of sub-national
bodies (80 per cent) date from 1990 onwards. Also,
co-ordination emerges as a defining feature of sub-
national government in Ireland. Almost one third
(32 per cent) of local and regional bodies view co-
ordination as their main role, which demonstrates
recognition of a high level of activity diffusion at
sub-national level, and the need to avoid duplica-
tion. A further 28 per cent view direct implementa-
tion of policy as their primary role with another 18
per cent identifying specialist areas of work.
In terms of secondary function, analysis of the
norm for the eleven sub-sectors again identifies co-
ordination as featuring strongly (23 per cent). Other
prominent roles for sub-national bodies include the
provision of information, advising, the direct
implementation of policy and promotional (non-
commercial) development. 
There is currently considerable institutional
reconfiguration at sub-national level, and at least
three sub-sectors (harbour commissions, regional
fisheries boards and regional tourism authorities)
have recently been abolished or are in the process
of reform or having their main functions subsumed
by other organisations. Many Partnership
companies and LEADER groups have also recently
been merged, with more to follow. Membership of
the EU has also resulted in institutional change at
the sub-national level, and at least half (54 per cent)
of organisations other than local authorities noted
that the EU had a ‘strong influence’ on their current
organisation form. A further 32 per cent reported
that the EU had had ‘some influence’ in this regard.
A significant number of sub-national bodies have
Articles and Memoranda of Association and
interviews suggest that the Code of Practice for the
Governance of State Bodies is used extensively.
The norm for the eleven sub-sectors reveals that
the aspect of general HR policy which regional and
local organisations are most likely to have
autonomy over is establishing staff evaluation
schemes. Few organisations have discretion over
salary levels. Local and regional bodies also have
considerable discretion over staff appointment and
selection procedures (61 per cent), and dismissal
criteria (56 per cent). Approximately half of the
bodies practice some form of internal HR
management devolution.
The vast majority of local and regional bodies
receive their funding from central government.
However, several raise some revenue themselves for
current expenditure, including harbour commis-
sions and Partnership companies. The EU is also an
important source of funding for other sub-sectors
although this will change in the context of Ireland’s
move from being a net recipient to a net donor
within the Union. Few can take out loans or shift
budget by year without ministerial or departmental
approval, but many can shift budgets by function.
Just over half of the eleven sub-sector respondents
report having an audit committee in their boards,
and almost all have been audited externally in the
last two years. Audits tend to focus more on
financial results, legality and compliance and
internal control systems, than on organisational
results.
Only 15 per cent of sub-national bodies (other
than local authorities) have discretion over
deciding on target groups, while the equivalent
figure for policy instruments is 13 per cent. Local
and regional bodies are also more likely to report on
strategy, objectives, planned investment, financial
and non-financial targets than national non-
commercial bodies, as well as reporting on work
completed in these areas. Eighty-nine per cent of
local and regional bodies in the eleven sub-sectors
produce annual reports. The vast majority also
publicly report on financial and non-financial
performance. Fifty-six per cent state that they feel
the number of performance indicators has increased
and an equal number report that indicators are used
‘to a large extent’ in their relationship with their
parent department or body. Apart from harbour
commissions, all sub-sectors’ non-financial results
are evaluated by themselves and an external body,
which may or may not be their parent department.
Approximately three quarters report that there are
no rewards for meeting their goals (mainly resource
increases where they do exist), while about half
said sanctions existed.
Survey responses indicate that all local and
regional bodies have a board (compared to 69 per
cent of national bodies), appointed by a variety of
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means from popular or stakeholder election to
ministerial nomination. The two largest cohorts of
representatives to local and regional bodies
(excluding local authorities) are stakeholder repre-
sentatives and members of local authorities
nominated to serve on boards of other organisa-
tions. A majority of boards surveyed are moving
from being concerned with operational issues to
more strategic matters. The role of the vast majority
of CEOs (or equivalent) are in writing. Most CEOs
are accountable for results, the functioning of the
organisation, budget administration and 
compliance with rules and regulations. Half of the
CEOs are employed on a permanent basis, while
half are on fixed-term contracts. The majority of
CEOs are evaluated by their boards. A majority of
respondents also reported that both management
and boards use internal reporting and evaluation
systems to enable results assessment ‘to a large
extent’.
While no local politicians are on the boards of
national non-commercial bodies, a significant
number of city and county councillors sit on the
boards of local and regional bodies, and they
comprise 35 per cent of all board members at local
and regional level. Stakeholder representatives
comprise a further 31 per cent (Table 8.2). Also,
while 29 per cent of board members of national
bodies are independent experts, only 3 per cent of
those on the boards of local and regional bodies are.
There is also considerable variation across sub-
sectors in terms of CEO appointment mechanisms,
contracts and evaluation.
One-third of local and regional bodies (other than
local authorities) responded that they meet with
their parent department quarterly. Almost a quarter
reported that they never formally meet with their
parent department, while 36 per cent do so
annually. Sixty-five per cent report that such
meetings focus on the achievement and reporting of
results ‘to a large extent’. Many of the sub-sectors
have representative bodies such as the Association
of City and County Enterprise Boards, the National
Fisheries Management Executive or PLANET
(LEADER groups) which also act as conduits
between local and regional organisations and
parent bodies.  Informal contact by telephone and 
e-mail is very common, with almost 70 per cent of
survey respondents noting that it occurred at least
once a month, if not more frequently.
10.3 Findings by sub-sector
Regional authorities have minimum levels of
strategic HR autonomy and low HR autonomy for
individual staff. Also, they do not practice internal
HR management devolution. For regional
authorities, the primary source of income is
transfers from local authorities, and results indicate
that they have low financial autonomy. They have
no internal audit committees but are audited by the
Comptroller and Auditor-General. Regional
authorities have moderate policy autonomy. They
do not use performance indicators in their strategy
statements. The boards of regional authorities
consist solely of local councillors and the CEOs are
on fixed-term contracts. Formal meetings between
regional authorities and the Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government are
relatively frequent and tend to focus mainly on
economic issues.
Regional assemblies have low levels of strategic
HR autonomy and moderate levels of HR autonomy
for individual staff. However, both use some forms
of internal HR management devolution. As with
regional authorities, regional assemblies have low
financial autonomy and their primary source of
income is transfers from local authorities. Their
funding is distributed as agreed under the National
Development Plan 7-year framework. Neither have
an internal audit committee but the Comptroller
and Auditor-General audits them. Regional
assemblies have high levels of policy autonomy.
They do not use performance indicators in their
strategy statements but those indicators that exist
focus principally on their use of resources. The
CEOs of regional assemblies are accountable for
issues other than results, functioning of the
organisation, budget administration and
compliance with rules and regulations. Regional
assemblies do not report regularly on non-financial
results and tend to meet with the Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government
infrequently on a formal basis (but regularly by
informal means). The assemblies also meet with the
Department of Finance.
Harbour commissions have maximum strategic
HR autonomy, including the greatest autonomy
over setting staff numbers and salaries as these roles
rest with the commissioners themselves. They also
have maximum HR autonomy for individual staff,
though staff numbers tend to be small. Harbour
commissions generate their own current expendi-
ture through charges and fees, within limits set by
the minister. Overall they have low financial
autonomy. Of all sub-sectors, harbour commissions
are the most likely to have to operate within
ministerial or departmental limits on target groups
and policy instruments. They have moderate policy
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autonomy. They tend not to produce reports due to
their size and do not use performance indicators
either. Almost all of them set their own goals.
Harbour commissions have very diverse board
memberships. Harbour commissions are the sub-
sector least likely to meet with their parent
department.
Vocational education committees have minimum
strategic HR autonomy, with no ability to set staff
numbers or salary levels, which is instead decided
upon centrally. They also have low HR autonomy
for individual staff. VECs have moderate financial
autonomy and in general budgets are tightly
controlled by the Department of Education and
Science. All of them have audit committees. VECs
have moderate policy autonomy, applying local
discretion to goals and objectives set centrally.
Their performance indicators tend to focus
extensively on the use of resources. A majority of
VECs report that management of divisions on the
basis of results happens ‘to some extent’ in their
organisation. VECs tend not to meet formally with
the Department of Education and Science, and
instead the Irish Vocational Education Association
represents their interests. VECs frequently report on
non-financial results and are the most likely sub-
sector to make informal contact with their parent
department.
City and county enterprise boards also have
minimum strategic HR autonomy and low HR
autonomy for individual staff. They do not have the
freedom to take out loans and display low financial
autonomy. All of them have audit committees on
their boards. They have little discretion over
deciding on policy instruments, and even less on
target groups. They have moderate policy autonomy
overall. They are most likely to produce documents
on planned investment for their parent
departments. A majority of respondents noted that
sanctions existed for them for not meeting targets.
City and county enterprise boards have very diverse
board memberships. The management and boards
of enterprise boards are most likely of all sub-
sectors to use internal reporting and evaluation
systems to enable results assessment. City and
county enterprise boards are most likely to have
formal quarterly meetings with their parent
department (Enterprise, Trade and Employment).
Professional issues and the achievement and
reporting of results are mainly focussed on. A large
number of enterprise boards noted that they report
on non-financial results at least quarterly.
Partnership companies also reported having a
high degree of autonomy over the ability to set staff
numbers and salaries. Overall, while they liase
closely with Pobal, they have high strategic HR
autonomy and maximum HR autonomy for
individual staff. A majority of Partnerships
responded that they could take out loans without
having to seek the approval of the department or
minister. However, the approval of Pobal is
normally necessary. Overall they have moderate
financial autonomy. Partnerships have moderate
policy autonomy. Most of them produce multi-
annual business plans and planned investment
requires city or county development board
endorsement. Most of them set their goals in co-
operation with Pobal and the department.
Indicators played an important role in their
relationship with their parent body, and are used in
reporting to the regional assemblies. Partnership
company boards average at around twenty
members. Partnerships are the most likely to
allocate resources on the basis of objectives and
results. Partnerships have a representative network
which makes representations on their behalf.
LEADER groups have maximum strategic HR
autonomy, including a lot of autonomy over their
staff numbers and salaries, once financial prudence
is exercised. They also have maximum HR
autonomy for individual staff. A large portion of
LEADER groups’ funding is derived from the EU,
and they have moderate financial autonomy. A
majority of respondents reported having freedom to
take out loans without departmental approval.
LEADER groups have moderate policy autonomy,
including little discretion over deciding on target
groups and policy instruments. After enterprise
boards, they are most likely to submit documents
on planned investment to their parent department.
A number of LEADER groups do not produce
annual reports. Most of them set their goals in co-
operation with the department. Indicators played
an important role in their relationship with their
parent body. Almost a third of LEADER groups
reported that their boards are moving from
operational to more strategic issues. The
management of LEADER groups are very likely to
use internal reporting and evaluation systems to
enable results assessment. LEADER groups report
on non-financial results regularly, and the
achievement and reporting of results are the main
issues of concern at meetings with the Department
of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs.
Prior to their abolition in 2006, HR-related issues
for regional fisheries boards were centrally co-
ordinated by the Central Fisheries Boards, and
therefore the boards themselves had minimum
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strategic HR autonomy and moderate HR autonomy
for individual staff. Regional fisheries boards had a
large degree of discretion over setting charges for
services but otherwise had low financial autonomy.
Each had an audit committee. Regional fisheries
boards had moderate policy autonomy. Most of
them set their goals in co-operation with the
department. A majority of respondents noted that
sanctions existed for them for not meeting targets.
Regional fisheries boards had a relatively large
average board size of twenty-two. They are most
likely of all sub-sectors to manage divisions on 
the basis of results and objectives. The use of
internal reporting and evaluation systems to enable
results assessment by management and boards 
is least likely in regional fisheries boards. They 
are amongst the most likely sub-sector to 
make informal contact with their parent
department.
Reflecting their company-like statutes, regional
tourism authorities displayed high levels of
autonomy over the ability to set staff numbers.
However, they had limitations in respect of other
HR issues and overall had low strategic HR
autonomy. All of them also practiced internal HR
management devolution and had moderate HR
autonomy for individual staff. Of all sub-sectors,
regional tourism authorities had the highest
financial autonomy, and could take out loans and
set charges as necessary. They received funding
from membership fees, local authorities and grants
from Fáilte Ireland. They were also most likely to
extend financial management autonomy
downwards internally and each of them had an
audit committee. Regional tourism authorities are
the sub-sector with the greatest discretion over
deciding on target groups and policy instruments
and overall had high policy autonomy. They are
most likely of all sub-sectors to produce multi-
annual business plans. Half of them responded that
the performance indicators in their strategy
statements reflected their work only to a small, if
any, extent. Rewards did exist for the authorities, as
did sanctions but to a lesser extent. Fifty per cent of
regional tourism authorities responded that their
boards were moving from operational to more
strategic issues. Allocating resources on the basis of
objectives and results was also very likely to
happen in the authorities. Regional tourism
authorities were not likely to meet formally with
their parent department, communicating
principally with Fáilte Ireland instead. The
achievement and reporting of results provided a
main focus at such meetings.
City and county development boards display
minimum strategic HR autonomy and low levels of
HR autonomy for individual staff. Budgets for city
and county development boards tend to be small
and are normally transferred from local authorities.
They have no financial autonomy. Within their co-
ordinating role, city and county development
boards have maximum policy autonomy, and report
having a large degree of discretion over deciding on
target groups and policy instruments. A large
minority of the boards do not produce annual
reports. Almost all of the boards report having
freedom to set their goals. A large number have over
fifty performance indicators in their strategy
statement, although many also noted the number of
indicators had decreased. They are the only sub-
sector where more of their indicators measured
qualitative rather than quantitative results. City and
county development boards have relatively large
average board sizes of twenty-three members. The
performance of the local authority officer (normally
the director of service) who works with the board is
evaluated by the city or county manager. City and
county development boards tend not to formally
meet with the Department of the Environment,
Heritage and Local Government.
A large number of city and county childcare
committees report being able to set staff numbers
without ministerial or departmental influence.
Combining their results reveals that they have
moderate levels of strategic HR autonomy and high
levels of HR autonomy for individual staff. City and
county childcare committees derive most of their
income from EU grants. They have low levels of
financial autonomy but moderate policy autonomy.
Indicators play an important role in their
relationship with their parent body and tended to
focus mainly on the use of resources, activities and
tasks, and quantitative results. A majority of
respondents noted that sanctions existed for them
for not meeting targets. Their boards and
management are very likely to use internal
reporting and evaluation systems to enable results
assessment. A large majority responded that they
report on non-financial results at least quarterly. At
meetings with their parent department, the
achievement and reporting of results are the
principal matters, ahead of professional or
economic issues.
10.4 Findings for local authorities
Local authorities are exceptional in the context of
this study, and cannot be considered as ‘sub-
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national bodies’ in the manner other sub-sectors
are. Given their democratic mandate and
constitutional and legal obligation to provide civic
leadership and promote the ‘community interest’,
local authorities are at the heart of Irish sub-
national government. Arguably one of the greatest
challenges faced by councils is the need to
continually adapt to the range of non-directly
elected sub-national bodies operating in various
policy domains and to develop more permeable
boundaries in order to successfully operate in an
inter-organisational environment. New modes of
governance and increasing accountability
requirements can be time-consuming and a balance
must be forged between efficiency and ensuring
stakeholder involvement in various processes. The
unique role of local authorities necessitates that
different criteria be used in any analysis of what
constitutes good or successful local government.
Nonetheless, the issues pursued in this study
should inform any future consideration of corporate
governance arrangements for Irish local
government.
The limited discretion of Irish local authorities
across a range of issues, from internal HR to
independent revenue-raising, has been well
documented. Against a normative view of local
authorities as a self-financing, independent policy-
making tier of government, Irish local authorities
have tended to compare poorly. However, this study
demonstrates that local authorities are the pivotal
institutions of sub-national government in Ireland,
and are vital to the successful implementation of
many national policies. In fact, up to 40 per cent of
the new National Development Plan 2007-13 will
be delivered by local authorities. 
The study bears out the fact that much of local
authority activity is conducted within defined
statutory frameworks, and many functions are
performed according to legislative and
departmental guidelines. In fact, this seems to be
true of sub-national government generally and
many local and regional bodies are similarly bound.
However, within the aforementioned frameworks
survey responses indicate that local authorities do
have room for policy manoeuvre, customisation
and innovation. 
The fact that much of local authority activity is
established in law accounts for the fact that almost
three quarters of respondents noted that the
primary role of their local authority is the direct
implementation of policy. Also, 39 per cent stated
that regulation is their principal secondary
function. The multi-functional role of local
authorities is reflected in the fact that 
co-ordination, non-commercial promotional
development and commercial development also
feature in responses.
Local authorities display minimum levels of
strategic HR autonomy. As per the public service
generally, policy on staff numbers, salary levels and
conditions for promotion are set centrally for all
local authorities. One area where they have
discretion is in relation to staff evaluation schemes.
Almost every local authority practises some level of
internal HR management devolution. In terms of
individual HR autonomy, local authorities have
moderate levels of autonomy. Most have discretion
in relation to staff promotion, evaluation, dismissal
and appointments, but little discretion in relation to
salary and tenure.
Local authorities have moderate financial
autonomy. In the overall, local authorities source
some 56 per cent of their current expenditure from
local sources (commercial rates 26 per cent; goods
and services 30 per cent), with the remainder being
provided by way of government grants/subsidies
(23 per cent) and general-purpose grants from the
Local Government Fund (21 per cent). For most,
money from the Local Government Fund and grants
are key sources of revenue for capital and current
expenditure, with fees and charges also
contributing a significant portion of income. While
a minority of councils responded that they had
audit committees (a point also noted by the recent
Indecon report on Local Government Financing),
recent legislative changes provide that such
committees will be established in all local
authorities, starting with city and county councils.
They are also audited annually by the Local
Government Audit Service, which also undertakes
value for money evaluations across the local
government sector. New financial management
systems have also been rolled out, including the
introduction of accrual accounting and risk
management techniques.
In terms of target groups and policy instruments,
most local authorities operate within departmental
guidelines, but in general have moderate policy
autonomy. Local authorities are more likely than
national bodies to produce reports on planned
investment and are adept at producing multi-
annual business plans. They are also the most likely
of all sub-national bodies to report on work
completed and all produce annual reports. Local
authority goals are set either by the authority or in
conjunction with the Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government. A
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majority report that the number of performance
indictors has increased over the last five years. Most
local authorities evaluate their non-financial results
either themselves or in conjunction with others.
Almost half of local authority respondents reported
that some form of rewards and sanctions existed for
their organisation.
For local authorities, the city and county manager
would appear to be accountable to the elected
council for everything in the organisation, with
whom he or she works closely. A large number of
respondents note that internal reporting and
evaluation systems are being extensively developed
to assess results on objectives, and that divisions in
the organisation are managed on the basis of results.
However, only half of local authority respondents
report that resources are allocated on the basis of
results. Survey responses also indicate that local
authority management is more likely than elected
members to use internal reporting and evaluation
systems.
A variety of communication routes between local
authorities and Department of the Environment,
Heritage and Local Government are utilised. In
particular, meetings between the department’s
management advisory committee and the City and
County Managers’ Association provide an
important channel of communication. Meetings
tend to focus on the achievement and reporting of
results. Local authorities also regularly report on
non-financial results to the department.
Considerable work has been undertaken in recent
years towards improving governance in local
authorities through the establishment of corporate
policy groups and strategic policy committees. 
10.5 Recommendations for the 
11 sub-sectors
While each non-directly elected sub-sector has,
insofar as possible, been treated individually in the
previous chapters, it is appropriate here to present
global rather than individual recommendations.
Attention to variations in role, composition, levels
of autonomy and accountability practices between
sub-sectors have been drawn throughout this study
which should provide food for thought on future
reforms. Again, it must be noted that several sub-
sectors are already undergoing a process of change
and transformation. It is intended that these
recommendations will improve the corporate
governance of local and regional bodies in Ireland
as well as the future development of sub-national
government in Ireland.
10.5.1 Creation of new local and regional bodies
The bodies considered in this study have multiple
roles and duties, and an audit of these functions to
identify those that may more appropriately be
located within a single national body, including
government departments, would prove useful.
While a large number of local and regional bodies
are concerned with co-ordination, it is recognised
in the new National Development Plan 2007-13
(p.238) and National Action Plan for Social
Inclusion 2007-16 (p.79) that the county and city
development boards are ‘the key coordinating
mechanism for public service delivery at local
level’. In this respect, it is envisaged that a key
function of the development boards will be to avoid
duplication of function at sub-national level. 
A framework for clarifying what functions or
services are more appropriately performed by local,
regional or national levels of government would be
instructive. The reasons for adopting sub-national
duplicate structures instead of a centralised body
with regional offices should be borne in mind,
particularly in the context of decentralisation. To
maximise effective networking, organisations need
to adapt their internal structures and work practices
according to the task in hand. In part, the ‘cohesion
process’ currently in progress for the Partnerships
and LEADER groups within certain local authority
geographical areas provides evidence that this is
already underway. 
Local and regional organisations must also
harness their resources in tandem with other sub-
national (and national) bodies. In general, given the
wide variety of organisations currently operating at
sub-national level, and the vast array of functions
being performed by them, it would not seem
prudent to establish any further local or regional
bodies without detailed consideration of existing
structures and how potential reforms would affect
them. The diminution of EU influence (and
particularly funding) over many bodies may also act
as a catalyst for future restructuring.
10.5.2 HR autonomy and accountability
An audit of staff numbers at sub-national level
would be practical and should be updated at least
annually, taking into account seasonal variations.
It would also be advantageous to develop
guidelines for the devolution of internal HR
management in organisations at sub-national level.
Although salaries are controlled centrally, some
criteria for allowing local discretion over this issue
would be useful, particularly in respect of
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performance-related pay. Many local and regional
bodies report having considerable discretion over
hiring of staff and more organisations could be
given greater discretion to decide on staff numbers
within a defined budget.
In this respect it would be constructive to
develop a system for sharing resources in staff
recruitment within and across sub-sectors.
There should be a contract template for the
various categories of staff in local and regional
bodies, particularly those who recruit seasonal staff.
10.5.3 Financial autonomy and accountability
Given the variety of local and regional bodies in
existence, consistency around financial reporting
standards and formats should be ensured. Some
guidelines for smaller bodies would prove valuable
in achieving this.
Value for Money audits, where they do not exist,
should be introduced on a pilot basis in
conjunction with the office of the Comptroller and
Auditor-General.
Given that a majority of local and regional bodies
do not currently have the ability to move budget by
year but are expected to report on future planned
investment, the possibility of introducing multi-
annual financial packages should be considered.
Further extension of the requirement for bodies to
produce multi-annual business plans would assist
this development and the changing nature of EU
funding as a source of revenue will also require
changes in financial management arrangements.
Consideration should be given to allowing sub-
national bodies, particularly those involved in
commercial development, greater freedom to take
out loans once certain criteria are met.
10.5.4 Policy autonomy and accountability
Ensuring the coherence and consistency of national
policies at sub-national level requires high levels of
trust between central, regional and local
government. Allowing greater local discretion over
policy implementation can foster trust and improve
outcomes and can be enhanced through regular
reporting mechanisms. Consideration should
therefore be given to allowing greater involvement
of local and regional bodies in identifying policy
instruments and the target groups for policy.
Guidelines for the development and best use of
performance indicators in sub-national bodies
should be developed. 
This study has identified very little use of
rewards and sanctions in the bodies surveyed. The
introduction of rewards for performance and
financial efficiency in local and regional bodies
should be considered in the context of future public
service modernisation. Conversely, sanctions for
poor performance should also feature in any
changes in this regard. 
10.5.5 Boards
In terms of the non-directly elected bodies
considered here, there are significant variations in
board size and composition which often bear little
relation to the tasks required of them. The lack of
independent experts on local and regional boards
(when compared with national bodies) is
prominent in this regard, while other categories of
board member, such as local councillors and
stakeholders, tend to dominate. In order to address
this, some consideration should be given to
formulating guidelines concerning the achievement
of an appropriate board composition. Also, the
appointment of representatives of local and
regional government to the boards of national
bodies offers opportunities for the views of sub-
national government to be more formally reflected.
The demand on boards to become more strategic
in carrying out their work, as evidenced by this
study, indicates that particular skill-sets concerning
strategic planning are required. One method of
achieving this might be to create a database of
persons with relevant skills who are qualified to
serve on boards of various kinds. A board, or a
defined portion of a board, could be appointed from
this database which could be updated on an annual
basis. This database could be ordered by
geographical area in order to suit the particular
requirements of many sub-national bodies.
Consideration should be given to ensuring that
the Code of Practice for the Governance of State
Bodies is cognisant of the needs of sub-national as
well as national bodies.
Given that a large number of the bodies surveyed
do not have internal audit committees, and the cost
of employing external auditors, consideration
should be given by parent organisations to
providing centralised training and/or resources to
help local and regional bodies in this regard.
10.5.6 Relationship between local and regional
bodies and ‘parent’ organisations 
This study has identified a range of reporting
practices and accountability relationships existing
between the organisations under examination and
their ‘parent’ body or department. In many cases,
intermediate structures are used. It is therefore
recommended that the role and responsibilities of
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‘parent’ departments in relation to the local and/or
regional bodies under their aegis be clarified. In this
respect, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU or
Service Level Agreement) should be considered
where it does not already exist and where there are
weak statutory guidelines. MOUs are increasingly
common in Irish public administration, and are
encouraged as good practice by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development. They are
useful for managing relationships and help
establish basic principles and guidelines under
which two or more entities agree to work. 
Also, it is important to ensure that there are
regular formal meetings between the bodies and
‘parent’ organisations and that such meetings have
a clear format and purpose. Where it does not
already occur, regular attendance of senior
departmental representatives at the board meetings
of local and regional bodies should be provided for.
10.6 Recommendations for local
authorities
As indicated from the outset of this study, local
authorities cannot be considered as ‘bodies’ or
‘agencies’ in the manner other sub-national
organisations are. However, as per the other sub-
sectors, the findings presented here indicate that
some consideration be given to a number of
corporate governance issues in local authorities:
The new social partnership agreement, Towards
2016, calls for further developments in respect of
improving organisational performance and
Performance Management and Development
Systems (PMDS). These issues are closely related to
human resource functions and therefore the
possibility of local authorities developing greater
strategic HR autonomy might usefully be explored.
A more developed system of rewards and sanctions
for performance might also be appropriate in this
context.
Although many local authority functions are
statutory, more emphasis should be given to
ensuring that there is more focus on the allocation
of resources on the basis of results and greater
linkages between strategies and outputs.
In keeping with good corporate governance
practices, methods of involving elected members in
local authority internal reporting and evaluation
systems would be desirable. 
10.7 Network governance at sub-national
level
A well-known schema for understanding social
(and political) co-ordination is the distinction
between hierarchies, markets and networks90. The
study of national non-commercial bodies records
the principal features of each91. Table 10.2 describes
these principal features.
While the three models of governance presented
here are ideal types, they nevertheless provide
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useful frames of reference for the trajectory of future
reforms and developments. The evidence from this
study bears out the fact that the key elements of the
hierarchical approach feature across the range of
sub-national bodies operating in Ireland. The
organisations in each sub-sector operate to varying
degrees in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and many
elements of their corporate governance
arrangements (particularly HR and finance) are
performed in the context of little discretion from
their ‘parent’ departments or bodies, or other parts
of central government. Market-based reforms are
perhaps least evident.
However, there is also strong evidence of the
principal features of network-based approaches
emerging at sub-national level. Networks are
predicated on processes of trust and to effectively
network organisations must:
● consider internal structures and practices as
tasks no longer performed along simple
functional lines
● not seek to control all resources, instead working
with other organisations and pooling resources
appropriately 
● focus on core competencies and distinctive
strengths where value can be added in order to
provide levers of change.92
The increased use of mechanisms of consultation,
participation, co-operation and stakeholder
involvement indicate that the trajectory of
development is towards this model as opposed to
any other. It is also consistent with national public
sector reform objectives93 and the recommenda-
tions in this report are presented in this context. 
As emphasised throughout this study, the wide
variation in current corporate governance
arrangements across and within sub-sectors make
‘one-size-fits-all’ arrangements impracticable, even
if it were to be desirable. However, greater attention
must be given to the role of non-commercial local
and regional bodies in the changing landscape of
Irish public administration. It is hoped that this
study will achieve its goal of advancing consistent
thinking as to how the achievement of appropriate
levels of autonomy and accountability for sub-
national bodies in Ireland can best be achieved. 
86
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
_______________
92 Painter, C.; Isaac-Henry, K. and Rouse, J. ‘Local Authorities and Non-Elected Agencies: Strategic Responses and Organisational
Networks’ in Public Administration, 75 (2), pp.228
93 See the Department of the Taoiseach Towards 2016: Ten-Year Framework Social Partnership Agreement 2006-2015 (Dublin:
Department of the Taoiseach, 2006), pp.114-37
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 86
87
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE BODIES IN IRELAND
Australian National Audit Office Principles and better
practices: Corporate governance in Commonwealth
authorities and companies, Discussion paper
(Canberra: ANAO, 1999)
Callanan, M. “Regional Authorities and Regional
Assemblies” in Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local
Government in Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA, 2003),
pp.429-444)
Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. (eds) Local Government in
Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA, 2003)
Central Statistics Office Statistical Bulletin Vol. LXXVI
No. 3, (September 2001), pp. 649-650 (Dublin: Central
Statistics Office)
Chandler, J.A. Local Government Today (2nd ed.)
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996)
Chubb, B. The Government and Politics of Ireland (Essex:
Longman, 1982)
Clancy, P. and Murphy, G. Outsourcing Government:
Public Bodies and Accountabilty (Dublin: TASC/New
Island, 2006)
Clark, G. “Cities, Regions, and Metropolitan Development
Agencies” Local Economy Vol.20(4), 2005, pp.404-11
Coolahan, J.Irish Education: history and structure
(Dublin: IPA, 1981)
Curry, J. Irish Social Services (4th ed.) (Dublin: IPA, 2005)
Department of Communications, Marine and Natural
Resources Annual Report 2005 (Dublin, 2006)
Department of Communications, Marine and Natural
Resources Review of the Inland Fisheries Sector in
Ireland – Stage 1 (Dublin: FGS Consulting, 2005)
Department of Communications, Marine and Natural
Resources Statement of Strategy 2005-7 (Dublin, 2004)
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government (Value for Money Unit) Local Government
Audit Service Follow-up report on the Development of
Internal Audit in Local Authorities (Dublin:
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government, 2004)
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local
Government Delivering Value for Money: Service
Indicators in Local Authorities (Dublin: Department of
the Environment, Heritage and Local Government,
2004)
Department of the Taoiseach Towards 2016: Ten-Year
Framework Social Partnership Agreement 2006-2015
(Dublin: Department of the Taoiseach, 2006)
Department of Finance Code of Practice for the
Governance of State Bodies (Dublin: Department of
Finance, 2001)
Devolution Commission Interim Report (Dublin:
Stationery Office, 1996)
Devolution Commission Second Report (Dublin:
Stationery Office, 1997)
Dexia Sub-national public finance in the European Union
(Dexia Economic Outlook, November 2006)
Elgie, R. “Why do governments delegate authority to
quasi-autonomous agencies?The case of Independent
Administrative Authorities in France” Governance
Vol.19(2), 2006, pp.207- 27
Gap Gemini Ernst & Young Human Resource Strategy
Review: Future State Design Report into the Central
and Regional Fisheries Boards (Dublin: 2001) 
Government of Ireland National Development Plan 2007-
13: Transforming Ireland – A better quality of life for all
(Dublin: Government Publications, 2007)
Halkier, H.; Danson, M. and Damborg, C. (eds) Regional
Development Agencies in Europe (London: Kingsley,
1998)
Hall, W. and Weir, S. The Untouchables: Power and
Accountability in the Quango State (London: Scarman
Trust, 1996)
Hogwood, B; Judge, D and McVicar, M. “Agencies and
Accountability” in Rhodes, R. (ed.) Transforming
British Government: Volume I: Changing Institutions
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000)
Humphreys, Peter and Gorman, Patricia Information on
public sector employment and manpower (Dublin:
Institute of Public Administration, 1987)
Indecon Economic Consultants Review of Local
Government Financing, (Dublin: Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2006)
Institute of Public Administration Yearbook and Diary
2006 (Dublin: IPA, 2005)
John, P. Local Governance in Western Europe (London:
Sage, 2001)
John, P. “The Europeanisation of Sub-national
Governance” in Urban Studies Vol.37 (5-6), 2000,
pp.877-94
Jones, G. and Stewart, J. The Case for Local Government
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1985)
Keating, M. and Loughlin, J. The Political Economy of
Regionalism (eds) (London: Frank Cass, 1997)
Keyes, J. “Community and Enterprise” in Callanan, M.
and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out
(Dublin: IPA, 2003), pp. 285-98
Keogan, J. “Reform in Irish Local Government” in
Callanan, M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in
Ireland: Inside Out (Dublin: IPA, 2003), pp.82-96
King, D. and Stoker, G. (eds) Rethinking local democracy
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996)
References
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 87
88
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
Kirchmaier, T. and Grant, J. “Corporate ownership
structure and performance in Europe” European
Management Review Vol. 2, 2005, pp. 231-45
Kooiman, J. Governing as Governance (London: Sage,
2003)
Loughlin, John (ed.), Subnational Democracy in the
European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001)
Loughlin, John and Peters, B. Guy, “State Traditions:
Administrative Reform and Regionalisation” in M.
Keating and J. Loughlin (eds), The Political Economy of
Regionalism (London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 41-61.)
McGauran, A-M.; Verhoest, K. and Humphreys, P. The
Corporate Governance of Agencies in Ireland: Non-
Commercial National Agencies (Institute of Public
Administration: Committee for Public Management
Research Report No. 6, 2005)
Norton, A. International Handbook of Local and Regional
Government (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1994)
OECD Distributed Public Governance: Agencies,
Authorities and other Government Bodies (OECD:
Paris, 2002)
Office for Social Inclusion National Action Plan for
Social Inclusion 2007-2016 (Dublin: Office for Social
Inclusion, 2007)
O’Riordáin, S. Poverty and Social Inclusion: Linking
Local and National Structures (Dublin: Combat Poverty
Agency, 2006)
O’Sullivan, T. “Local Areas and Structures” in Callanan,
M. and Keogan, J. Local Government in Ireland: Inside
Out (Dublin: IPA, 2003), pp.41-81
Painter, C. “Local authorities and non-elected agencies:
the dilemmas of multi-dimensional relationships”
Local Government Policy Making Vol.23 (2), 1996,
pp.18-25
Painter, C.; Isaac-Henry, K. and Rouse, J. “Local
Authorities and Non-Elected Agencies: Strategic
Responses and Organisational Networks” in Public
Administration, Vol.75 (2), 1997, pp.225-245 
Painter, C.; Isaac-Henry, K. and McAnulla, S.
“Modernising Local Government: Micro-
Organisational Reform and Changing Local Structural
Configurations” Local Government Studies Vol.29(4),
2003, pp.31-45
Peters G.B. “Managing Horizontal Government: The
politics of co-ordination” Public Administration Vol.
76 (2), 1998, pp.295-311.
Pierre, J. and Peters, G.B. Governance, Politics and the
State (London: Macmillan, 2000)
Pollitt, C. and Talbot C. (eds) Unbundled Government: A
Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies,
Quangos and Contractualisation (London: Routledge,
2004)
Pollitt, C.; Talbot, C., Caulfield, J. and A. Smullen (eds)
Agencies: How Governments do things through Semi-
Autonomous Organisations (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004)
Price Waterhouse Review of the Organisation and
Management Structure of the Fishery Service (Dublin:
1996)
PricewaterhouseCoopers Review of Regional Tourism
Structures in Ireland (Report for Fáilte Ireland: Dublin,
2005)
Roche, D. Local Government in Ireland (Dublin: IPA,
1982)
Rhodes, R.A.W. Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The
sub-central governments of Britain (London: Unwin,
1988)
Rhodes, R.A.W. Understanding Governance: Policy
Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997)
Rhodes, R. (ed.) Transforming British Government:
Volume I: Changing Institutions (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2000)
Rubin, E. “ The myth of non-bureaucratic accountability
and the anti-administrative impulse” in Dowdle, M.W.
Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and
Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Law
and Society, 2006)
Sabel, C. Ireland: Local Partnerships and Social
Innovation (OECD: Paris, 1996)
Stoker, G. “Intergovernmental Relations” Public
Administration Vol.73, 1995, pp.101-122
Stoker, G. Transforming Local Governance: From
Thatcherism to New Labour (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004)
Teague, P. and Murphy, M.C. “Social Partnership and
local development in Ireland: The limits to
deliberation” (Geneva: International Institute for
Labour Studies Discussion Paper DP/156/2004, 2004)
Thompson, G., J. Frances, R. Levavic, and Mitchell J.
(eds.) Markets, Hierarchies and Networks, The
Coordination of Social Life, (London: Sage, 1991)
Thynne, I. “State Organisations as agencies: an
identifiable and meaningful focus of research?” Public
Administration and Development, Vol. 24 (2004)
Verhoest, Koen, Peters, Guy B., Bouckaert, Geert, and
Verschuere, Bram “The study of organisational
autonomy: a conceptual review” Public Administra-
tion and Development, Vol.24(2), 2004, pp. 101-118. 
Verhoerst, Koen and Geert Bouckaert “Machinery of
Government and Policy Capacity: The Effects of
Specialization and Coordination” in Martin Painter
and Jon Pierre (eds): Challenges to State Policy
Capacity ( London: Palgrave, 2005), pp.92-111
Walsh, J. “Local Development and Local Government in
the Republic of Ireland: From fragmentation to
integration?” in Local Economy (Feb 1998), pp.329-41
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 88
Note: The survey population for this study is derived from the database of public sector bodies compiled in
Autumn 2003 (see Appendix 2). Since then, a number of changes within this population have taken place,
particularly in respect of those bodies operating under the aegis of the Department of Health and Children,
but also including the transfer between departments of national and sub-national bodies, and the renaming
of certain organisations. For example, in the list presented here, the parent body ADM is now called Pobal.
At time of writing a comprehensive updating of the database is underway with 1st May 2007 as the base date.  
Agency Parent Body
Ballyfermot Partnership ADM
Ballymun Partnership Ltd ADM
Blanchardstown Area Partnership ADM
Bray Partnership ADM
Canal Communities Partnership ADM
Cavan Partnership ADM
Clondalkin Partnership Company ADM
Comhair Cathair Chorcai ADM
Donegal Local Development Company ADM
Drogheda Partnership Company ADM
Dublin Inner City Partnership ADM
Dundalk Employment Partnership Limited ADM
Finglas/Cabra Partnership ADM
Galway City Partnership ADM
Galway Rural Development Company ADM
Inishowen Partnership Board ADM
KWCD Partnership ADM
Leitrim Partnership ADM
Longford Community Resources Ltd ADM
Meitheal Mhaigheo ADM
Monaghan Partnership Board ADM
North West Kildare/North Offaly Partnership ADM
Northside Partnership ADM
Pairtíocht Chonamara ADM
Pairtíocht Gaeltacht Thír Chonaill ADM
PAUL Partnership, Limerick ADM
Roscommon County Partnership ADM
Sligo LEADER Partnership Company ADM
South Kerry Development Partnership ADM
Southside Partnership ADM
Tallaght Partnership ADM
Trá Lí Partnership ADM
Waterford Area Partnership ADM
Westmeath Community Development Ltd ADM
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Wexford Area Partnership ADM
Wexford County Partnership ADM
Eastern Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Northern Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
North-Western Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Shannon Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Southern Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
South-Western Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Western Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Western Development Commission Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
Carlow VEC Education and Science
Cavan VEC Education and Science
Clare VEC Education and Science
Condae Thiobraid Arainn Thuaidh VEC Education and Science
Cork City VEC Education and Science
Cork County VEC Education and Science
Donegal VEC Education and Science
Dublin City VEC Education and Science
Dublin County VEC Education and Science
Dun Laoghaire VEC Education and Science
Galway City VEC Education and Science
Galway County VEC Education and Science
Kerry Education Service VEC Education and Science
Kildare VEC Education and Science
Kilkenny VEC Education and Science
Laois VEC Education and Science
Leitrim VEC Education and Science
Limerick City VEC Education and Science
Limerick County VEC Education and Science
Longford VEC Education and Science
Louth VEC Education and Science
Mayo VEC Education and Science
Meath VEC Education and Science
Monaghan VEC Education and Science
Offaly VEC Education and Science
Roscommon VEC Education and Science
Sligo County VEC Education and Science
South Tipperary VEC Education and Science
Waterford City VEC Education and Science
Waterford County VEC Education and Science
Westmeath VEC Education and Science
Wexford County VEC Education and Science
Wicklow County VEC Education and Science
Carlow Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Cavan Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Clare Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Cork City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Cork North Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Donegal Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Dublin City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Fingal Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
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Galway County and City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Kerry Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Kildare Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Kilkenny Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Laois Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Leitrim Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Limerick City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Limerick County Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Longford Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Louth Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Mayo Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Meath Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Monaghan Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
North Tipperary Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Offaly Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Roscommon Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Sligo Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
South Cork Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
South Dublin Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
South Tipperary Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Waterford City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Waterford County Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
West Cork Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Westmeath Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Wexford Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Wicklow Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Border Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Border, Midland and Western Regional Assembly Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Carlow County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cavan County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Clare County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cork City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cork County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Donegal County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Fingal County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Galway City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Galway County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kerry County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kildare County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kilkenny County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Laois County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Leitrim County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Limerick City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Limerick County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Longford County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Louth County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Mayo County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Meath County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Mid-East Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
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Midland Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Mid-West Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Monaghan County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
North Tipperary County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Offaly County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Roscommon County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Sligo County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South Dublin County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South Tipperary County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South-East Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Southern and Eastern Regional Assembly Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South-West Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Waterford City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Waterford County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
West Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Westmeath County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wexford County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wicklow County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Carlow County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cavan County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Clare County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cork City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cork County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Donegal County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Fingal County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Galway City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Galway County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kerry County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kildare County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kilkenny County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Laois County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Leitrim County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Limerick City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Limerick County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Longford County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Louth County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Mayo County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Meath County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Monaghan County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
North Tipperary County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Offaly County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Roscommon County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Sligo County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South Dublin County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South Tipperary County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Waterford City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Waterford County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Westmeath County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wexford County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wicklow County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
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Drogheda Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Clonmel Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wexford Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kilkenny Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Sligo Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin Tourism Fáilte Ireland
Midlands-East Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
North West Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
South East Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
South West Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
Western Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
Arigna Catchment Area Community Company LEADER II Groups
Ballyhoura Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
Barrow-Nore-Suir Rural Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
Blackwater Resource Development LEADER II Groups
Carlow Leader Rural Development Co ltd LEADER II Groups
Cavan-Monaghan Rural Development Co-op Society Ltd LEADER II Groups
Comhar Iorrais (Leader) Teo LEADER II Groups
Comhdháil Oileáin na hÉireann LEADER II Groups
County Sligo LEADER Partnership Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Donegal Local Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
East Cork Area Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
Galway Rural Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Inishowen Rural Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
IRD Dulhallow Ltd LEADER II Groups
Irish Country Holidays LEADER II Groups
Irish Farmhouse Holidays LEADER II Groups
Kildare European Leader II Teo LEADER II Groups
Laois Rural Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Longford Community Resources LEADER II Groups
Louth LEADER LEADER II Groups
Meath Community Partnership Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Meitheal Forbartha na Gaeltachta Teo LEADER II Groups
Mid-South Roscommon Rural Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Muintir na Tíre LEADER II Groups
Offaly LEADER Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Rural Dublin LEADER Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Rural Resource Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
South Kerry Development Partnership Ltd LEADER II Groups
South West Mayo Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Tipperary LEADER Group Ltd LEADER II Groups
Tuatha Chiarraí Teoranta LEADER II Groups
Waterford Leader Partnership Ltd LEADER II Groups
West Cork LEADER Co-operative Society Ltd LEADER II Groups
West Limerick Resources Ltd LEADER II Groups
Western Rural Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Westmeath Community Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
Wexford Organisation for Rural Development LEADER II Groups
Wicklow Rural Partnership Ltd LEADER II Groups
Carlow Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Cavan Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Clare Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
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Cork City Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Cork County Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Donegal Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Dublin City Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Dublin South Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Fingal Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Galway City and County Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Kerry Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Kildare Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Kilkenny Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Laois Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Leitrim Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Limerick City Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Limerick County Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Longford Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Louth Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Mayo Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Meath Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Monaghan Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Offaly Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Roscommon Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Sligo Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Tipperary North Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Tipperary South Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Waterford City Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Waterford County Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Westmeath Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Wexford Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Wicklow Childcare Committee Office of the Minister for Children
Arklow Harbour Commissioners Transport
Baltimore and Skibbereen Harbour Commissioners Transport
Bantry Bay Harbour Commissioners Transport
Dingle Harbour Commissioners Transport
Kinsale Harbour Commissioners Transport
River Moy Commissioners Transport
Sligo Harbour Commissioners Transport
Tralee and Fenit Pier and Harbour Commissioners Transport
Westport Harbour Commissioners Transport
Wexford Harbour Commissioners Transport
Dublin Transportation Office Transport
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Ballyfermot Partnership ADM
Ballymun Partnership Ltd ADM
Blanchardstown Area Partnership ADM
Bray Partnership ADM
Canal Communities Partnership ADM
Cavan Partnership ADM
Clondalkin Partnership Company ADM
Comhair Cathair Chorcai ADM
Donegal Local Development Company ADM
Drogheda Partnership Company ADM
Dublin Inner City Partnership ADM
Dundalk Employment Partnership Limited ADM
Finglas/Cabra Partnership ADM
Galway City Partnership ADM
Galway Rural Development Company ADM
Inishowen Partnership Board ADM
KWCD Partnership ADM
Leitrim Partnership ADM
Longford Community Resources Ltd ADM
Meitheal Mhaigheo ADM
Monaghan Partnership Board ADM
North West Kildare/North Offaly Partnership ADM
Northside Partnership ADM
Pairtíocht Chonamara ADM
Pairtíocht Gaeltacht Thír Chonall ADM
PAUL Partnership, Limerick ADM
Roscommon County Partnership ADM
Sligo LEADER Partnership Company ADM
South Kerry Development Partnership ADM
Southside Partnership ADM
Tallaght Partnership ADM
Trá Lí Partnership ADM
Waterford Area Partnership ADM
Westmeath Community Development Ltd ADM
Wexford Area Partnership ADM
Wexford County Partnership ADM
COFORD (National Council for Forest Research and 
Development) Agriculture and Food
Coillte Teoranta – Irish Forestry Board Agriculture and Food
Agriculture Appeals Office Agriculture and Food
Bord Bia – Irish Food Board Agriculture and Food
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Bord Glas – Horticultural Development Board Agriculture and Food
Irish National Stud Company Limited Agriculture and Food
National Milk Agency Agriculture and Food
Teagasc – Agriculture and Food Development 
Authority Agriculture and Food
Veterinary Council Agriculture and Food
SDS An Post
National Theatre Society Ltd – Abbey Theatre Arts Council
Arts Council/An Chomhairle Ealaíon Arts, Sport and Tourism
Bord na gCon – Irish Greyhound Board Arts, Sport and Tourism
Bord Scannan na hÉireann – Irish Film Board Arts, Sport and Tourism
Campus and Stadium Ireland Development Ltd Arts, Sport and Tourism
Chester Beatty Library Arts, Sport and Tourism
Fáilte Ireland – National Tourism Authority Arts, Sport and Tourism
Horse Racing Ireland Arts, Sport and Tourism
Irish Manuscripts Commission Arts, Sport and Tourism
Irish Museum of Modern Art Arts, Sport and Tourism
Irish Sports Council Arts, Sport and Tourism
National Archives Arts, Sport and Tourism
National Concert Hall Arts, Sport and Tourism
National Gallery of Ireland Arts, Sport and Tourism
National Library of Ireland Arts, Sport and Tourism
National Museum of Ireland Arts, Sport and Tourism
SFADCo (Tourism) Arts, Sport and Tourism
Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority Central Bank and FSA of Ireland
National Statistics Board Central Statistics Office
Bus Átha Cliath – Dublin Bus CIE
Bus Éireann – Irish Bus CIE
Iarnrod Éireann – Irish Rail CIE
An Post Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Aquaculture Licence Appeals Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Arklow Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Baltimore and Skibbereen Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Bantry Bay Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Bord Gáis Éireann Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Bord Iascaigh Mhara – Irish Sea Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Bord Na Móna Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Broadcasting Commission of Ireland Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Broadcasting Complaints Commission Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Central Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Commission for Communications Regulations Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Commission for Energy Regulation Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Commissioners of Irish Lights Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Digital Hub Development Agency Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Dingle Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Drogheda Port Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Dublin Port Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Dun Laoghaire Harbour Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Dundalk Port Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Eastern Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
EirGrid plc Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Electricity Supply Board (ESB) Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
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Galway Harbour Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Irish Maritime Development Office Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Irish National Petroleum Corporation Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Kilrush Harbour Authority Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Kinsale Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Marine Casualty Investigation Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Marine Institute (Foras na Mara) Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
MediaLabEurope Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Mining Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
National Oil Reserves Agency Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
New Ross Port Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Northern Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
North-Western Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Port of Cork Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Port of Waterford Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Radio Telefís Éireann (RTÉ) Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
River Moy Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Shannon Foynes Port Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Shannon Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Sligo Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Southern Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
South-Western Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Sustainable Energy Ireland Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Tralee and Fenit Pier and Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Western Regional Fisheries Board Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Westport Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Wexford Harbour Commissioners Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Wicklow Port Company Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Youghal Harbour Authority Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Area Development Management (ADM) Ltd Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
Bord na Leabhair Gaelige Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
Commissioners of Charitable Donations and Bequests Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
Dormant Accounts Fund Disbursements Board Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
National Advisory Committee on Drugs Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
Placenames Commission Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
Údarás na Gaeltachta Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
Western Development Commission Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs
Army Pensions Board Defence
Board of Civil Defence Defence
Coiste an Asgard Defence
Advisory Council for English Language Schools Education and Science
Carlow VEC Education and Science
Cavan VEC Education and Science
Chomhairle um Oideachais Gaeltachta agus 
Gaelscolaíochta Education and Science
Clare VEC Education and Science
Commission on Child Abuse Education and Science
Commission on School Accommodation Education and Science
Condae Thiobraid Arainn Thuaidh VEC Education and Science
Cork City VEC Education and Science
Cork County VEC Education and Science
Donegal VEC Education and Science
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Dublin City VEC Education and Science
Dublin County VEC Education and Science
Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies Education and Science
Dun Laoghaire VEC Education and Science
Further Education and Training Awards 
Council (FETAC) Education and Science
Galway City VEC Education and Science
Galway County VEC Education and Science
Higher Education and Training Awards Council (HETAC) Education and Science
Higher Education Authority Education and Science
Inspectorate (Education) Education and Science
Institúid Teangeolaíochta Éireann (ITÉ) Education and Science
Integrate Ireland Language and Training Ltd. (IILT) Education and Science
International Education Board Ireland Education and Science
Irish Council for Science, Engineering and Technology 
(incl. Embark) Education and Science
Irish Research Council for Science, Engineering and
Technology (inc. Embark Initiative) Education and Science
Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Science Education and Science
Kerry Education Service VEC Education and Science
Kildare VEC Education and Science
Kilkenny VEC Education and Science
Laois VEC Education and Science
Léargas – The Exchange Bureau Education and Science
Leitrim VEC Education and Science
Limerick City VEC Education and Science
Limerick County VEC Education and Science
Longford VEC Education and Science
Louth VEC Education and Science
Mayo VEC Education and Science
Meath VEC Education and Science
Monaghan VEC Education and Science
National Adult Learning Council Education and Science
National Centre for Guidance in Education Education and Science
National Centre for Technology in Education Education and Science
National Council for Curriculum and Assessment Education and Science
National Education Welfare Board Education and Science
National Educational Psychological Service Education and Science
National Qualifications Authority of Ireland Education and Science
Offaly VEC Education and Science
President’s Award – Gaisce Education and Science
Registration Council (for Secondary Teachers) Education and Science
Residential Institution Redress Board Education and Science
Roscommon VEC Education and Science
Royal Irish Academy Education and Science
Royal Irish Academy of Music Education and Science
Sligo County VEC Education and Science
South Tipperary VEC Education and Science
State Examinations Commission Education and Science
Waterford City VEC Education and Science
Waterford County VEC Education and Science
Westmeath VEC Education and Science
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Wexford County VEC Education and Science
Wicklow County VEC Education and Science
BioResearch Ireland Enterprise Ireland
Crafts Council of Ireland Enterprise Ireland
Optronics Ireland Enterprise Ireland
PEI Technologies Enterprise Ireland
Carlow Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Cavan Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Clare Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Companies Registration Office Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Competition Authority Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Cork City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Cork North Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Donegal Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Dublin City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Employment Appeals Tribunal Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Enterprise Ireland Enterprise, Trade and Employment
FÁS (Foras Áiseanna Saothair) incl. FÁS
International Consulting Ltd. Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Fingal Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Forfás Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Galway County and City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Health and Safety Authority Enterprise, Trade and Employment
IDA Ireland Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Kerry Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Kildare Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Kilkenny Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Labour Court Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Labour Relations Commission Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Laois Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Leitrim Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Limerick City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Limerick County Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Longford Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Louth Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Mayo Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Meath Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Monaghan Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
National Standards Authority of Ireland Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Nitrigin Éireann Teo. Enterprise, Trade and Employment
North Tipperary Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Offaly Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Office of the Director of Consumer Affairs Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Office of the Registrar of Friendly Societies Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Patents Office Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Roscommon Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
SFADCo Ltd (Industrial) Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Sligo Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
South Cork Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
South Dublin Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
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South Tipperary Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Waterford City Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Waterford County Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
West Cork Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Westmeath Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Wexford Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Wicklow Enterprise Board Enterprise, Trade and Employment
European Consumer Centre Enterprise, Trade and Employment/EU
Bord Pleanála Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Border Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Border, Midland and Western Regional Assembly Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Building Regulations Advisory Body (BRAB) Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Carlow County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Carlow County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cavan County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cavan County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Chomhairle Leabharlanna – Library Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Clare County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Clare County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Clonmel Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Comhar – National Sustainable Development 
Partnership Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cork City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cork City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cork County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Cork County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Donegal County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Donegal County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Drogheda Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin Docklands Development Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dundalk Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
ENFO – The Environmental Information Service Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Environmental Protection Agency Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Fingal County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Fingal County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Fire Services Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Galway City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Galway City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Galway County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Galway County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Heritage Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Housing Finance Agency plc Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Irish Water Safety Association Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kerry County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kerry County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kildare County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kildare County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
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Kilkenny County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Kilkenny County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Laois County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Laois County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Leitrim County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Leitrim County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Limerick City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Limerick City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Limerick County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Limerick County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Local Government Computer Services Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Local Government Management Services Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Longford County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Longford County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Louth County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Louth County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Mayo County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Mayo County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Meath County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Meath County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Met Éireann Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Mid-East Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Midland Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Mid-West Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Monaghan County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Monaghan County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
National Building Agency Ltd Environment, Heritage and Local Government
National Traveller Accomodation Consultative 
Committee Environment, Heritage and Local Government
North Tipperary County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
North Tipperary County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Offaly County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Offaly County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Referendum Commission Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Rent Tribunal Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Roscommon County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Roscommon County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Sligo Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Sligo County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Sligo County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South Dublin County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South Dublin County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South Tipperary County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South Tipperary County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South-East Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Southern and Eastern Regional Assembly Environment, Heritage and Local Government
South-West Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Temple Bar Properties Limited Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Waterford City Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Waterford City Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Waterford County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Waterford County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
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West Regional Authority Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Westmeath County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Westmeath County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wexford Borough Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wexford County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wexford County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wicklow County Council Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Wicklow County Development Board Environment, Heritage and Local Government
Dublin Tourism Fáilte Ireland
Midlands-East Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
North West Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
South East Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
South West Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
Western Regional Tourism Authority Ltd Fáilte Ireland
Central Bank of Ireland and Financial Services 
Authority of Ireland Finance
Committee on Top-Level Appointments in 
the Civil Service Finance
Economic and Social Research Institute Finance
ERDF and Cohesion Fund Financial Control Unit Finance
Institute of Public Administration Finance
National Development Finance Agency Finance
National Lottery Finance
National Treasury Management Agency Finance
Office of Public Works Finance
Office of the Chief Medical Officer for the Civil 
Service Finance
Office of the Civil Service and Local Appointments 
Commissioners Finance
Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General Finance
Office of the Information Commissioner Finance
Office of the Ombudsman Finance
Office of the Revenue Commissioners Finance
Ordnance Survey Ireland Finance




Prize Bond Company Ltd Finance/An Post
NDP/CSF Evaluation Unit Finance/EU
NDP/CSF Information Office Finance/EU
NDP/CSF IT Unit Finance/EU
Boord o Ulster-Scotch Foras Teanga
Foras na Gaeilge Foras Teanga
Agency for Personal Service Overseas (APSO) Foreign Affairs
DCI Advisory Board (The Advisory Board for 
Development Cooperation Ireland) Foreign Affairs
The Fulbright Commission Foreign Affairs
Irish Council for Science, Technology and Innovation Forfás
Irish National Accreditation Board Forfás
National Competitiveness Council Forfás
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) Forfás
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Agency Name Parent Body
Loughs Agency Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission
Board for Employment of the Blind Health and Children
Bord Altranais – Nursing Board Health and Children
Bord na Radharcmhastóirí – Opticians Board Health and Children
Bord Uchtála – The Adoption Board Health and Children
Comhairle na nOspidéal Health and Children
Consultative Council on Hepatitis C Health and Children
Crisis Pregnancy Agency Health and Children
Dental Council Health and Children
Drug Treatment Centre Board Health and Children
East Coast Area Health Board Health and Children
Eastern Health Shared Services Health and Children
Eastern Regional Health Authority Health and Children
Food Safety Authority of Ireland Health and Children
General Medical Services (Payments) Board Health and Children
General Register Office Health and Children
Health Boards Executive Health and Children
Health Insurance Authority Health and Children
Health Research Board Health and Children
Health Service Employers Agency Health and Children
Hospital Bodies Administrative Bureau Health and Children
Hospitals Trust Board Health and Children
Institute of Public Health in Ireland Health and Children
Irish Blood Transfusion Service Health and Children
Irish Health Services Accreditation Board Health and Children
Irish Medicines Board Health and Children
Medical Council Health and Children
Mental Health Commission Health and Children
Midland Health Board Health and Children
Mid-Western Health Board Health and Children
National Breast Screening Board/BreastCheck Health and Children
National Cancer Registry Board Health and Children
National Children’s Advisory Council Health and Children
National Children’s Office Health and Children
National Council for the Professional Development 
of Nursing and Midwifery Health and Children
National Council on Ageing and Older People Health and Children
National Disease Surveillance Centre Health and Children
National Social Work Qualifications Board Health and Children
National Strategy for Nursing and Midwifery 
in the Community Health and Children
National Treatment Purchase Fund Health and Children
North Eastern Health Board Health and Children
North Western Health Board Health and Children
Northern Area Health Board Health and Children
Office for Health Management Health and Children
Office of Tobacco Control Health and Children
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland Health and Children
Poisons Council Health and Children
Postgraduate Medical and Dental Board Health and Children
Pre-Hospital Emergency Care Council Health and Children
Social Services Inspectorate Health and Children
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Agency Name Parent Body
South Eastern Health Board Health and Children
South Western Area Health Board Health and Children
Southern Health Board Health and Children
Special Residential Services Board Health and Children
VHI – Voluntary Health Insurance Board Health and Children
Western Regional Health Board Health and Children
Women’s Health Council Health and Children
Office for Health Gain Health Boards
Rosslare Europort Iarnrod Eireann
Censorship of Films Appeal Board Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Censorship of Publications Appeal Board Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Censorship of Publications Board Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Chief State Solicitor’s Office Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Commission on Liquor Licensing Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Courts Service Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Equality Authority Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Film Censor’s Office Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Forensic Science Laboratory Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Garda Síochána Complaints Appeal Board Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Garda Síochána Complaints Board Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Human Rights Commission Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Inspector of Prisons and Places of Detention Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Irish Prison Service Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Judicial Appointments Advisory Board Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Judicial Studies Institute Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Land Registry Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Legal Aid Board (incl. Refugee Legal Service) Justice, Equality and Law Reform
National Childcare Co-ordinating Committee Justice, Equality and Law Reform
National Consultative Committee on Racism 
and Interculturalism Justice, Equality and Law Reform
National Crime Council Justice, Equality and Law Reform
National Disability Authority Justice, Equality and Law Reform
NDP Gender Equality Unit Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Office of the Data Protection Commissioner Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Office of the Director of Equality Investigations Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Parole Board Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Probation and Welfare Service Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Reception and Integration Agency Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Refugee Appeals Tribunal Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Registration of Title Rules Committee Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Registry of Deeds Justice, Equality and Law Reform
State Pathology Service Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Victim Support Justice, Equality and Law Reform
Arigna Catchment Area Community Company LEADER II Groups
Ballyhoura Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
Barrow-Nore-Suir Rural Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
Blackwater Region LEADER Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Carlow LEADER Rural Development Co ltd LEADER II Groups
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Agency Name Parent Body
Cavan-Monaghan Rural Development Co-op 
Society Ltd LEADER II Groups
Comhar Iorrais (Leader) Teo LEADER II Groups
Comhdháil Oileáin na hÉireann LEADER II Groups
County Sligo LEADER Partnership Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Donegal Local Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
East Cork Area Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
Galway Rural Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Inishowen Rural Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
IRD Duhallow Ltd LEADER II Groups
Irish Country Holidays LEADER II Groups
Irish Farmhouse Holidays Ltd LEADER II Groups
Kildare European Leader II Teo LEADER II Groups
Laois Rural Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Longford Community Resources LEADER II Groups
Louth LEADER LEADER II Groups
Meath Community Partnership Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Meitheal Forbartha na Gaeltachta Teo LEADER II Groups
Mid-South Roscommon Rural Development 
Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Muintir na Tíre LEADER II Groups
Offaly LEADER Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Rural Dublin LEADER Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Rural Resource Development Ltd LEADER II Groups
South West Mayo Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Tipperary LEADER Group Ltd LEADER II Groups
Tuatha Chiarraí Teoranta LEADER II Groups
Waterford Leader Partnership Ltd LEADER II Groups
West Cork LEADER Co-operative Society Ltd LEADER II Groups
West Limerick Resources Ltd LEADER II Groups
Western Rural Development Company Ltd LEADER II Groups
Wexford Organisation for Rural Development LEADER II Groups
Wicklow Rural Partnership Ltd LEADER II Groups
Salmon Research Institute Marine Institute
Carlow Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Cavan Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Clare Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Cork City Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Cork County Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Donegal Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Dublin City Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Dublin South Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Fingal Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Galway City and County Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Kerry Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Kildare Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Kilkenny Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Laois Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Leitrim Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Limerick City Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
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Agency Name Parent Body
Limerick County Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Longford Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Louth Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Mayo Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Meath Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Monaghan Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Offaly Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Roscommon Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Sligo Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Tipperary North Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Tipperary South Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Waterford City Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Waterford County Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Westmeath Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Wexford Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
Wicklow Childcare Committee National Childcare Management Committee
National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission National Treasury Management Agency
Foras Teanga (North/South Language Body) North/South Ministerial Council
Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights 
Commission (FCILC) North/South Ministerial Council
InterTradeIreland North/South Ministerial Council
Safefood: Food Safety Promotion Board North/South Ministerial Council
Special European Union Programmes Body North/South Ministerial Council
Tourism Ireland Ltd North/South Ministerial Council
Waterways Ireland North/South Ministerial Council
Law Reform Commission Office of the Attorney General
Office of the Parliamentary Council to the 
Government Office of the Attorney General
Government Supplies Agency OPW
Office of the Appeal Commissioners Revenue
Lyric FM RTÉ
Raidio na Gaeltachta RTÉ
TG4 RTÉ
National Microelectronics Applications Centre Ltd SFADCO
National Technology Park Plassey Ltd. SFADCO
Bord Pinsean – Pensions Board Social and Family Affairs
Combat Poverty Agency Social and Family Affairs
Comhairle Social and Family Affairs
Family Support Agency Social and Family Affairs
Pensions Ombudsman Social and Family Affairs
Reach Social and Family Affairs
Social Welfare Appeals Office Social and Family Affairs
Social Welfare Tribunal Social and Family Affairs
Central Statistics Office Taoiseach
Information Society Commission Taoiseach
National Centre for Partnership and Performance Taoiseach
National Economic and Social Council Taoiseach
National Economic and Social Development Office Taoiseach
National Economic and Social Forum Taoiseach
North/South Ministerial Council – Joint Secretariat Taoiseach
Aer Lingus Group plc Transport
Aer Rianta cpt Transport
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Agency Name Parent Body
CIÉ – Coras Iompair Éireann Transport
Commission for Aviation Regulation Transport
Dublin Transportation Office Transport
Irish Aviation Authority Transport
Medical Bureau of Road Safety Transport
National Roads Authority Transport
National Safety Council Transport
Railway Procurement Agency Transport
Arramara Teo Údarás na Gaeltachta
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Strategic HR autonomy
This measures combinations of the ability of local
and regional bodies to decide on strategic general
policy in relation to staff numbers, staff
appointments/selection procedures, staff salary
levels, conditions for promotion, staff tenure, staff
evaluation schemes and general criteria for
dismissal (see question 13 of the questionnaire, in
Appendix 5). The score is based on a matrix
developed by the Instituut voor de Overheid for
their 2002 study of Belgian public bodies. It ranges
from those public bodies which are able to decide
on all of the above issues without ministerial/
departmental influence and who therefore have
maximum strategic HR autonomy; to those who are
unable to decide on any of these issues
independently and which therefore have no
strategic HR autonomy. 
The scores for each answer are as follows:
● Yes – 1
● No – 2
● Maximum total possible (there are seven
variables) = 14 (no strategic HR autonomy)
● Minimum total possible = 7 (maximum 
strategic HR autonomy)
Ranked scores:
● 14 – no strategic HR autonomy
● 12/13 – minimum strategic HR autonomy
● 11 – low strategic HR autonomy
● 9/10 – moderate strategic HR autonomy
● 8 – high strategic HR autonomy
● 7 – maximum strategic HR autonomy
For each of the sub-sectors, the unit of
measurement is the modal response to each
question for the sub-sector, i.e. the most common
response by the organisations in a particular
grouping such as enterprise boards. Where two or
more equal modal responses were recorded, an
average result is used.
General HR autonomy for individual staff
This measures combinations of the ability of
agencies to decide on HR conditions for individual
members of staff, in relation to salary, promotion,
tenure, evaluation, dismissals and appointments
(see question 14 of the questionnaire). The scores
allocated for each answer were as follows:
● Yes for all staff – 1
● Yes for most staff – 2
● Yes for some staff – 3
● No – 4
● Maximum total possible (there are six 
variables) = 24 (no HR autonomy for individual
staff)
● Minimum total possible = 6 (maximum HR
autonomy for individual staff)
As the agencies could provide a range of answers,
the ranked scores were therefore as follows:
● 6 – maximum HR autonomy for individual staff
● 7-12 – high HR autonomy for individual staff
● 13-17 – moderate HR autonomy for individual
staff
● 18-23 – low HR autonomy for individual staff
● 24 – no HR autonomy for individual staff
Again, for each of the sub-sectors, the unit of
measurement is the modal response to each
question for the sub-sector, i.e. the most common
response by the organisations in a particular
grouping. Where two or more equal modal
responses were recorded, an average result is used. 
Financial autonomy
This measures combinations of the ability of
agencies to be able to take out loans, set charges,
shift budget allocations by function and shift
budget allocations by year (see question 15 of the
questionnaire). The scores allocated for each
answer were as follows:
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● Yes, can decide without ministerial/
departmental approval – 1
● Can decide with ministerial/departmental
approval – 2
● Cannot decide – 3
● Maximum total possible (there are four variables)
= 4 (maximum financial autonomy)
● Minimum total possible = 12 (no financial
autonomy)
As the agencies could provide a range of answers,
the ranked scores were therefore as follows:
● 4 – maximum financial autonomy 
● 5-6 – high financial autonomy 
● 7-8 – moderate financial autonomy 
● 9-11 – low financial autonomy 
● 12 – no financial autonomy 
Again, for each of the sub-sectors, the unit of
measurement is the modal response to each
question for the sub-sector, i.e. the most common
response by the organisations in a particular
grouping. Where two or more equal modal
responses were recorded, an average result is used. 
Policy autonomy
This matrix measures the autonomy of the agency
in relation to its choice of target group and policy
instruments (see question 16 and 17 of the
questionnaire). The scores for each answer were as
follows:
● Agency decides, little or no departmental/
ministerial involvement – 1
● Agency decides following consultation with
department/minister – 2
● Agency decides within conditions set by
department /minister – 3
● Department/minister decides following consulta-
tion with agency – 4 
● Department/minister decides, agency not
involved – 5
In some cases, these conditions were set by
legislation. In this case, the score given is 3, the
median score for autonomy, as in this case neither
the agency nor the department had autonomy over
each other. 
● Maximum total possible (there are two variables)
= 2 (maximum autonomy)
● Minimum total possible = 10 (no autonomy)
The ranked scores are therefore:
● 2 – maximum policy autonomy 
● 3-4 – high policy autonomy
● 5-6 – moderate policy autonomy
● 7-8 – low policy autonomy
● 9 – minimum policy autonomy
● 10 – no policy autonomy 
For each of the sub-sectors, the unit of
measurement is the modal response to each
question for the sub-sector, i.e. the most common
response by the organisations in a particular
grouping. Where two or more equal modal
responses were recorded, an average result is used.
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Letter to respondents: 
Dear X
Re: Corporate governance of Irish public sector
bodies
I am writing to you about the second phase of a
research programme on the governance and
accountability of Irish public sector bodies94 which
is being undertaken by Committee for Public
Management Research (CPMR – for more informa-
tion, see http://www.cpmr.gov.ie/). The first phase
of this study, which focused on national level
bodies, was published last Autumn95. This
programme of research provides a valuable resource
by mapping the development of Irish public sector
bodies and identifying best practice on their
governance. 
The Institute of Public Administration (IPA) is
carrying out this study on behalf of the CPMR (for
information on the Institute, see www.ipa.ie). The
IPA has developed the study in partnership with
the Instituut voor de Overheid (Public Management
Institute), of the Catholic University of Leuven. It is
part of a major international study of state
organisations, including those in Flanders
(Belgium), Norway, Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands. This original, cross-national research
provides a valuable resource not only for mapping
the development of Irish public sector bodies and
identifying best practice on our governance
arrangements but also for benchmarking Irish
experience with that in other public administra-
tions. In order to achieve this, the study’s definition
of public sector bodies is specifically wider than
that which we would often use in Ireland in order
to ensure international comparability. 
A key task of this second phase of the Irish study
is to assess systems of autonomy and accountability
within non-commercial public sector bodies
operating at regional and local level. To do so, a
questionnaire survey has been designed, which we
are inviting you to complete for your organisation,
by Monday 20 March 2006. Your answers will be
strictly confidential, and will be reported in a way
that will not reveal the identity of your
organisation. The aggregate findings of the survey
will form a major part of a CPMR report on the
governance of Irish public sector bodies, to be
published later in 2006. In the meantime, all those
who complete the questionnaire will receive a copy
of the summary findings from the survey, as well as
a copy of the final CPMR report.
The questionnaire is web based, and to be
completed on-line. This enhances data collection
and analysis, and also greatly assists confidentiality
of the information, as only personnel in the
Research Division of the IPA will be issued with
passwords to access the data. The questionnaire is
being hosted on the server of the Institut voor
Overheid of the Catholic University of Leuven, and
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4
Sample cover letter and Questionnaire
_______________
94 A public sector body is defined as one that has the following characteristics:
Performs some public function
Is structurally differentiated from other organisations
Has some capacity for autonomous decision-making
Has some expectation of continuity over time
Has some personnel and
Has some financial resources
Altogether, 601 such organizations have been identified in Ireland. 
95 The corporate governance of agencies in Ireland: Non-commercial national agencies
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If for any reason you are not able to access this
web-page, please contact Jeanette Mair at
jmair@ipa.ie or 01-240 3760 and we will forward a
PDF version of the questionnaire to you, which you
can complete and return to us in either electronic or
paper format. For any other queries, suggestions or
assistance in completing the questionnaire, please
contact me at mmaccarthaigh@ipa.ie or 01-2403758;
or Dr Peter Humphreys at phumphreys@ipa.ie or at
01-240 3755.
As I am sure you appreciate, best practice needs
to be underpinned by the most accurate and
comprehensive information available. With your
support, we are confident that the results of this
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Section one   
Respondent information 
Organisation name (text answer)______________________
___________________________________________________
What is your function in the organisation? 
(please select one option)  
— CEO or equivalent    ______
— Company secretary or equivalent  ______
— Financial director    ______
— HR director     ______
— Senior manager/Director of Service  ______
— other (please specify) __________________________
The Organisation  
1. What Government Department/body is your
organisation directly under the aegis of? 
(text answer) ____________________________________
2. What is the policy field in which your organisation
operates? (please select up to two options) 
— education    ______
— enterprise    ______
— environment    ______
— equality    ______
— infrastructure    ______
— natural resources   ______
— local development   ______
— social service    ______
— training    ______
— other, please specify ___________________________
3. What are the primary and secondary functions of the
organisation? (please select one option for 'primary'
and one for 'secondary') 
Primary Secondary 
— to advise           _________    _________
— direct implementation 
of policy    _________    _________
— provision of information _________    _________
— commercial development _________    _________
— promotional (non-
commercial) development _________    _________
— co-ordination _________    _________
— regulation _________    _________
— other, please specify ___________________________
4. In what year was your organisation established in its
present form? (text answer) _______________________
5. Did the organisation exist in a previous form?
(please select one answer) 
— Yes  
— No     If no, please proceed to question 7  
6. If yes, what organisation/s preceded it and
approximately when were they set up? (text answer) 
___________________________________________________
7. What was the influence of the EU in the
organisation’s [current] form? (please select one
option)   
— strong influence  ______
— some influence  ______
— no influence    ______
If no influence, please proceed to qn. 9  
8. If there was EU influence, what was this due to?
(please select one option)  
— EU legislation ______
— EU funding ______
— both ______
— other, please specify ___________________________
9. Under what type of legislation was the organisation
set up? (please select one option) 
— Irish Act ______
— Irish statutory instrument    ______
— EU legislation   ______
— other, please specify ___________________________
— Not applicable   ______
10. What is the legal status of the organisation? (please
select one option)  
— private company    ______
— public company    ______
— statutory corporation  ______
— corporate body ______
— other, please specify ___________________________
— don’t know   ______
— not applicable   ______
11. What were the employee numbers (full-time
equivalents) at the end of 2005? (text answer) 
________________________________________________
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Questionnaire on the governance and accountability of Irish public sector bodies  
Contact details for further information. For any queries you may have in completing this questionnaire,
please contact the survey manager Dr Muiris MacCarthaigh, at mmaccarthaigh@ipa.ie, or 01-240 3758 or Dr
Peter Humphreys, at phumphreys@ipa.ie, or 01-240 3755.  
Thank you.
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 113
Section two – Autonomy   
13. Human Resources – is the organisation able to set
general policy for the organisation on the following,
without Ministerial/Departmental influence? (please
select one option for each item) 
— Staff numbers yes    no    N/A 
— Staff appointment/
selection procedures yes    no    N/A
— Staff salary levels     yes    no    N/A 
— Conditions for promotion yes    no    N/A
— Staff tenure yes    no    N/A
— Staff evaluation schemes yes    no    N/A
— General criteria for 
dismissal yes    no    N/A
14. Human Resources – is the organisation able to
decide on the following for individual members of
staff, without Ministerial/Departmental influence? 
— Salary (please select one option)  
■ yes for all staff 
■ yes for most staff  
■ yes for some staff   
■ no  
■ N/A  
— Promotion (please select one option)  
■ yes for all staff 
■ yes for most staff  
■ yes for some staff   
■ no  
■ N/A  
— Tenure (please select one option)  
■ yes for all staff 
■ yes for most staff  
■ yes for some staff   
■ no  
■ N/A  
— Staff evaluation (please select one option)  
■ yes for all staff 
■ yes for most staff  
■ yes for some staff   
■ no  
■ N/A  
— Dismissals (please select one option)  
■ yes for all staff 
■ yes for most staff  
■ yes for some staff   
■ no  
■ N/A
— Appointment 
■ yes for all staff 
■ yes for most staff  
■ yes for some staff   
■ no  
■ N/A
15. Finance – Can the organisation do the following: 
— Take out loans (please select one answer)
■ Yes, fully without conditions set by
Minister/Department and without prior
approval from Minister/Department 
■ Yes, within conditions set by




— Set charges for services (please select one answer)  
■ Yes, fully without conditions set by
Minister/Department and without prior
approval from Minister/Department 
■ Yes, within conditions set by




— Shift budget allocations between different
functions (please select one answer)  
■ Yes, fully without conditions set by
Minister/Department and without prior
approval from Minister/Department 
■ Yes, within conditions set by




— Shift budget allocations between years (please
select one answer)  
■ Yes, fully without conditions set by
Minister/Department and without prior
approval from Minister/Department 
■ Yes, within conditions set by
Minister/Department or with prior approval
from Minister/Department 
■ No 
■ N/A  
16. Policy – how does the organisation decide on the
target group for its actions/functions? (please select
one option) 
— Organisation takes most of the decisions itself,
Minister/Department are not or only slightly
involved in the decision making process and sets
few restrictions 
— Organisation takes most of the decisions itself,
following consultation with the
Minister/Department 
— Organisation takes most of the decisions itself
under conditions or restrictions set by the
Minister/Department 
— The Minister/Department takes most of the
decisions, following consultation with the
organisation
— The Minister/Department takes most of the
decisions, independently of the organisation 
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— Most of the decisions are set by legislation instead
of being taken by the Minister/ Department or by
the organisation itself
— Other, please specify __________________________
— Not applicable
17. How does the organisation decide on the policy
instruments whereby it delivers its functions?
(please select one option) 
— Organisation takes most of the decisions itself,
Minister/Department are not or only slightly
involved in the decision making process and sets
few restrictions 
— Organisation takes most of the decisions itself,
following consultation with the
Minister/Department 
— Organisation takes most of the decisions itself
under conditions or restrictions set by the
Minister/Department 
— The Minister/Department takes most of the
decisions, following consultation with the
organisation  
— The Minister/Department takes most of the
decisions, independently of the organisation 
— Most of the decisions are set by legislation instead
of being taken by the Minister/Department or by
the organisation itself
— Other, please specify __________________________
— Not applicable
Section three – Accountability and
responsibility 
18. Does the organisation have a board (or council)
which is responsible for overseeing the direction and
delivery of the organisation’s performance? (please




If the answer is no or N/A – please skip to
question 21  
19. If yes to question 20, who appoints the
board/council members? (please select all relevant
options)  
— Minister alone 
— Minister after formal/informal consultation with
organisation 
— Minister after nomination by and/or consultation
with stake holders 
— Members appointed by election 
— Members appointed by stake holders
— Other, please specify __________________________
20. How many board (or council) members are there
from the following groups, and how many of these
have voting rights?  
Type of Number Number





— Central  Government 
reps   ______ ______
— Other Governmental 
reps   ______ ______    
— Representatives of
trade unions  ______ ______ 
— Reps of employer 
organisations  ______ ______ 
— Employees of the 
organisation  ______ ______ 
— Representatives of 
stakeholders   ______ ______ 
— Independent experts   ______ ______ 
— Elected members    ______ ______ 
— Other, please specify __________________________
21. Has the board/council/organisation established an
audit committee? (please select one option)  
—yes ______
—no ______
— N/A.  ______
If the answer is no or N/A – please skip to question
24
22. If yes, how many members does the audit committee
have? (text answer) 
________________________________________________
23. And how many members have expertise in the
following? 
— audit & accounting 
— general management 
— other     
24. Does the organisation publish an annual report?
(please select one option) 
— yes ______
— no  ______
25. Is there a code of business conduct defining the
standards of behaviour to which board/council
members are to subscribe? (please select one option) 
— yes ______
— no  ______
26. Is there a code of business conduct defining the
standards of behaviour to which employees of the
organisation are to subscribe? (please select one
option) 
— yes ______
— no  ______
27. Does the organisation use the following? (please
select one option)  
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— an external audit service ______
— an internal audit service ______
— both  ______
— none of these  ______
28. If the organisation uses an external audit service, in
what year was the last external audit carried out? 
(text answer) ____________________________________
29. Which of the following are considered in either the
external or internal audit process? (please select all
options which apply) 
— Financial results   ______
— Organisational results   ______
— Legality and compliance  ______
— Internal control systems  ______
— Other, please specify __________________________
30. Has your organisation been the subject of an ad
hoc/non-routine audit within the last five years?
(please select all options which apply) 
— No ______
— Yes, and we carried this audit out 
internally ______
— Yes, and we contracted another body 
to carry out this audit ______
— Yes, and this audit was carried out by
another Government body (e.g. Local 
Government Management Services Board) ______
— Yes, and this audit was carried out 
by a body linked to the Oireachtas 
(e.g. Public Accounts Committee) ______
— Yes, and this audit was carried out by an
organisation commissioned by an 
overseeing authority ______
31. What are the primary and secondary sources of the
organisation's income? (please select one option for
'primary' and one option for 'secondary') 
Primary Secondary
— Direct budget allocation 
from Government   _________    _________
— Transfers from other 
Government budgets   _________    _________
— EU funding       _________    _________
— Fees/charges       _________    _________
— Gifts/sponsorship/
membership     _________    _________
— Other (please specify)    _________    _________
32. Who appoints the CEO or equivalent? (please select
one option) 
— The board/council ______
— The board/council after nomination by or
consultation with the organisation ______
— The Government or Minister ______
— The Government or Minister after 
nomination by or consultation 
with the organisation ______
— Other, please specify __________________________
33. Is the specific role of the CEO or equivalent recorded
in writing? (please select one option) 
— Yes ______
— No  ______
34. Is the specific accountability of the CEO or
equivalent recorded in writing? (please select one
option) 
— Yes ______
— No  ______
35. What is the CEO or equivalent accountable for?
(please select relevant answers for each option) 
— Results Yes    No    N/A 
— Functioning of organisation Yes    No    N/A 
— Administration of budget Yes    No    N/A
— Compliance with rules and 
regulations Yes    No    N/A
— Other Yes    No    N/A
— None of these Yes    No    N/A
36. On what type of contract is the CEO or equivalent
appointed? (please select one option) 
— Permanent ______
— Fixed term ______
37. By whom is the CEO or equivalent evaluated?
(please select all relevant options) 
— Minister ______
— The Board/Council ______
— Dáil ______
— Other, please specify __________________________
— N/A ______
Section four – Accountability and direction  
38. Does the organisation produce a document which
goes to Government and which specifies the
following? (please select one option for each item) 
— strategy Yes    No    N/A
— objectives Yes    No    N/A
— planned investment Yes    No    N/A
— financial targets Yes    No    N/A
— non-financial targets Yes    No    N/A
39. Does the organisation report in a document which
goes to Government on how it has delivered on the
following? (please select one option for each item) 
— strategy Yes    No    N/A
— objectives Yes    No    N/A
— planned investment Yes    No    N/A
— financial targets Yes    No    N/A
— non-financial targets Yes    No    N/A
40. Are the goals of the organisation set in qualitative or
quantitative terms? (please select one option) 
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— Qualitative  ______
— Quantitative  ______
— Both   ______
41. Is the organisation involved in the setting 
of goals? (please select one option) 
— Yes, we set goals ourselves  ______
— The organisation sets the goals in 
co-operation with the parent body/
Department ______
— The parent body/Department 
determines the goals in co-operation 
with the organisation ______
— No, the parent body/Department set 
the goals on their own  ______
42. To make goals measurable, indicators are 
used. To what extent are the following 
factors measured with the indicators used? 
(please select one answer for each type) 
To a large To some Not 
extent extent at all 
— Effects on society      ______ ______ ______
— Quality of services     ______ ______ ______
— Use of resources      ______ ______ ______
— Activities & task 
performance    ______ ______ ______
— Quantitative results     ______ ______ ______
— Qualitative results     ______ ______ ______
43. How many indicators are there in the 
organisation's strategy statements? 
(please select one option) 
— None  ______
— 10  ______
— 11-20  ______
— 21-49  ______
— 50   ______
44. How has the number of indicators 
changed in the last five years? 
(please select one option) 
— More indicators  ______
— Less indicators  ______
— No change   ______
45. To what extent do the indicators reflect the 
full range of the organisation's activities? 
(please select one option) 
— To a large extent  ______
— To some extent  ______
— To a small/no extent   ______
46. To what extent are indicators used in the
relationship between the organisation and 
the parent body/Department? 
(please select one option) 
— To a large extent ______
— To some extent ______
— To a small/no extent  ______
47. How frequently does your organisation 
report non-financial results to the parent
body/Department? (please select one option) 
— At least monthly ______
— At least quarterly ______
— At least twice a year ______
— Less than once a year ______
— No such reporting  ______
48. Who evaluates the non-financial results 
of the organisation? 
(please select all relevant) 
— Organisation itself ______
— Parent department ______
— Third parties, under the direction of 
your organisation ______
— Third parties, under the direction of 
the parent body/Department ______
— Others ______
— Nobody  ______
49. To what extent are there rewards for the 
organisation when it has good results or 
reaches targets? (please select one option) 
— To a large extent ______
— To some extent ______
— Not at all  ______
If not at all  – please skip to question 51
50. If the organisation is rewarded for good results or
achieving goals, then what form do these rewards
take? (pleas tick all relevant options) 
— Wage increase/bonuses for all staff ______
— Wage increase/bonuses for senior 
management only ______
— Greater autonomy ______
— Increase in resources allocated to the 
organisation ______
— other, please specify ___________________________
51. To what extent are there sanctions for the
organisation when it has poor results or fails to
reach targets? (please select one option) 
— To a large extent ______
— To some extent ______
— Not at all  ______
If not at all – please skip to question 53  
52. If the organisation is sanctioned for poor results or
not achieving goals, then what form do these
sanctions take? (please tick all relevant options) 
— Wage decrease/bonuses for all staff ______
— Wage decrease/bonuses for senior 
management only ______
— Less autonomy ______
117
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE BODIES IN IRELAND
01 CPMR Report Body  19/07/2007  08:37  Page 117
— Decrease in resources allocated to 
the organisation ______
— other, please specify ___________________________
53. How often are formal steering meetings held
between the parent body/Department and your
organisation during the course of a year? (please
select one answer) 
— At least once a month ______
— At least quarterly ______
— At least once a year ______
— Never   ______
If never – please skip to question 55  
54. To what extent are the following focused on during
these meetings? (please select one answer for each
issue) 
To a large To some Not 
extent extent at all 
—  Economic issues ______ ______ ______
—  Professional issues ______ ______ ______
—  Achievement/reporting 
of results     ______ ______ ______
55. How often is there informal contact (e.g. meetings
without written proceedings, or emails or phone
calls) between the parent body/Department and
senior management of your organisation during the
course of a year? (please select one option) 
— More than once a week  ______
— More than once a month  ______
— At least quarterly  ______
— At least once a year  ______
— Never ______
56. To what extent do the following happen in your
organisation? For each item, please number as
follows: 1 – they do not happen; 2 – to some extent;
3 – to a large extent; 4 – not applicable 
— Development of innovative products 
and/or services   ______
— Charging for services to customers     ______
— Multi-annual business plans      ______
— Managing divisions in the organisation 
on the basis of  objectives and results       ______
— Internal allocation of resources to 
divisions on the basis  of results         ______
— Development of internal reporting 
and evaluation systems  to enable the 
governing board to assess  results with 
regard  to objectives         ______
— Development of internal reporting and 
evaluation systems to enable 
management to assess results with 
regard to objectives   ______
— Extension of internal management 
autonomy to lower management levels 
in terms of financial management   ______
— Extension of internal management 
autonomy to lower  management levels 
in terms of HR management    ______
— Development of results oriented HRM 
(such as performance related pay, setting 
of objectives and targets)    ______
— Development of systems to calculate 
product prices   ______
— A shift in the role of the organisation’s 
board from more  operational to more 
strategic oriented control     ______
— Public reporting on the organisation’s 
financial performance  in e.g. annual 
reports       ______
— Public reporting on the organisation’s 
non-financial performance in e.g. 
annual reports      ______
— Quality standards for production/
service delivery   ______
— Customer surveys        ______
— Quality management systems 
(e.g. ISO)     ______
— Internal units that monitor quality     ______
If you would like to add any further information of
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Definitions
Public service body – a public sector organisation that
has the following characteristics: 
— Performs some public function 
— Is structurally differentiated from other
organisations 
— Has some capacity for autonomous decision-
making 
— Has some expectation of continuity over time
— Has some personnel and 
— Has some financial resources.  
Qn. 2 – Policy field
— infrastructure – includes housing, infrastructure
services, infrastructure 
— natural resources – includes agriculture, fisheries,
environment, natural resources  
— health – includes health and medical 
— local development – urban and rural  
— social service – includes charity, childcare,
children, social development, social security    
Qn 3 – Function of organisation 
— Implementing policy – e.g. direct service delivery,
or transfer of funds 
— Regulation – regulation of economic or social
issues in wider society; or regulation of the public
sector  
— Advice and policy development – providing
objective advice about policies  
— Information – collection and/or provision of
information, for public use 
— Research
— Commercial development
— Promotional – focused on developing a sector, but
not for commercial ends, e.g. the promotion of the
Irish language, or of safety, or of literacy 
— Representation – providing segments of civil
society with representational and participatory
opportunities  
— Registration – registration of professional groups,
e.g. nurses  
— Co-ordination – co-ordinating the activities of a
number of different groups or organisations  
Qn 13 – Ability to set general policy on HR – meaning
that the organisation has free choice to set general
principles and rules with regard to the use of resources
in the HR area  
Qn 13/14 - Staff tenure – i.e. length of contract, such as
temporary or permanent  
Qn 16 – Target group – groups at whom the
organisation’s policy instruments are directed  
Qn 17 – Policy instrument – instruments with which
policy is implemented, e.g. subsidies, training, provision
of information
Qn 20 – Board members 
— other Governmental representatives – e.g. those
from local government 
— representatives of employee organisations – e.g.
those from trade unions  
— representatives of employees of the organisations
– e.g. a staff representative 
— representatives of stakeholders, e.g. interest
groups  
Qn 21 – Audit committee – a committee with
responsibility for independent review of systems of
internal control and the external audit process  
Qn 27 – Internal audit service – review of the financial
management and results of the organisation, by the
organisation  
Qn 27/28 – External audit service – review of the
financial management and results of the organisation, by
an external body  
Qn 32 – CEO – the manager of the organisation, the
person who is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the organisation and thus also for
implementation of its functions  
Qn 38 
Strategy – means by which resources will be used to
meet organisation’s objectives 
Objectives – the goals of the organisation’s work 
Planned investment – investment to expand the
organisation, or to expand its existing work 
Financial targets – a specified goal in terms of finance,
e.g. to spend 100,000 euro on a specific policy area 
Non-financial targets – a specified goal in a non-
financial area, e.g. number of persons to be trained,
number of webpage hits
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